ORDER
T.N. Singh, J.
1. This is plaintiffs’ appeal and it arises out of a temporary injunction matter. Although plaintiffs/appellants are threesome, the real man who has taken up the cudgel is plaintiff/appellant No. 2 Prem Kumar Oberoi and on the other side, similarly, it is defendant No. 2, K, V. Sachdev who has to bear the brunt of the attack. Paradoxically, however, in the instant appeal, relief is claimed mainly against defendants/respondents 3 and 4, corporate bodies; No. 3, is “Press Area Branch, New Delhi” and No. 4 is “Jayendraganj Branch, Gwalior”, both of the same nationalised Bank, Central Bank of India.
2. When the suit was instituted on 16-8-1989, the Bank was not impleaded; inly on 15-3-1990, the two branches of the Central Bank of India were impleaded as defendants 3 and 4. Significantly, an order of ad interim temporary injunction was obtained by the plaintiffs on 18-8-1989 for maintaining “status quo” which appears to have been modified On 5-12-1990 in view of subsequent events impinging on rights and liabilities of the Bank. By that order, the Bank is restrained from reversing the credit for Rs. 11.33 lakhs, given to plaintiffs in respect of a transaction relating to sale of machineries by the plaintiffs to the defendants.
3. Shortly put, plaintiffs’ case was that an agreement was executed on 7-9-1987 between Prem Kumar Oberoi and Vinod Chaddha on the one side (first party) and Bharat Raj Goyal and K. V. Sachdev on the other side (second party) under which, for a price of Rs. 12,00,000/-, certain machineries (described in Schedules annexed thereto) had been sold (under terms and conditions contemplated thereunder) to the second party. Shorn of frills, the case of the plaintiffs, was for a declaration that under the said agreement, the defendants, before they removed the machineries, must make payment of Rs. 1,40,000/- together with interest thereon of Rs. 64,500/- and licence fee for the shed of Rs. 10,000/- along with electric charges – Rs. 8,400/-. Without paying in that manner total sum of Rs. 2,29,000/-, the defendant had no right to shift the machineries in question from Gwalior to Faridabad and the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction in that regard. By amending the plaint, other reliefs were added claiming that the defendants had no right to use goodwill of the plaintiff firm, Premier Auto Industries, Gwalior, and that they be also restrained from rescinding the, contract dated 7-9-1987 and from getting refund of the price which the Bankers had already paid for the machineries to the plaintiffs. The two original defendants filed jointly on 5-4-1990 their written-statement and the newly-impleaded defendants, two branches of the same Bank, filed jointly on 2-7-1991 their written statement.
4. For the purpose of disposal of the appeal, it is more pertinent to refer to Bank’s case set out in the said written statement. Indeed, the admitted position on facts is that the machineries in question were duly hypothecated by the plaintiffs to defendant No. 4, Gwalior Branch of the Bank, against loan advanced to them. At para 3 of the written statement, it is stated further that the New Delhi Branch had agreed to sanction a Term Loan of Rs. 6,00,000/- on 16-8-1989 to defendant No. 2 (K. V. Sachdev) and that Branch, vide its letter dated 17-8-1989, had advised the Gwalior Branch to give credit of Rs. 11.33 lakhs inclusive of the amount which defendant No. 2 had deposited at New Delhi and that credit was to be given in the account of M/s. Premier Auto Industries, Gwalior; and that appropriate instructions were given by the New Delhi Branch to Gwalior Branch to arrange despatch of the machineries. On account of dispute between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2, the machineries were not despatched by the plaintiffs nor were they allowed to be lifted by defendant No. 2 and instead, on 18-8-1989, suit was filed by the plaintiffs/vendors along with the application for injunction. By deliberately concealing the fact that on 18-8-1989 an injunction had been obtained restraining lifting of the machineries, the plaintiffs acted with “ulterior motive” and they “wrongfully induced” the answering defendants to give credit of Rs. 11.33 lakhs to their account on 21-8-1989 and thereafter, at 6.00 p.m., on the same date, they delivered their letter dated 19-8-1989 to the defendant/Bank.
