JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. All these three writ applications involving common question of fact and law were taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioners in these writ applications questioned a notification dated 29th December, 1952 issued under Section 29th of the Indian Forest Act which is contained in Annexure 1 to all the writ applications inter alia on the ground that the lands in question had been recorded as Gair-Mazura am Land and were in the nature of raiyati and thus the same could not have been a subject-matter thereof.
3. The petitioners have contended that the said lands belonged to one Thakur Man Mohan Deo who was the landlord of the Rohani Ghatwali Estate and it, therefore, did not vest in the State of Bihar. In the year 1952, it was further submitted that the lands in question were neither forest lands nor waste lands and thus the notification dated 29th December, 1952 could not have been issued by the State in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act.
4. The petitioners have contended that the aforementioned Thakur Man Mohan Deo executed two deed of gift dated 6-4-1964 and 17-4-1964 to Bhoodan Yagna Committee, Deoghar which was sent for confirmation before the revenue authorities but the records of confirmation had been missing. However, confirmation was given in case No. 2 of 1983-84 which is contained in Annexure 3-X to the writ application.
5. The petitioners have contended that some lands have been settled by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee, Deoghar, by issuance of purchase which is contained in Annexure 4 to the writ application. The said settlements were allegedly confirmed.
6. The petitioners have further contended that Thakur Man Mohan Deo had not surrendered the Rohani estate to the Forest Department and if there exists any such document, the same must be bogus, manufactured and forged documents.
7. Mr. Radhey Shyam Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that as the notification as contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application does not fulfill the requirements of Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, the same must be held to be wholly illegal and the criminal cases pending against the petitioners on the basis thereof are liable to be quashed.
8. Mr. Prasad, when questioned, with regard to the laches on the part of the petitioners strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and ors. AIR 1984 SC 121, and submitted on the basis that the writ petition cannot be dismissed only on that ground.
9. From the facts as narrated hereinbefore, it is evident that the impugned notification was issued by the State of Bihar in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act. It has been stated in the said notification that the lands in question are forest lands waste lands comprised therein would be treated to be protected forest.
10. In the notification the lands had been shown to be belonging to the State of Bihar.
11. In this writ application it is not possible for this Court to enter into the thicket of disputed question of fact as to whether prior to issuance of the said notification dated 29th December, 1952, all the legal requirements were complied with or not. Under the provisions of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act a prosecution arises to the effect that an official Act is presumed to have been done in regular course of business.
12. Further, the question as to whether the lands in fact were saved from vesting under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act or not would essentially be a question of fact, which have to be determined on the basis of the evidences brought on records by the parties to the lis. Prima facie the lands had been recorded as Gair-Mazura am and not even Gair-Mazura Khas, Thus, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot determine the question as to whether the lands were in Khas cultivating possession of the land-holder so as to come within the purview of Section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act or not.
The petitioners themselves have suggested that the possibility of the document having been executed by the ex-landlord in favour of the Forest Department cannot also be ruled out. But they have contended that such a documents are forge and fabricated ones. The said question again cannot be decided by this Court in this writ application.
13. Further, the petitioners cannot be permitted to question any notification which was published in the Gazette as far back as in the year 1952. If the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest namely the ex-landlord had any raiyati interest in the said land, he could have filed the appropriate claim application, before the authorities concerned in terms of the provisions of the Indian Forest Act itself. Such a claim could have been adjudicated upon by the statutory authorities.
14. It is true as has been held by the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1984 SC 121, that a writ petition should not be dismissed only on the ground of laches therein it is contended that the provisions of the Statute is question is ultra vires.
However, such is not the position here.
The contention raised by the petitioner requires investigation of a disputed question of fact. A writ Court can neither act as a Civil Court and thus cannot decide a serious disputed question of title. As indicated hereinbefore, even the question as to whether the Estate of the ex-landlord had vested in the State of Bihar or not is essentially a question of fact.
15. In Bhoop Singh v. Union of India , it has been held as follows :
There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief, to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of this claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner’s contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Article 14 of the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable and, therefore, any relief claimed itself be founded on equity and be alien to that concept. In our opinion grant of the relief to the petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
(italics are mine for emphasis)
16. In Sahdeo Jha v. P.K. Naberia 1992 (1) PLJR 125 (SC), the Supreme Court again dismissed the writ application on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner.
