JUDGMENT
1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties.
2. It appears that there was a dispute between the parties. The matter was before the Labour Court. The Labour Court decided in favour of the employee. The employer filed a writ petition in this Court, which is pending. During the pendency of that writ petition, it appears that a settlement was arrived at between respondent No. 2 and the petitioners -employees. That settlement is dated July 17, 2006. That settlement contemplates payments being made by respondent No. 2 to the Petitioners. Payments were not being made. Therefore, an application was moved under Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). That application has been rejected by that Officer by communication dated September 11,2006 for the reason that as required by the provisions of Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the settlement has not been sent through the authorised Officer and it is this communication which is challenged in this Petition.
3. We have heard the learned Counsel for both sides. Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:
33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a25 settlement or an award or under the provisions of (Chapter VA or Chapter VB) the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.
Perusal of the above quoted provision makes it clear that what is sought to be implemented or enforced should be a settlement. The term “settlement ” is defined under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It reads as under:
2(p) “settlement ” means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to (by an officer authorised in this behalf) the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer.
4. Perusal of the communication dated September 11,2006 shows that the only reason for which the application has been rejected is that a copy of the settlement was not sent to the authorised Officer. Perusal of Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 shows that, for this purpose, the authorised Officer is the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) and the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) or the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central). The application was sent under Section 33-C(1) alongwith the copy of settlement by the Petitioner to the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). It is obvious that the requirement of sending a copy to the appropriate Officer incorporated in Section 2(p) is directory requirement and that requirement can be said to have been substantially complied with by the Petitioners when they submitted their application alongwith the copy of the settlement before the authorised Officer.
5. In our opinion, therefore, the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner should not have rejected the application for that reason and should have tried the application on merits and made an order in accordance with law. It appears that one more reason is given, namely, pendency of the writ petition in this Court. It is obvious that the settlement is arrived at between the parties during the pendency of that writ petition and if the employer abides by the settlement, to that extent, the employer will get discharge from the order passed by the Labour Court which is impugned in the Writ Petition. Therefore, merely because the Writ Petition is pending, the parties cannot be prevented from entering into settlement and if the settlement is entered into, implementation of that settlement cannot be deferred merely because the Petition is pending. It goes without saying that if the settlement is fully implemented, the employer can place that fact before the Court in the Writ Petition and get appropriate order for discharge of liability. In our opinion, therefore, the following order would meet the ends of justice.
ORDER
(i) The communication dated September 11,2006, a copy of which is at Exhibit- D to the Petition, is set aside.
(ii) The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) is directed to process and decide the application submitted by the Petitioners under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible on merits.
(iii) Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.