5. However, at para 18, the Bank also asserted that credit was given expressly on the condition of “subject to despatch of machineries” and at para 20, the Bank averred supporting the case of the other two defendants that the question of defendant No. 2 lifting the machineries forcefully did not arise because that defendant had already paid Rs. 75,000/- and there was arrangement that subject to despatch of the machineries, credit shall be given to the plaintiffs for Rs. 11.33 lakhs. At paras 22(b) and 23(a), the Bank further stated that because the machineries were neither despatched now allowed to be lifted, the Bank was entitled to reverse the credit entry. The Bank prayed, therefore, for vacating the order dated 5-12-1990 and for allowing it to reverse the entry.
6. Although in this Court, Shri Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants, laid great stress on the fact that the machineries in question had been duly sold under the agreement dated 7-9-1987 and title to the goods duly passed thereunder to the defendants, I am of the tentative view that facts disclose a different situation. I am purposely refraining from expressing any opinion on the merit of the case of the plaintiffs/appellants, based on the agreement aforesaid and the contention of the learned counsel that the suit be deemed to be suit for price as contemplated under Section 55, Sale of Goods Act, 1930, for short, the ‘Act’. That question may be decided during the course of trial of the suit. For the present, it would suffice to say that the parties exchanged correspondence copiously during the intervening period (between the agreement dated 7-9-1987 and the filing of the suit) and surprisingly that exercise extended beyond too. Shri Dubey, in the course of his arguments on 4-9-1991, had drawn my attention to letters of defendant No. 2 dated 28-8-1989 and 5-9-1989 and plaintiffs’ dated 31-8-1989. Although records were called for and those are before me, but counsel had undertaken, for expediting hearing, to file copies of documents and accordingly, appellants’ counsel had filed copies of Bank’s letters (Gwalior Branch’s) dated 10-3-1989, 19-8-1989 and 21-8-1989, addressed to plaintiffs/appellant No. 1, Premier Auto Industries, along with copy of the letter dated 25-7-1989, written by K. V. Sachdev (defendant No. 2) to Prem Kumar Oberoi (plaintiff No. 2). Bank’s counsel also filed copies of documents, letters of Press Area Branch, New Delhi dated 17-8-1989, addressed to Regional Office, Gwalior and Gwalior Branch letter dated 21-8-1989, addressed to Prem Kumar Oberoi.
7. During the course of hearing, submission was made to me that the old agreement dated 7-9-1987 was modified and that there was a “new deal” in respect of the machineries in question and that was between plaintiff No. 2 Prem Kumar Oberoi and defendant No. 2 K. V. Sachdev. In that respect, reliance was placed on correspondence exchanged between parties from 7-4-1989 onwards. Accordingly, I allowed, therefore, Shri Lahoti, learned counsel appearing for defendant/respondent K. V. Sachdev, to prepare and file for Court’s use a Paper Book containing relevant correspondence and furnish a similar Paper Book to Shri Dubey for his use. That was filed on 18-9-1991 and counsel were heard finally in this matter on 26-9-1991. Copies of letters on which Shri Dubey had relied, as earlier alluded, dated 28-8-1989 and 5-9-1989, form part of the said Paper Book along with other correspondence exchanged between parties from 17-3-1989.
