It is most significant to note that in a very major development with far reaching implications, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Samuel Kamalesan vs Union of India in W.P.(C) 7564/2021 & CM APPL. 23679/2021, 31825/2021 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:4652-DB and so also in 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 644 that was reserved on 4.3.2025 and then finally pronounced on 30.5.2025 while reaffirming the unity and discipline of the armed forces has upheld the termination of a Commanding Officer in Indian Army who refused to participate in regimental weekly religious parades on the ground that he belonged to Christian faith, despite multiple opportunities and counseling sessions at various levels by the superiors. We need to note that while shedding light on this, a Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms Justice Shalinder Kaur in this leading judgment held that the termination order makes it clear that the officer was resolute in his decision of not attending religious parades and stood outside the premises citing personal religious beliefs, which was corroborated by his Commanding Officer. While specifying further, the Court made it indubitably clear that the termination was based on the officer’s conduct and its impact on military discipline and unit cohesion, rather than solely on the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) ratings.
It is definitely in the fitness of things that the Delhi High Court said that it salutes and acknowledges the dedication of those who guard the country’s borders day and night in adverse conditions. It added that the ethos of India’s Armed Forces places nation before self; and certainly, nation before religion. Absolutely right!
It also hastened to add that a higher and heightened responsibility is cast on Commanding Officers to ensure that troops under their command are provided with facilities, when required, to observe their respective religious practices. It was also pointed out by the Court that, “The Commanding Officers are to lead by example and not by division; and by placing the cohesion of the Unit above individual religious preferences, particularly when commanding troops who they will lead in combat situations and war.” We thus see that the Division Bench of Delhi High Court dismissed the plea of Samuel Kamalesan challenging his termination order and dismissed him from Indian Army without pension and gratuity.
While dismissing the plea of Samuel, the Court held that while Regiments in the Armed Forces may historically bear names associated with religion or region, the same does not undermine the secular ethos of the institution, or of personnel who are posted in these regiments. The Court also said that Kamalesan kept his religion above a lawful command from his superior which was clearly an act of indiscipline. It said that while, to a civilian, it may appear a bit harsh and may even sound far-fetched, however, the standard of discipline required for the Armed Forces is different. This alone explains why adultery even though decriminalized by the Apex Court in Joseph Shine case is still punishable for those in defence forces! Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this robust, rational, remarkable and recent judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Navin Chawla for a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Ms Justice Shalinder Kaur sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the Order dated 03.03.2021 issued by the respondent, dismissing the petitioner from the Indian Army without pension and gratuity. The petitioner also seeks reinstatement in service.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench while dwelling briefly on facts of case envisages in para 2 that, “As a brief background of the facts in which the present petition arises, the petitioner was commissioned in the Indian Army on 11.03.2017 in the rank of a Lieutenant in the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, which comprises of 3 squadrons of Sikh, Jat, and Rajput personnel. The Petitioner was made the Troop Leader of Squadron ‘B’, which comprises of Sikh Personnel.”
As we see, the Division Bench then lays bare in para 3 disclosing that, “It is the case of the petitioner, that the petitioner’s Regiment maintains only a Mandir and a Gurudwara for its religious needs and parades, and not a ‘Sarv Dharm Sthal’, which would serve persons of all faiths. The petitioner, who is of Christian faith, claims that there is no church in the premises. He claims that even the written orders calling the Regiment to the weekly religious parades, referred to such parades as the “Mandir Gurudwara parade”, and even in common parlance, the term ‘Sarv Dharm Sthal’, was not used in the Regiment.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 56 that, “At the outset, we salute and acknowledge the dedication of those who guard our borders day and night in adverse conditions. The ethos of our Armed Forces places nation before self; and certainly, nation before religion. Our Armed Forces comprise of personnel of all religions, castes, creeds, regions, and faiths, whose sole motto is to safeguard the country from external aggressions, and, therefore, they are united by their uniform rather than divided by their religion, caste, or region.”
Do also note, the Bench notes in para 57 that, “While Regiments in our Armed Forces may historically bear names associated with religion or region, this does not undermine the secular ethos of the institution, or of personnel who are posted in these regiments. There are also War Cries which, to an outsider, may sound religious in nature, however, they serve a purely motivational function, intended to foster solidarity and unity amongst the troops.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 58 that, “At the same time, the Armed Forces also give due respect to the religious beliefs of their personnel. This is also recognized in paragraph 332 of the Regulations, which states as under:“332. Observance of Religions Customs.- Religious customs and prejudices will be respected. Officers will take special care that none of their acts, or of their subordinates, wounds the religious feelings of a person or violates the sanctity of any place held sacred.””
