ORDER
Satish Kumar Mittal, J.
1. Petitioners Ujjagar Singh, Ajit Singh and Dalipa Jir Singh, have filed the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code’) for quashing of the complaint dated 14-12-1995 (Annexure P-1) filed by the respondent-Dharam Pal before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra, designated as Special Judge, under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1989’), summoning order dated 11-6-1996 (Annexure P-2) passed in the aforesaid complaint, vide which the petitioners were summoned by the Special Court for committing the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act of 1989, for using atrocious words against the complainant, and orders Annexures P-3 and P-4 vide which their applications for discharge under Section 245 of the Code, were dismissed.
2. After the summoning order, the petitioner’s appeared before the Special Court and filed applications for discharge under Section 245 of the Code on the ground that Special Court has no jurisdiction to directly entertain the aforesaid complaint without the case having been committed to it by a Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code. The applications filed by the petitioners were dismissed by the Special Judge vide its orders dated 3-5-1997 (Annexure P-3) and 2-11-1998 (Annexure P-4) by relying upon the decision of Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Hareendran v. Sarada, 1995 (2) Rec Cri R 19 (FB). The petitioners have challenged the said orders in the present petition.
3. The sole ground on which the petitioners are seeking quashment of the aforesaid complaint. Summoning order and the orders Annexures P-3 and P-4, dismissing their applications under Section 245 of the Code, is that the Special Court has no jurisdiction to directly entertain the complaint and take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed under the aforesaid Act of 1989 without the case having been committed to it by the Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code. Thus, the sole question involved in the present petition is as to whether the Special Court under the Act of 1989 has the original jurisdiction to try an offence allegedly committed under the said Act without the case having been committed to it by the Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code ?
4. When this petition was filed, the petitioners relied upon a decision of this Court in Jyoti Arora v. State of Haryana, 1998 (1) Rec Cri R 234 : (1998 Cri LJ 2662), where this Court has considered the aforesaid question and took the view that the Special Court under the Act of 1989 has no jurisdiction to straightaway entertain the complaint and summon the accused without the matter having been committed to it by a Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code. During the pendency of this petition, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the aforesaid question in Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P., 2000) 1) Rec Cri R 797 : (2000 Cri LJ 819), where police directly filed a charge-sheet against the accused before the Sessions Judge, designated as Special Judge, for the trial of offence under the Act of 1989 for committing an offence under the said Act. On the said charge-sheet, the Special Judge framed a charge against the accused. At that stage, the accused filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the charge as well as the charge-sheet on the aforesaid ground. A single Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh quashed the charge as well as the charge-sheet while holding that the procedure adopted by the police in filing the charge-sheet straightaway to the Special Court was not in accordance with law and the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any offence under the Act without the case having been committed to that Court. While upholding the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :–
“Hence we have no doubt that a Special Court under this Act is essentially a Court of Session and it can take cognizance of the offence when the case is committed to it by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. In other words, a complaint or a charge-sheet cannot straightaway be laid before the Special Court under the Act.”
5. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not approve the law laid down by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Hareendran’s case (1995 (2) Rec Cri R 19) (supra), where a different view was taken, and made the following observations :–
“The very approach of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court seems to be that there should be specific indication in the Act that the Special Court gets jurisdiction to try the offence only on a committal order, and in the absence of such specific indication the Special Court must have the right to take cognizance of the offence as though it is a Court of original jurisdiction. We have pointed out above that unless there is express provision to the contrary in any other law the interdict contained in Section 193 of the Code cannot be circumvented. Hence the reasoning of the Full Bench in Hareendran v. Sarada (1995 (2) Rec Cri R 19) (supra) is apparently fallacious.”
6. The view taken by the High Courts of Madhya pradesh (Meerabai v. Bhujbai Singh, 1995 Cri LJ 2376) Allahabad (Pappu Singh v. State of U.P. 1995 Cri LJ 2803); Patna (Jhagur Mahto v. State of Bihar, 1993 (1) Crimes 643; Punjab and Haryana High Court (Jyoti Arora v. State of Haryana, 1998 (2) All Cri LR 73 : (1998 Cri LJ 2662) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Referring Officer rep. by State of A. P. v. Shekar Nair, 1999 Cri LJ 4173) on the aforesaid question was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The following observations made by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, were held to be correctly stating the legal position on the aforesaid question :–
“We find it difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Kerala High Court in the two decisions referred to above. As already observed by us, in the absence of a particular procedure prescribed by the said Act as regards the mode of taking cognizance, enquiry or trial, the procedure under the Code will have to be applied by reason of Section 4(2) of the Code as clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement. AIR 1994 SC 1775. There is no provision in the Act which excludes the application of Section 193, Cr. P.C. The mere fact that no procedure is prescribed or specified under the Special Act does not mean that the Special Act dispenses with the procedure for committal in the case triable by Court of Sessions and that the Special Court gets original jurisdiction in the matter of initiations, enquiry or trial. There is no good reason why the procedural provisions of Code relating to power and mode of taking cognizance including Section 193 should not be applied to the Special Court.”