8. Having gone through carefully the entire material on record, I found it necessary to record my tentative conclusion that the stand of Shri Lahoti appears to be correct. In the letter dated 17-3-1989 which K. V. Sachdev addressed to Premier Auto Industries, he wrote that as machineries had not been lifted by 7-6-1988 as per agreement dated. 7-9-1987, he would like to know if any of the “two alternatives” offered by him was acceptable to the other side. The reply of Prem Oberoi who described himself as Partner of Premier Auto Industries, carried some suggestion in regard to the alternatives offered. Then, there is a letter dated 74-1989 by Sachdev to Oberoi which records “as mutually agreed”certain terms. That letter Octroi acknowledged on 14-4-1989 wherein he agreed to Sachdev’s suggestion that “the machines etc. shall be lifted under the supervision of CBI, Gwalior and may be verified by the Press Area, New Delhi Branch”. However, he suggested also that if Sachdev was not able to fix up financing by the Bank of the purchase (in respect of which new price settled was Rs. 12,08,114.48) and the machineries were not lifted before 30-4-1989, he would pay Rs. 50,000/- as damages. Oberoi writes a second letter on 3-6-1989 to Sachdev that “30 days’ time” as contemplated in his letter dated 144-1989 had expired and if the machineries were not lifted within another ten days, Sachdev would be responsible for losses, damages, etc. On 19-6-1989, Sachdev writes to Oberoi confirming terms “mutually agreed” at Faridabad on 19-6-1989 in respect of purchase of machineries which Oberoi acknowledged vide his letter dated 23-6-1989. As per new terms, time for lifting the machineries was extended upto 31-7-1989 and liquidated damages of Rs. 60,000/- for default was contemplated. The earlier term about delivery was reiterated that, “these machines would be verified by the Press Area, New Delhi Branch along with the representative of CBI, Gwalior Branch at Faridabad” and Sachdev agreed to bear the actual cost of shifting thereof from Gwalior to Faridabad. However, in his letter dated 30-6-1989 Sachdev wrote to Prem Oberoi of “the new deal”, and complained that Oberoi was backing out and suggested that there was understanding between parties that advance payment of Rs. 75,000/- would be adjusted against the new price settled. Although to that letter, Oberoi replied on 7-7-1989, he appears to have eventually accepted on 9-7-1989 Sachdev’s proposal by writing, “it was agreed that your letter dated 30th June is acceptable to us” and added, “it further agreed if you didn’t lift the machine before the 31st July, 1989, you shall immediately pay Rs. 60,000/- as liquidated damages”. On 25-7-1989, Sachdev writes to Oberoi that his Banker, Central Bank of India, Press Area, New Delhi Branch, was insisting that Oberoi should send a letter through Regional Office, Gwalior, to CBI Press Area, New Delhi Branch, confirming that the net amount payable by him was Rs. 11,33,114.48.
9. Some letters which the Bank has written including its intra-Office correspondence, also deserve to be noticied. On 2-8-1989, Regional Manager, Gwalior, writes to Branch Office, Press Area, New Delhi, from which it is clear that Bank was duly informed by parties of the deal struck. It is also noted that although Sachdev did not lift the machinery by 31-7-1989, he had agreed to make payment of Rs. 11.33 lakhs against the machinery and, therefore, matter was taken up with the selling party “to make the payment of difference amount to liquidate the entire dues existing at Gwalior Branch in the said account”. The Regional Manager requested that the buyer Sachdev should be asked to deposit Rs. 5.33 lakhs by 10th instant and thereafter, the Branch had to “remit Rs. 11.33 lakhs to us including the Term Loan of Rs. 6,00,000/-, sanctioned to them so that we may get our dues liquidated with payment of the balance amount by the seller and allow to lift the machines”. To this letter, reply was sent on 17-8-1989 confirming that Sachdev had deposited Rs. 5.33 lakhs and had also created equitable mortgage on property valued at Rs. 12.36 lakhs. It also states,”the amount agreed for payment of machineries, i.e. Rs. 11.33 lakhs as per your letter dated 2-8-1989 ‘may be debited to us for debit to party’s account with us”. Branch Manager, Jayendraganj Branch, Gwalior wrote on 21-8-1989 to Prem Oberoi as follows :
“We have today credited your loan account with Rs. 11,33,000/-. This credit is made subject to despatch of machinery valued Rs. 15.02 lakhs to the buyer as per valuation report dated 21-1-1989 and as per agreement dtd. 7-9-1987 in between the parties.
Further, as already informed, after crediting this amount, your a/c is still showing a debit balance of Rs. 1,91,08735. Please ensure liquidation of the loan account immediately in order to fulfil the terms and conditions.”
