It is absolutely vital to note that in a major development, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Ram Charan & Ors vs Sukhram & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 9537 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.5559 of 2023) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 865 that was pronounced just recently on July 17, 2025 in the exercise of its civil appellate jurisdiction has minced just no words whatsoever to hold in no uncertain terms most unequivocally that in the absence of any established custom governing inheritance, the principles of “justice, equity, and good conscience,” in conjunction with the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14, mandate that a tribal woman’s legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property. We need to note that the Apex Court thus set aside the judgments of the Chhattisgarh High Court and two lower courts that is the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court, which had dismissed a partition suit that had been filed by the heirs of a tribal woman who came from Gond caste. We thus see that the Apex Court allowed the appeal and very clearly held that, “We are of the firm view that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property.” Absolutely right!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Karol for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Joymalya Bagchi sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “The instant appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 1st July 2022 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, in Second Appeal No.465 of 2009, whereby it affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21st April 2009 passed by the Second Additional District Judge (FTC) (Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’), Surajpur, District Sarguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.1A/08 and the judgment and decree dated 29th February 2008 passed by the Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Surajpur, Sarguja (C.G.) (Hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’) in Civil Suit No.21A/08, dismissing the suit of partition filed by the appellant-plaintiffs.”
As we see, the Bench stipulates in para 3 stating that, “The short question involved in this appeal is whether a tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property or not. One would think that in this day and age, where great strides have been made in realizing the constitutional goal of equality, this Court would not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective of their biological differences, but it is not so.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 4 while elaborating on the facts of the case disclosing that, “The facts lie in a narrow compass. The appellants-plaintiffs are the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. They sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan Gond. Their mother was one of the six children – five sons and one daughter, stating that their mother is entitled to an equal share in the scheduled property. The cause of action arose in October 1992 when defendant Nos.6 to 16 refused to make a partition. The appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property.”
But the Trial Court by its judgment dated 29th February, 2008 dismissed the suit as pointed out in para 5 of this robust judgment.
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 6 holding that, “The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 21st April 2009 concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the mother of the appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the property of her father. It is held so for the reason that no evidence had been led to show that children of a female heir are also entitled to property.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “The High Court, having considered the contentions of the parties qua the first argument of custom, held that the finding of the Trial Court is in consonance with the judgments of this Court in Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta and Ors. 2008 13 SCC 119; Ratanlal v. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka 2018 11 SCC 119; and Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya (2019) 16 SCC 1. It was held that the appellant-plaintiffs seeking partition of property had failed to establish their right over such property by way of custom, showing that a female heir is also entitled thereto.”
Simply put, the Bench observes in para 10 that, “In so far as the argument of the appellant-plaintiffs that they had adopted Hindu traditions, it was held that since there was no evidence to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this contention. In terms of the above, the substantial question of law was answered in the negative.”
As things stands, the Bench then unfolds in para 11 laying bare that, “In that view of the matter, the appellant-plaintiffs are before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused their written submissions.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 12 that, “At the outset of our consideration, it is clarified that the question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way of life is no longer in play. That apart, we may also notice Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which unequivocally excludes from its application, Scheduled Tribes. It reads:
“Section 2(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.””
Do further note, the Bench clearly notes in para 13 that, “Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next possibility to be considered is that of the application of the custom. For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and that assumption was misplaced. The point of inception regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion stage, meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove otherwise. An alternate scenario was also possible where not exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the defendants then could have been asked to show that women were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 19 that, “When applying the principle of justice, equity and good conscience, the Courts have to be mindful of the above and apply this otherwise open-ended principle contextually. In the present case, a woman or her successors, if the views of the lower Court are upheld, would be denied a right to property on the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right.”
Over and above all, it is also worth noting that the Bench then notes in para 20 that, “Apart from the application of this general principle, we also find this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property of their forebears and not women, more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) states that the State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women.”
Quite significantly, the Bench propounds in para 26 holding that, “This discussion on equality under Article 14, which, needless to state, includes the aspect of gender equality within its fold will be, in our view, incomplete without reference to the first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. The object and reasons as stated in the Bill are instructive in the general sense and we reproduce the same with profit:
“…The law by excluding the daughter from participating in the coparcenary ownership not only contributes to her discrimination on the ground of gender but also has led to oppression and negation of her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the Constitution. having regard to the need to render social justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. The Kerala Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975…” (Emphasis supplied).”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench observes in para 27 that, “Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out.”
Most rationally, the Bench expounds in para 28 holding that, “Granted that no such custom of female succession could be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.”
As a corollary and far most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 29 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating very precisely that, “In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. The judgments of the Courts below are accordingly set aside to that extent. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi,
