While displaying paramount concern for the poor and deprived, the Delhi High Court in an extremely learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Samarpal & Ors vs UOI & Ors in W.P.(C) 4785/2008 & CM APPL. 9216/2008 that was reserved on June 2 and then finally pronounced on July 4, 2022 has minced just no words in holding that Courts should be sensitive when the poor and deprived knock at its doors for justice. The Court said that our preambular goal is not law but justice. This was so observed while directing the Central government to provide an alternative plot of land to five slum dwellers whose houses were demolished more than 14 years ago by the Indian Railways for expansion of New Delhi Railway Station. The Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice C Hari Shankar was dealing with a petition by five people claiming that they were residents of a Shahid Basti slum cluster near the New Delhi Railway Station since 1980s.
To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by a Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice C Hari Shankar sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth most forcefully in para 1 that, “The homeless, who people the pavements, the footpaths, and those inaccessible nooks and crannies of the city from where the teeming multitude prefer to avert their eyes, live on the fringes of existence. Indeed, they do not live, but merely exist; for life, with its myriad complexions and contours, envisaged by Article 21 of our Constitution, is unknown to them. Even a bare attempt at imagining how they live is, for us, peering out from our gilt-edged cocoons, cathartic. And so we prefer not to do so; as a result, these denizens of the dark continue to eke out their existence, not day by day, but often hour by hour, if not minute by minute.”
Most exemplarily, the Bench then unfolds in para 2 that, “Articles 381 and 392 of the Constitution of India obligate the State to secure a social order in which the sacred preambular goal of justice, social, economic and political, informs all institutions of national life and, towards this end, to strive to minimise inequalities in income, and to endeavour to eliminate inequalities and status, facilities and opportunities. In particular, Article 39 requires the State to direct its policy towards securing (i) that citizens have the right to an adequate means to livelihood (vide clause (a)), (ii) that ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good (vide clause (b)) and (iii) that the operation of the economic system does not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment (vide clause (c)). Alleviation of the plight of the poor and homeless is subsumed in each of these directive principles which, though they are not enforceable by Court, are nonetheless fundamental in the governance of the country, and mandatorily required to be borne in mind by the State while making laws (vide Article 373). One may legitimately extrapolate the mandate of Article 37 to requiring the State to bear, in mind, the directive principles not only while making laws, but also while implementing laws. (Refer Minerva Mills v.UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789). Every statutory instrument, be it plenary or subordinate, is required to be so interpreted as to render it constitutional, rather than unconstitutional. (Refer Express Newspapers Ltd. v. UOI, AIR 1958 SC 578; M. Pentiah v. Veermallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769 ; State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453; Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228). Juxtaposed, these principles require all statutes, and instruments of state policy, to be interpreted in a manner which would harmonize with the directive principles of state policy, contained in Chapter IIIA of the Constitution of India.”
Most significantly, what forms the cornerstone of this notable judgment is that the Bench then minces absolutely no words to hold in para 4 that, “When the poor and deprived knock at the doors of the Court, the Court is required to be sensitive and sensitised in equal measure. The Court is required to remain alive to the fact that such litigants do not have access to exhaustive legal resources. The onus that the law places on the petitioner who petitions the Court, to positively establish every ingredient necessary to entitle him to relief has, in the case of the impecunious with meagre resources at hand, to be tempered with the conviction that, if the litigant is entitled to relief, relief should not be denied to him on technical considerations. As one of the three coequal wings of the government, albeit functioning independent of, and uninfluenced by, the other two, the judiciary is required to remain as sensitive to the call of Articles 38 and 39 as the legislature, or the executive. Law, with all its legalese, is worth tinsel, if the underprivileged cannot get justice. At the end of the day, our preambular goal is not law, but justice. Law is but the instrument, the via media, as it were, to attain the ultimate goal of justice, and law which cannot aspire to justice is, therefore, not worth administering.”
Facts
While elaborating on facts, the Bench then notes in para 4 that, “The petitioners are five in number. Be it noted, at the very outset, that the petition has not been filed in a representative capacity, and that the relief sought in the petition is restricted to the five petitioners before the Court. For no fault of the petitioners, this petition has lingered in this Court for 13 years since it was filed. Issuance of omnibus directions, at this distance of time, in respect of persons who may not have chosen to approach the Court, would be neither practical nor practicable.”
For sake of clarity, the Bench then specifies in para 5 that, “This judgment would also, therefore, apply in its operation to the five petitioners in this petition, and to no one else.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 6 that, “The petitioners claim to have been residing in the Shahid Basti jhuggi (slum) cluster, near the New Delhi Railway Station, since the 1980s, which falls in the Nabi Karim electoral constituency. They claim that their names were entered in the Electoral Register and that they were also exercising voting rights. They also claim to be in possession of ration cards and/or other documents which would establish their claim that, since the 1980s, they had been residing in the Shahid Basti slum colony.”
As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 7 that, “In 2002-2003, the Railways, who were seeking to convert the New Delhi Railway Station into a “world-class” railway station and, for that purpose, to increase the number of platforms from 9 to 16, desired to acquire the land on which the petitioners were situated. The petitioners aver that, for this purpose and at the behest of the Railways, they shifted to another location on the opposite side of the tracks, situated at Lahori Gate, and set up a slum colony there. The name of the slum colony, it is stated, remained the same, i.e. Shahid Basti.”
As we see, the Bench then states in para 8 that, “The Railways have, in an Additional Affidavit filed by them pursuant to orders passed by this Court, acknowledged the fact that, during the exercise of increasing the number of platforms in the New Delhi Railway Station in 2003, they had to remove the jhuggis in the Shahid Basti below the foot over bridge and shift them to the Lahori Gate side. Though they contend that only 10 to 15 jhuggis were so shifted, the petitioners, in their response to the additional affidavit, dispute this figure and assert that their jhuggis were amongst those which were so relocated.”