10. About the subsequent correspondence, reference may be made to few letters exchanged between parties. In his letter dated 21-8-1989/ Sachdev complained to Oberoi that the latter had not been able to deposit the balance amount with Central Bank of India to liquidate his liability “of loan outstanding from him in the name of Premier Auto Industries” and if the default was not made up then the authority given by him to Bank to deposit the amount (Rs. 11.33 lakhs) to his account would be withdrawn. The next letter dated 26-8-1989, Sachdev wrote to Regional Manager, Gwalior, endorsing copy thereof to Press Area Branch that some critical components had been removed from the machineries (which were to be sent to Faridabad under Bank’s supervision) due to which it would not be possible for those machineries to be used. The deal was accordingly cancelled and in that regard, Oberoi was informed that the machineries would be purchased if those are allowed to be tested and used for six months to one year at Gwalior before being shifted to Faridabad. In his letter dated 28-8-1989, Sachdev writes to Oberoi that he had received copy of the plaint of the suit filed and he informed him that as he had chosen to recover liquidated damages and was not interested in going ahead with the deal, from his side also, the deal stood cancelled. It is surprising that though Oberoi wrote a letter to Sachdev on 25-8-1989 after institution of the suit, he said nothing in that letter about the suit while acknowledging Sachdev’s letter dated 21-8-1989.
11. One thing appears to me crystal clear on the materials on record. The game of chess was not played only by the buyer and the seller, namely, plaintiff Oberoi and defendant Sachdev; it was a triangular contest. Indeed, the Bank was the motive force for the transaction as its funds had been blocked with plaintiff whom it had financed and it was anxious that the best out of the worst bargain should be made by it and for doing that, it staked through its New Delhi Branch more money. As the machineries had been hypothecated with Bank’s Gwalior Branch, the bank had a lien thereon and both, the buyer and the seller were aware of this constraint and agreement between them was subject to Bank’s claim. Verily, therefore, the three agreed about the manner of payment of the price and also mode of delivery of the machinery in question. Plaintiff Oberoi and defendant Sachdev were not free players in an open contest; their moves were liable to be vetoed and this had been mutually agreed between the three.
12. As in the Court below, before me also, in this Court, implicit reliance, Shri Dubey placed on Section 20 of the Act, but Section 19 also, I extract as that is the core provision :
“19. Property passes when intended to pass. – (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.
(3) Unless a different intention appears, the rules contained in Sections 20 to 24 are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.
20. Specific goods in a deliverable state. – Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment of the price or the time of delivery of the goods, or both, is postponed.”
13. I have no hesitation to reiterate the conclusion on facts, recorded earlier, that the contract for sale of the machinery in question was not an “unconditional contract” contemplated under Section 20, as Shri Dubey contended. It is not possible, therefore, to agree with him that “the time of payment of the price” or “the time of delivery of goods” or other circumstances concerning the price or delivery are not to be considered for determining if the machineries had been duly sold for which the plaintiffs/appellants were entitled to recover the price. The very fact that the buyer and seller were not free to act in the manner they chose because of intervention of the Bank and the stake of the Bank in the transaction made the contract a conditional one. Section 4(1) of the Act postulates “a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price”; sub-section (2) contemplates that such a contract may be “absolute or conditional”. When there is interposition of a third party in regard to manner or modality or “payment of the price” contemplated under Section 4, it cannot be said that only the “buyer” and the “seller” had made an agreement in that regard. Support for this construction of Section 20 is provided by what is contemplated under Section 32. Thereunder, “unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent conditions”; the seller is supposed to be “ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the buyer in exchange for the price”. Thus, in a case, such as of hypothecation, when seller is legally handicapped and is unable “to be ready and willing” at his own sweet will, to give possession of the goods, it will not be possible for him to make an “unconditional” sale of goods in question. Support for this view, I also read in Collector, Customs v. Pednekar and Co., AIR 1976 SC 1408 which was a case of financial guarantee for opening of a letter of credit. The agreement was to sell goods to the guarantor and yet it was held that the guarantor did not become owner of the goods.
14. Shri Dubey relied on paras 346-348, Halsubury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 9, to submit that a distinction must be drawn between “contractual terms and mere representation”. To be fair to learned counsel, I must state that he had cited the same for interpretation of the original agreement dated 7-9-1987 but, as held earlier, that document has ceased to be sacrosanct because of subsequent correspondence. In any case, it must be noted that at para 348, law stated is that any term of a contract may be “express or implied” and as stated in para 351, relationship between the parties may be a matter of profound importance in determining whether a contract contains an implied term and that an implied term can be gathered from the intention of the parties. That may be manifested also by their conduct. Not only plaintiff Oberoi had fettered volition, defendant Sachdev was equally fettered because he had to arrange finance for the purchase and that position was accepted by Oberoi. Shri Dubey’s reliance, therefore, on Section 20, is futile.
15. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 19 and 20(3), it is also not possible to say that the parties had expressed their intention through interposition of the Bank that the time of payment of price and the time of delivery was “immaterial”; that was, rather, a material term and on that depended really actual transfer of title in the machineries from the plaintiff to the defendant. Under sub-section (2) of Section 19, it is clearly contemplated that intention of the parties is to be gathered from “the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case” to ascertain when it was intended that the title in the machineries passed from the plaintiff to the defendant. Although contract was originally made on 7-9-1987, defendant Sachdev’s inability to arrange finance resulted in the contract changing shape and in course of time, the mode as also the modality of payment of price and of delivery of the machineries changed and indeed, the price fixed also, itself came to be altered. As per “new deal” it appears clear that the parties bargained as contemplated in Sections 32 and 33. Payment had to be made through Bank (defendants/respondents 3 and 4) and delivery too in that manner was agreed. After defendant Sachdev had paid to the Bank at Delhi the stipulated sum and created also the stipulated equitable mortgage, plaintiff Oberoi had to make further payment as contemplated in the Bank’s letter dated 21-8-1989 of Rs. 1,91,087.35 when steps could be taken for the machinery to be moved from Gwalior to Faridabad and then verified there by the Press Area Branch, New Delhi of the same Bank. It was not intended that title in the machineries would pass from plaintiff to defendant unless those conditions were satisfied.
16. From the conduct of the parties – plaintiff Oberoi, defendant Sachdev and the Bank – no other conclusion is reasonably possible in the circumstances of the case. In terms of Section 33, the conditions herein indicated had been agreed to by the parties for them to fulfil the same for treating “delivery” contemplated under Section 33, to be made by putting the machineries in possession of defendant Sachdev at .Faridabad. Competence of the parties to agree to such conditions-precedent is duly contemplated under Section 33 under which “doing/anything” by any party is envisaged for the purpose of “delivery”. As provided in Section 31, it is indeed “the duty of the seller to deliver the goods and of the buyer to accept and pay for them in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale”. Section 35 provides that it is the buyer who is to exercise his option in the matter of taking delivery as he is required to apply for delivery and until that is done, the seller is not bound to deliver the goods. Section 36(1) clearly concedes to the buyer and seller the freedom to contract about the place and manner of delivery.
17. In the instant case, it cannot even be said that plaintiffs had exercised or were entitled to exercise the right of an unpaid seller contemplated under Section 46. Because, it cannot be said to be a case of the buyer neglecting or refusing delivery of the machineries inasmuch as defendant Sachdev did perform his part of the contract and obtained finance from the Bank’s Branch at Press Area, New Delhi as a result of which credit was given for the amount agreed upon as price to the plaintiff firm in its account. Unfortunately, as seller, the plaintiff firm, was not “ready and willing” to deliver the machineries and indeed, it expressed that intention by filing the suit on 16-8-1989. Later, it continued to refuse delivery notwithstanding the fact that it had obtained credit in its account in respect of the “price” agreed upon. The impression which one gains from the conduct displayed by the plaintiffs is that they were willy-nilly, or deliberately, dilly-dallying because of their financial handicap. Proviso to Section 44 would not also help the plaintiffs because it appears to be a case of repudiation by them of the contract and not the repudiation of the contract by the buyer/defendant. It is only when delivery was not effected in the manner agreed to that the defendant, by its letter dated 28-8-1989, informed the other side that the deal stood cancelled and that position is legality sustainable under Section 60. The buyer is authorised under Section 60 either to treat the contract as subsisting and wait till date of delivery or to rescind it and sue for damages when the other side repudiates the contract before delivery. This Court in Kaluram v. Balramdas, 1991 MPLJ 575, had an occasion to interpret the term “repudiation” of Section 60 to hold that a notice by defendant through his lawyer on the plaintiff tantamounts to repudiation by him of the contract; the term “rescind”, this Court also interpreted to mean that when one of the parties releases the other party from the obligation contracted for such a delivery. Defendant could, therefore, rightly claim that he had lawfully rescinded the contract by releasing the plaintiff from the obligation of delivering to him the machineries on the contract of sale being repudiated by the plaintiff by filing the suit.
