PETITIONER:
32DHAGAMWAR NARSINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S. S. GREWAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
09/10/1961
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION:
1962 AIR 422 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 32
ACT:
Mine-Appeal-Chief Labour Officer of Company
Termination of service by company-Appeal to Chief
Inspector of Mines, if maintainab1e-Chief Labour
Officer, if Welfare Officer Mines Rules, 1955, rr.
72, 73 and 74.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was appointed as the Chief
Labour officer by the Company in 1947. In
December; 1955, the company terminated his
services The appellant, claiming to be a Welfare
officer, preferred an appeal to the Chief
Inspector of Mines under r. 74(2) of the Mines
Rules, 1955.
^
Held, that the appellant was not a Welfare
officer and as such could not prefer an appeal
under r. 74 (2). The Welfare officer mentioned in
r. 74 (2) is the same officer as is mentioned in
r. 72 (1) which rule contemplates a Welfare
officer appointed in respect of one mine. But the
appellant was an officer of several mines of the
Company and not of one of such mines only.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 548 of 1958.
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and
order dated March 27, 1957, of the Patna High
Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 315 of 1956.
B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabudhe and A. C.
Ratnaparkhi. for the Appellant
K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for Respondent
No. 1.
N. C. Chatterjee and S. N. Mukerji, for
Respondent No. 2.
1961. October 9. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SARKAR, J.-on September 25, 1947, the
appellant was appointed by respondent No. 2, the
Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (hereafter called
the Company) as the Chief Labour officer of its
collieries of which it appears to have a few, and
he worked
33
under the Company till the latter terminated his
services by a notice dated December 5,1955. On
such discharge, the appellant , claiming to be a
Welfare Officer of a mine within r.74(2) of the
Mines Rules 1955, which rule we shall later ser
out, filed an appeal before respondent No.1, the
Chief Inspector of Mines in India, under that rule
questioning the validity of his discharged by the
Company. The Chief Inspector held that the
appellant was not a Welfare Officer within that
rule and refused to entertain his appeal.
The appellant then moved the High Court at
Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an
appropriate writ directing the chief inspector to
decide the appeal. The High Court dismissed the
appellant’s petition agreeing substantially with
the view taken by the Chief Inspector. The
appellant has now appealed to this Court against
the judgment of the High Court.
The Mines Rules; 1955 were framed under the
Mines Act 1952, and came into force on July 2,
1956. We are principally concerned with the
proviso for. 74(2) but this has to be read with
r.72. The relevant portions of these rules are set
out below.
Rule 72. (1) In every mine wherein 500
or more persons are ordinarily employed there
shall be appointed at least one Welfare
Officer:-
Provided that if the number of persons
ordinarily employed exceeds 2000, there shall
be appointed additional Welfare Officer on a
scale of one for every 2000 persons or
fraction thereof-
(2) No person shall as a Welfare Officer
of a mine unless he possesses-
(Here certain qualifications are
specified)
Provided that in case of a person already in
service as a Welfare Officer in a mine the
34
above qualifications may, with the approval
of the Chief Inspector be relaxed.
(3)……………………..
(4) A written notice of ever y such
appointment….. and of the date thereof
shall be sent by the owner, agent or manager
t o the Chief Inspector within 7 days from
the date of such
appointment………………
Rule 73. Duties of Welfare officers:
………………………………….
………….
(Here certain duties are prescribed)
Rule 74.
(1)……………………………….
(2) The condition of service of a
Welfare Officer shall be the same as of other
members of the staff of corresponding status
in the mine;
Provided that in the case of discharge
or dismissal, the Welfare Officer, shall have
a right of appeal to the Chief Inspector
whose decision thereon shall be final and
binding upon the owner, agent or manager of
the mine as the case may be.
The Chief Inspector mentioned in these Rules is
the Chief Inspector of Mines in India.
If the appellant was not a Welfare officer
within the proviso to r. 74(2) as the company
contends, then, of course, no appeal by him lay
under it. He would then clearly not be entitled to
the writ he asked. The question therefore is
whether the appellant was a Welfare Officer within
the rule and is really one of construction of it.
We desire now to point out certain facts as
to which there is no controversy. First, both the
Act and the Rules came into force long after the
appellant had been appointed by the Company.
Secondly no relaxation of qualifications had been
sought from or granted by the Chief Inspector with
respect to
35
The appellant under the proviso to sub-r. (2) of
r. 72 after the Rules came in to force. Thirdly,
no notice as contemplated in r. 72(4) had been
given concerning the appellant. It appears that
the Chief Inspector found that the appellant “was
performing duties akin to those of Welfare
officers contemplated by rule 73 and he was
qualified to work as a Welfare officer.” We
propose to deal with this appeal on the basis of
these findings.
Dealing with the contention noticed by the
Chief Inspector and the High Court that a Welfare
Officer under r. 74(2) is one who is appointed
after the Rules came into force, Mr. Sen for the
appellant said that a person like the appellant
who had the requisite qualifications and was
discharging the duties prescribed for a Welfare
officer from before the Rules came into force,
would be a Welfare officer within them. He pointed
out that the proviso to sub-r. (2) of r. 72
clearly contemplated the continuance of the
service of such a person as a Welfare officer with
relaxation where such was necessary and was
granted. He also said that sub-r. (4) of r. 72 was
inapplicable to Such a person because he had been
appointed long ago and because the proviso to r.
72(2) indicated that its application was not
intended. We do not think it necessary to
pronounce on this question in the present case. In
our view, the appeal must fail even if Mr. Sen’s
contention is right and that for another reason .
We observe that the Rules do not define the
term “Welfare officer”. But we think it is beyond
doubt-and indeed the contrary has not been
contended that the Welfare officer mentioned in
the proviso to r. 74(2) is the same officer as is
mentioned in sub-r (1) of r. 72. Now it is, in our
view, perfectly plain that the Welfare officer
contemplated by r. 72(1) is such an officer of one
mine. The rule says that there shall be at least
one Welfare officer for every mine employing
between 500 and 2000 persons and this makes any
other view impossible
36
As we understood Mr. Sen, he also accepted that
the Welfare officer contemplated is one appointed
in respect of one mine. Now, the appellant was on
his own case, the Welfare Officer of several mines
of the Company and not of one of such mines only.
Therefore, we think that he was not a Welfare
officer within r. 72(1) and hence not within the
proviso to r. 74(2).
But Mr. Sen contends that the appellant might
be considered as having been severally and
independently appointed the Welfare officer of
each of the Company’s several collieries in his
charge. We think that would be an impossible view
to take. One appointment cannot be treated as
several appointments and it is not in dispute that
the appellant had only one appointment for all the
Company’s collieries.
We think that this appeal fails and we
dismiss it with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