7. Thus, the controversy in the present petition is squarely covered by the decision given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangula Ashok’s case (2000 Cri LJ 819) (supra). In the present case the complaint (Annexure P-1) was directly filed by the respondent before the Special Judge, Kurukshetra for committing the offence under the Act of 1989, by using the atrocious words against the complainant. After taking the preliminary evidence, the Special Judge passed the summoning order against the petitioners vide Annexure P-2. The procedure adopted by the Special Judge was wholly illegal and it was having no jurisdiction to straightaway entertain the complaint and pass the summoning order on the same without the matter having been committed to it by the Magistrate under Section 193 of the Code. The orders of rejecting the applications filed by the accused under Section 245 of the Code for their discharge have also been wrongly passed by the learned Special Court while relying upon the Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court in Hareendran’s case (1995 (2) Rec Cri R 19) (supra).
8. Facing with this situation, the learned counsel for the respondent-State canvassed that filing of the complaint under the Act of 1989 before the Special Judge and summoning order passed by it on the said complaint and further the orders Annexures P-3 and P-4 cannot be quashed on the aforesaid ground, which is a mere irregularity, as even after committing of the case by the Magistrate, only Special Court has the jurisdiction to try the alleged offence under the Act of 1989. According to him, even if the complaint was straightway filed before the Special Court and it took cognizance on the same by issuing the summoning order, that was a mere procedural irregularity and on the basis of such procedural irregularity, omission or illegality, the summoning order and the complaint should not be quashed, particularly when no prejudice was caused to the accused. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent State out reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji, 2001 (4) Rec Cri R 40 : (2001 Cri LJ 4228).
9. I have considered the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-State and in my opinion the said contention is not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhooraji’s case (2001 Cri LJ 4228) (supra) reiterated the principle laid down in Gangula Ashok’s case (2000 Cri LJ 819) (supra). However, in the particular facts and circumstances of that case, it was held that when no objection was raised before the trial Court regarding filing of the charge-sheet directly before the Special Court and taking of cognizance by it without a committal order by a Magistrate and the accused were convicted, then the conviction order cannot be set aside. In that case, for the first time, the objection was taken in the High Court, where the High Court of Andhra Pradesh after setting aside the conviction, directed for de-novo trial of the case. Then, it was held that conviction order cannot be set aside only on the ground of aforesaid irregularity until and unless it is proved that the trial conducted by the Special Court resulted into failure of justice due to procedural lapses or the trial has been vitiated or some special prejudice has been caused to the accused. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has distinguished the case of Gangula Ashok (2000 Cri LJ 819) (supra).
10. The aforesaid decision in Bhooraji’s case (2001 Cri LJ 4228) (supra) is not applicable in the present case because in this case the proceedings before the Special Court are at the initial stage. After the summoning order, the petitioners appeared before the Special Court and filed applications for discharge under Section 245 of the Code on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid complaint. These applications were dismissed by the Special Judge vide orders dated 3-5-1997 and again on 2-11-1998, by following the decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Hareendran’s case (1995 (2) Rec Cri R 19) (supra). The said decision of Kerala High Court has not been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangula Ashok’s case (2000 Cri LJ 819) (supra). The facts of the case are similar to Gangula Ashok’s case (supra) where the proceedings were quashed after framing of the charge. Thus, I find no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1.
11. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangula Ashok’s case (2000 Cri LJ 819) (supra), I allow this petition and all the proceedings pending before the Special Court, arising out of the complaint filed by the respondent dated 14-12-1995 (Annexure P-1),
summoning order dated 11-6-1996 (Annexure P-2) and orders dated 3-5-1997 and 2-11-1998 (Annexures P-3 and P-4), vide which the applications filed by the petitioners for discharge under Section 245 of the Code were dismissed, are hereby quashed. The Special Court is directed to return the complaint (Annexure P-1) to respondent No. 2 to be filed by him in a proper Court. If any such complaint is filed by the complainant before the appropriate Court, the same shall be disposed of by the said Court expedi-tiously in accordance with law.
With these observations, the petition stands disposed of.