To be sure, the Bench then mentions in para 9 that, “Continuing expansion and modernisation of the New Delhi Railway Station required the Railways to clear the area at the Lahori Gate side as well. Accordingly, after issuing notices, to the residents of the jhuggis situated in the area on 16th May, 2008 and 27th May, 2008, the Railways proceeded to demolish the jhuggis on 14th June, 2008, and evict the petitioners therefrom.”
Truth be told, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “Admittedly, the slum cluster at the Lahori Gate side, in which the petitioners were residing when they were evicted in 2008, prompting them to approach this Court, was set up only in 2003, after the petitioners were evicted from the slum cluster in their occupation on the opposite side of the tracks.”
Most remarkably, the Bench enunciates in para 46 that, “Jhuggis, it must be remembered, are not structures of cement and concrete. Jhuggi dwellers represent a shifting, nomadic, populace. Rarely is it that jhuggi dwellers can claim to permanently establish themselves at any particular site. They are often uprooted from the place where the place where they dwell, and shifted, perforce and often against their will, elsewhere. Hounded by poverty and penury, they have no option but to comply. Slum dwellers do not stay in slums out of choice. Their choice of residence is a last ditch effort at securing, for themselves, what the Constitution regards as an inalienable adjunct to the right to life under Article 21, viz. the right to shelter and a roof over their heads. As to whether the roof provides any shelter at all is, of course, another matter altogether.”
Conclusion
Most forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 52 that, “I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the sole stand on which learned Counsel for the respondents rest their case, i.e., that the jhuggi, at the Lahori Gate side of the railway tracks, from where the petitioners were uprooted, having come into existence only in 2003, the petitioners were not entitled to the benefit of the Relocation Policy by virtue of the concluding stipulation in para 6 thereof, cannot sustain on facts or in law. If the petitioners have been residents of the Shahid Basti jhuggi in Nabi Karim, prior to 30th November 1998, they would be entitled to the benefit of the Relocation Policy, even if the jhuggi at the Lahori Gate site, from which they were removed, came up only in 2003.”
Furthermore, the Bench then stipulates in para 53 that, “Subject, therefore, to the petitioners being able to demonstrate, to the respondents, that they have been residents of the Shahid Basti jhuggi in Nabi Karim from a date prior to 30th November 1998, they would be entitled to the benefit of the Relocation Policy and would, therefore, be entitled to alternative accommodation. Given the length of time for which this petition has remained pending, this right would, however, enure to the petitioners’ benefit only if they are able, additionally, satisfy the respondents that they continue, till date, to be jhuggi residents.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then mandates in para 54 that, “As a result, this petition is allowed to the following extent:
(i) It is declared that
(a) if the petitioners have been residents of the Shahid Basti jhuggi in Nabi Karim near the railway tracks or the foot over bridge at New Delhi Railway Station, from a date prior to 30th November 1998, and have been continuously living in jhuggis till 14th June, 2008, when they were removed, and
(b) if they are still residing in jhuggis as on date,
they would be entitled to be relocated and granted plots in accordance with their entitlement as per Clause 7 of the Relocation Policy.
(ii) In order to satisfy the respondents in this regard, the petitioners would present themselves before the officer, to be intimated by the respondent to Learned Counsel for the petitioner within a week with all documents in their possession, to demonstrate compliance with conditions (a) and (b) in (i) supra.
(iii) Proof of residence would be permitted to be adduced not only by Ration Cards or by Voter ID Cards, but also by any other document, issued by a public or Governmental authority, which is verifiable in nature. It would be for the Railways to verify the authenticity, genuineness and acceptability of the concerned document. In case any of the petitioners is required to produce any additional document, in the event of the documents produced by said petitioner(s) being found to be unsatisfactory, the Railways would apprise the concerned petitioner(s) accordingly.
(iv) The petitioners who are found, on a perusal of the documents and keeping in mind the observations and findings in this judgement, to be entitled to alternative allotment, would be allotted such alternative accommodation, as per the petitioners’ entitlement and in accordance with the Relocation Policy. This shall be done as expeditiously as possible and not, in any event, later than 6 months from the date of production of the documents by the concerned petitioner(s) before the Railways.”
Be it noted, the Bench then also directs in para 55 that, “As the petitioners are slum dwellers, should they be aggrieved by the decision taken by the respondents, or by any other act of the respondents in connection with the aforesaid directions, or should they find it necessary to seek any further directions or clarification from this Court, they would be permitted to revitalise these proceedings by moving an appropriate application, and would not be required to file a fresh writ petition for the said purpose.”
For removal of any doubt, the Bench then clarifies in para 56 that, “It is clarified that the aforesaid directions, and the benefit of this judgement, apply only to the five named petitioners in this petition.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by holding in para 57 that, “There shall be no order as to costs.”
All told, we thus see that the Single Judge Bench of Hon’ble Justice C Hari Shankar has not left even an iota of doubt to linger in the mind of anyone that the courts should always be sensitive when poor and deprived knocks at its doors, the court is required to be sensitive and sensitized in equal measure. It is also rightly maintained that the court is required to remain alive to the fact that such litigants do not have access to exhaustive legal resources! Of course, I am just falling extremely short of words to convey my fullest appreciation for what has been held so very courageously, compassionately and magnanimously by the Delhi High Court in this leading case.
It certainly merits no reiteration of any kind that all the Judges in India must definitely display similar such supreme concern always for those who are poor and deprived and when they knock the doors of the court with great hope that they won’t have to return empty handed as we see most commendably in this notable judgment! It has been very rightly held that our preambular goal is not law but justice! No denying it!