18. Shri Lahoti cited certain decisions to which I may briefly refer. Lahore High Court’s D. B. in Jhandoo Mal v. Phul Chand, AIR 1925 Lahore 217 in dealing with a case of repudiation of contract under Section 39, Contract Act, held that if one party to the contract by words or conduct expresses to the other party its intention not to perform its obligation under the contract when the time arises for its performance or even before that time, the other party may accept or decline that offer. When the offer is accepted, the contract is determined. That supports the view taken in Kaluram’s case (supra). Before enactment of the Sale of Goods Act, decision was rendered in the case of Ford Automobiles v. Delhi Motor Co., AIR 1923 Bombay 125 by Sir D. F. Mulla, J. on Section 83, Contract Act, since repealed. It was held that property in the motor cars did not pass to the defendant on delivery of the same to the railway company because the plaintiffs intended to retain the ownership of the goods until the defendants had paid the price. The contract of sale of the motor cars was deemed to be a conditional contract as the plaintiffs had instructed their agent not to deliver railway receipt to the defendants until payment had been made. The other decision on which Shri Lahoti relied heavily is of a Division Bench of Patna High Court, Hemraj v. Seventeen Textile Traders, AIR 1961 Patna 318. In that case, it was held, relying on Sections 12 and 21, Specific Relief Act, that there could be no case of temporary injunction in respect of contract for sale of movable properties (machineries also, in that case) because a breach of that contract could be compensated in terms of money. Explanation to Section 12 was held decisive of the controversy.
19. For all the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that no case is made out for my interference in this appeal with the impugned order. Plaintiffs/appellants have prima facie failed to establish their legal right against the defendant/Bank to restrain the Bank from reversing the credit. Obviously, the credit was conditionally given, subject to the plaintiffs’ liquidating their separate liability and also arranging delivery, as already agreed between parties, at Faridabad, of the machineries in question, through the Bank. Both conditions, the plaintiffs breached and cleverly suppressing the injunction, they had, obtained the credit. Bank still took care to make that credit conditional to guard against any pitfall. Because of the hypothecation of the machineries, that condition could be lawfully imposed by the Bank dehors parties agreeing to deal with the machinery otherwise. Although there is difference between a “pledge” and “hypothecation”, in the latter case, it would be a case of constructive possession as opposed to physical possession of pledgee of the goods pledged. There is, therefore* no difference in so far as the right to follow the goods is concerned as that right is equally available to the pledgee and also to any other lender who has obtained hypothecation and not pledge of the goods. The right to retain possession, whether physically or constructively, is common to both and in both cases the lender suffers the common disability of not maintaining suit for recovery of the debt and retain, at the same time, possession of the pledged property. (See, in this connection, Lallan Prasad’s case, AIR 1967 SC 1322). That conduct per se of the plaintiffs/appellants disentitled them, notwithstanding Bank’s careful handling of its interest, to the equitable relief of injunction against the Bank.
20. However, even on the ground that the Bank was required to discharge the liability of defendant Sachdev, relief cannot be claimed. Because, by repudiating themselves the contract, as held above, and allowing the said defendant to lawfully rescind the same, they burned their own boat. Prima facie, they failed to establish their claim either under Section 55 or even under Section 46 of the Act as rights of an “unpaid seller” which plaintiffs/appellants could exercise in terms of Section 46(2) for withholding delivery lawfully. For that, they had to establish that they had not defaulted in performance of their own duty contemplated under Section 44.
21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed; the impugned order is confirmed. The interim stay granted in this appeal on 19-8-1991 stands vacated. Parties are left to bear their own costs in this appeal.
22. While parting with the records, I consider it necessary to make it clear that anything said on merits of the case of any of the parties in disposing of this appeal shall not weigh with the trial Court in the final judgment to be rendered in the suit. Indeed, obviously, the plaintiffs would have, during the course of trial, the option to amend their plaint for enforcing any other right in respect of “new deal” against defendant Sachdev and also the Bank on the basis of subsequent events. If that is done, it shall be open also to the plaintiffs on the basis of amended plaint to pray for interim relief and in that case, the trial Court shall be required to dispose of that prayer independently in accordance with law without being obsessed in any manner by any observation made in this order.