17. In Raw Narain Singh v. State of Bihar 1992 (1) PLJR 400, 1 had the occasion to consider a similar question and upon considering a large number of case it was held as follows :
It is now will-known that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction may refuse to grant a relief, if the petitioner approached the Court after an unreasonable delay. The conduct of the petitioner is also relevant.
See H.R. Club v. The State of Bihar and ors. 1986 PLJR 116.
Reference in this connection may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B.M. Bharti v. L.M. Sud and ors. 1991 (62)FLR227.
In Vimla Sharma v. State-of Uttar Pradesh (1990) Supp. SCC 770, the Supreme Court granted relief to the appellant on the ground that although she was recommended for regular appointment on 10th November, 1975, but work has been extracted from her although the management did not make any order in her favour and she had been made to continue in Junior High School all through.
In the facts and circumstances of that case, it was held that it would be discriminatory and unjust to deny her the post and regular appointment.
Thus is that case also, the question of any person acquiring any right to hold a post did not arise.
In Sarju Sharan v. State of Bihar and ors. 1988 BLJ 494 : 1988 PLJR 469,1 have held as follows:
From the aforementioned facts it would be evident that the petitioner has not seriously tried to explain the delay. The very facts only one such representation has been annexed which also made on 1-10-1980, it is a clear proof of laches on the part of the petitioner. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner is guilty of serious delay and laches and on that ground he is not entitled to any relief.
In K.V. Rajlakshmi Setty and Anr. v. State of Mysore and ors. 1967 SC 993, a writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay alone. In the aforementioned decision the Supreme Court held as follows :
There is also a good deal of force behind the contention that the appellants are guilty of laches. After the passing of the order of May 17, 1950 they should have made an application within a reasonable time thereaftgr. Merely because the Chief Engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they should rest upon their boards if they were really being discriminated against.
Recently the Supreme Court again in State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors. held as follows :
Now, it is well-settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretionary does not originally assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Recently this Court also in Dr. Mrs. Rohtagi v. The State of Bihar, 1986 PLJR page 1160, after taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court in 1970 SC 470 : 1970 SCC 1343 and 1973 SC 1168 held that a writ petition should be dismissed if the petitioner approaches the High Court after long and unexplained delay. The same view has also been adopted by the Division Bench of this Court in 1985 Pat. 70 and 1985 PLJR 1148 ; Dr. Amar Nath Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bombay and ors. 1991(2) PLJR 609, a Division Bench of this Court while considering the matter of appointment of the Additional District Judges by this Court refused to grant relief to those petitioners as they appeared in the written examination, but did not qualify, on the ground that the same would cause hardship to the candidates called for interview stating(sic):
Further, there is a long delay in assailing the advertisements i.e. in October, 1970, whereas the advertisements are dated 8-2-1985 and 20-9-1989, In CWJC No. 6582 of 1990 the petitioners are candidates, who have not been called for interview, though participated in the written test. They allowed the examination to be held without protest pursuant to the advertisements. It is, therefore, too late for them to turn round and assail the advertisements. See , OmPrakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla. It is true that in CWJC 6700 of 1990, the petitioner did not participate in the examination, but even in a public interest litigation delay will not be allowed when parties have changed their respective position and more than two thousand candidates have participated in the axamination. This would cause hardship to the candidates called for interview.
In S.S. Rathore v, State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990SC 10, the Supreme Court while a suit held that limitation cannot be saved on the ground that representations had been filed which are not statutory in nature nor would the same save limitation if futile representation are made by the petitioners.
18. In this case, therefore, we cannot allow the petitioner to question a notification which was issued in the year 1952. The petitioner did not question the said notification even after purchas have been issued in their favour by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee.
19. In any event, the petitioners in the criminal cases can always show that their purview is bona fide and raise all contentions which may be relevant for disposal.
20. Thus, in any view of the matter, the petitioner cannot be said to be entitled to issuance of a writ which is discretionary in nature.
21. In the result, this writ application is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
R.N. Prasad, J.
22. I agree