Notably, the Bench underscores in para 59 that, “A higher and heightened responsibility is cast on Commanding Officers to ensure that troops under their command are provided with facilities, when required, to observe their respective religious practices. The Commanding Officers are to lead by example and not by division; and by placing the cohesion of the Unit above individual religious preferences, particularly when commanding troops who they will lead in combat situations and war.”
Quite remarkably, the Bench points out in para 63 that, “The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the overarching necessity of a Force, which has been raised to protect the nation, is to maintain discipline. Uniformity among personnel, not only in their appearance but also in showing their respect for the religion of all, is quintessential to a cohesive, disciplined, and coordinated functioning of an Armed Force.”More to the point, the Bench mandates in para 66 holding that, “Keeping in view the above, in the present case, while there can be no denial of the fact that the petitioner has the right to practice his religious beliefs, however, at the same time, being the Commanding Officer of his troops, he carries additional responsibilities as he has to not only lead them in war but also has to foster bonds, motivate personnel, and cultivate a sense of belonging in the troops.”
Briefly stated, the Bench points out in para 67 stating that, “In the present case, the question is not of religious freedom at all; it is a question of following a lawful command of a superior. It is not disputed by the petitioner that his superiors have been calling upon him to attend the religious parades by even entering the sanctum sanctorum and perform the rituals if this would help in boosting the morale of the troops. Section 41 of the Army Act makes it an offence to disobey the order of a superior officer.”
Quite significantly, the Bench holds in para 68 that, “In the present case, the petitioner has kept his religion above a lawful command from his superior. This clearly is an act of indiscipline.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 69 that, “The Commandant and the other officers in the Indian Army, including the Chief of Army Staff, have opined that the refusal of a Commanding Officer to participate in the religious functions and ceremonies and to refuse to even enter the sanctum sanctorum, based solely on personal religious beliefs, will undermine and act to the detriment of the above essential military ethos.”
Most significantly, the Bench mandates and encapsulates in para 70 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “While, to a civilian, this may appear a bit harsh and may even sound far-fetched, however, the standard of discipline required for the Armed Forces is different. The motivation that is to be instilled in the troops may necessitate actions beyond ordinary civilian standards. Therefore, the ordinary person standard may not be truly applicable while judging the requirements of the Armed Forces. It is for the Armed Forces and the military leadership to determine what actions they feel are important for its Commanding Officers to take in order to effectively motivate the troops under their command, and what may act as a demotivating factor for the Forces or to the bond and unflinching command that the Commanding Officer must yield over the troops. The Courts cannot second-guess the same. Unless such orders are found to be manifestly arbitrary, and the compliance of the same cannot be sought, the Courts must refrain itself from judging the same applying the civilian standards.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 71 that, “In the present case, we find that the Chief of Army Staff, having considered the rank and position of the petitioner, the sensitivity of the issue, and the potential impact on the troops and the Regiment, arrived at the conclusion that the conduct of the petitioner was in violation of the essential military ethos.”
It is worth mentioning that the Bench points out in para 72 that, “The petitioner’s refusal to fully participate in weekly Regimental religious parades, despite counseling at multiple levels of command and multiple opportunities being given to him for compliance, demonstrates an unwillingness to adapt to the requirements of military service and the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the consequences of such refusal were clearly communicated to the petitioner through the proper channels before terminating him from service.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench emphatically points out in para 73 that, “While we recognize the importance of religious freedom, the petitioner's position as a Commanding Officer required him to prioritize unit cohesion and the morale of his troops. His persistent refusal to fully participate in weekly regimental religious parades, despite extensive counseling and opportunities for compliance, justified the action taken by the respondent.”
While referring to a leading case titled – “In Union of India & Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu”, (2001) 5 SCC 593, the Delhi High Court opines in para 80 stating that, “The Supreme Court has, therefore, held that the terms “inexpedient” and “impracticable” must be understood in their proper context. It has clarified that “impracticable” is not synonymous with “impossible” but refers to something that is “not practicable” or “incapable of being performed or accomplished by the means employed or at command.” The term “inexpedient” means “not expedient; disadvantageous in the circumstances, inadvisable, impolitic.” Further, the Supreme Court held that the satisfaction regarding inexpediency or impracticability involves “more an element of subjectivity” when dealing with disciplinary action on account of misconduct by the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff, particularly considering the then prevailing fact situation warranting such decision after considering the reports on the officer’s misconduct. In the present case, the prevailing facts establish that the petitioner had consistently refused to fully participate in weekly Regimental religious parades at the ‘Sarv Dharm Sthal’ despite multiple opportunities and counselling sessions at various levels; his conduct had adversely affected the traditional camaraderie between officers and troops of the Regiment; the issue had persisted without any indication of the petitioner’s willingness to comply with military discipline. As the religious sentiments and the morale of the troops were in question, the same made a formal Court Martial proceedings unsuitable for resolution. Therefore, in the specific context of military discipline and the unique circumstances of the present case involving religious beliefs and regimental cohesion, the Chief of Army Staff’s satisfaction that conducting a Court Martial would be both inexpedient and impracticable, given the sensitive nature of the religious issue, appears well-founded.”
Adding more to it, the Division Bench then points out in para 81 observing that, “Further, the Show Cause Notice dated 31.01.2019 clearly mentions this aspect, and the petitioner was duly informed of the same. In compliance with the procedure laid down in Rule 14 of the Army Rules, the petitioner was given an opportunity to submit his explanation and defence in writing, which he did in March 2019. The respondent has also processed the petitioner's reply through the chain of command and given him one more opportunity to conform his conduct before taking the final decision. The case was even processed to the General Officer Commanding, 2 Corps who personally interviewed the petitioner for about 45 minutes, however, the petitioner remained adamant in his position. The Impugned Termination Order dated 03.03.2021 records that despite adequate time being given to the petitioner to reconcile on the issue and counselling by senior officers on several occasions, the petitioner remained strongly opinionated and obstinately continued to abstain from entering the Regimental ‘Sarv Dharm Sthal’ for participating in the religious parades.”
Most rationally, the Division Bench propounds in para 82 holding that, “We find that in such circumstances, a Court Martial might have led to unnecessary controversies, which could be detrimental to the secular fabric of the Armed Forces. The decision to not hold a Court Martial, therefore, appears to be well thought out and within the powers conferred on the Central Government and the Chief of Army Staff under Rule 14(2) of the Army Rules. The satisfaction of the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff regarding both the inexpedient and impracticable nature of conducting a Court Martial in this case is based on sound reasoning and is not arbitrary or capricious. As held in Harjeet Singh Sandhu (supra), the satisfaction regarding inexpediency or impracticability of Court Martial can be formed at any stage, and the power under Section 19 of the Army Act read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules is an independent power that can be exercised when the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff is satisfied that further retention of the officer in service is undesirable. The Impugned Termination Order specifically notes that the petitioner’s undisciplined behaviour was against all secular norms of the Indian Army and had adversely affected the traditional camaraderie between officers and troops of the Regiment, which would be detrimental in combat situations where rapport with troops is the most important and decisive battle winning factor. It also records that the trial of the petitioner by a Court Martial for his misconduct is rendered inexpedient and impracticable in view of the sensitive nature of the case owing to the involvement of religious beliefs. This demonstrates that the decision was taken after careful consideration of the specific circumstances of the case and the potential consequences of different courses of action.”
While continuing in the same vein, the Division Bench then further expounds in para 83 holding that, “Regarding the petitioner’s contention about tampering with his ACR, we note that while the petitioner claims that his ACR for 2017 and 2018 contained adverse remarks due to religious discrimination, and that there was tampering wherein what was shown to him differed from what was sent to superiors, these allegations remain unsubstantiated. The petitioner himself acknowledges that under Commandant-2, his ACR improved to 7/9 in 2019, which the respondent does not dispute. However, even assuming that there were irregularities in the earlier ACRs, the same would not negate the substantive issue of the petitioner’s continued refusal to participate fully in regimental religious parades despite multiple counselling sessions and opportunities for compliance. The termination order makes it clear that the officer was resolute in his decision of not attending religious parades and stands outside the premises citing personal religious beliefs, which conduct was corroborated by his Commanding Officer. The termination was based on his conduct and its impact on military discipline and unit cohesion, rather than solely on the ACR ratings.”
As things stands, the Division Bench holds in para 84 that, “The termination process followed proper procedures under Section 19 of the Army Act read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules. The petitioner received adequate notice through the Show Cause Notice dated 31.01.2019, was given full opportunity to respond, and his reply was duly considered through the proper chain of command before the final decision was rendered. The procedural safeguards envisaged under Rule 14(2) of the Army Rules have been substantially complied with.”
As a corollary, the Division Bench then holds in para 85 that, “For these reasons, we find no grounds to interfere with the Impugned Order dated 03.03.2021. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. All pending applications also stand disposed of as having been rendered infructuous.”
Finally, the Division Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 86 that, “There shall be no order as to costs.”
In conclusion, we thus see that this leading judgment by the Delhi High Court has made it abundantly clear that military code stands over religious exemptions. It was also made absolutely clear that those in defence services have to place nation before religion and armed forces are united by uniform and not divided by religion! As the discipline of those in armed forces has to be very high, those who fail to comply will have to face punishment as we see in this present case where the Delhi High Court upheld the termination of services of a Christian Army Officer over his consistent refusal to participate in the weekly regimental religious parades in the weekly regimental religious parades. No denying or disputing it!Sanjeev Sirohi
