JUDGMENT
G.D. Kamat, J.
1. This Criminal Writ Petition prays for a declaration that the detention of the petitioners after expiry of 90 days from the date of their arrest is unconstitutional, illegal and unauthorised and further seeks an appropriate writ order or direction to release the petitioners on bail or grant them interim bail if the situation so justifies.
2. First petitioner, it appears, helps his relative Kulvindersingh in carrying on a business of hotel (Dhaba). Petitioners 2, 3 and 4 are the employees at the said Dhaba. Karanja (Ghadge) Police Station in Crime No. 219/92 arrested all the petitioners on 25-12-1992 for being involved in offences under sections 17 and 21 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, NDPS Act). They are also said to have committed an offence under section 66(i)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. The story of the matter is that Karanja Police are said to have found 400 gms. of opium from outside the premises of Dhaba and a few bottles of country liquor.
No charge sheet was filed until an application for release on bail was filed on 3-4-1993 purported to be under proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167 of Cr.P.C.
3. The learned Special Judge upon hearing the parties, by his order dated 8-4-1993 rejected the application of the petitioner for their release on bail. The learned Judge held that the application for bail was not presented invoking section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the sole basis of the application being under section 167(2) of Cr.P.C., the same is not tenable on the ground that the mandate of the provisions of N.D.P.S. Act over-ride the provisions of section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. and refused bail.
4. Upon rejection of this application by the Special Court, the present application has been moved. The sole contention of Shri C.P. Sen, the learned Counsel for the petitioners is once it is admitted that no charge sheet was filed within a period of 90 days from the date of arrest of the petitioners, the proviso to section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. comes into play and the section being mandatory, the detention as from 91st day becomes illegal. Upon survey of several authorities rendered from time to time by Apex Court, the last one being in the decision of Aslam Babalal v. State of Maharashtra, , there can be no second opinion on the subject and the mandate of section 167(2) proviso being clear it must be held to over-ride all other general provisions with regard to bail including section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act, argues Mr. Sen.
5. It appears that so far there is no authority directly on the subject whether proviso to section 167(2) over-rides the provisions relating to bail under section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act by a Division Bench of this Court. Matter did fell for consideration before two learned Single Judges who took a view that section 167(2) Cr.P.C. cannot affect section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. But what emerges is a Third learned Single Judge took a dissenting view and made a reference to a Division Bench which is still pending.
6. This matter was on the board before a Regular Bench taking criminal matters but it appears that the matter could not be taken by that Bench with the result an order was obtained from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice who directed that the present petition be heard by this Bench. Since the reference on the subject is already pending, a question arose in our mind whether we could dispose of this petition de hors the reference which is still pending but not listed for hearing. This Bench is specially constituted for this case alone. We have considered the matter and this being Habeas Corpus Petition, we do not think that the present petition can be delayed on that ground.
7. The sole controversy is whether section 167(2) over-rides the provisions for bail under N.D.P.S. Act, which are special and stringent. It is necessary to view how the matter has been dealt with so far by the learned Single Judges of this Court and what the Apex Court says in so far as section 167(2) proviso of Cr. P.C. is concerned.
In the decision of Shashibala Nayar v. Intelligence Officer, NCB, reported in 1990 Mah. Law Journal 457, the learned Single Judge (Suresh, J.), took the view that section 167(2) has no application where a person has been charged under any of the offence falling within N.D.P.S. Act. What prevailed upon the learned Judge was that regard being had to the provisions which are enacted in the very Act in the matter of investigation, arrest, bail, seizure and trials the same being a complete code by itself, section 167(2) does not apply to persons who have committed offences under N.D.P.S. Act. This decision was rendered sometime on 3-8-1989.
To the same offect is more elaborate a view taken by another learned Single Judge A.A. Desai, J.) in (Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1991 Criminal Law Journal 1537. This time it was iterated that section 167 Cr.P.C. does not carve out any condition, limitation or restriction in the matter of grant of bail on the ground that section 167 is a part of Chapter XII of Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with investigations. At any rate, the attempt to extend applicability of section 167(2) would nullify the over-riding effect provided by non-obstante clause, which reads : “(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure” the opening words of section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act.
A matter on similar subject fell for consideration before another learned Single Judge of this Court (M.S. Deshpande, J.). Deshpande, J., did not find agreement with the views expressed by other learned Single Judges and having regard to the judicial discipline, he made a reference to the Division Bench in Criminal Application No. 1707 of 1991 with Cr. Application No. 2105 of 1989 and as mentioned earlier this reference is still pending.
A similar type of situation arose before another Judge of this Court (Dhabe, J.). In view of the conflicting opinions expressed and since the reference was pending before a Division Bench on a reference, the learned Judge directed release of the applicants before him on interim bail. This judgment of Dhabe, J., has been reported in 1991 Mah. Law Journal 311.
8. Let us now survey the law in so far as Supreme Court is concerned and on which reliance has been placed by Shri Sen, learned Counsel for the petitioners. In the decision of Rajnikant v. Intelligence Officer, NCB, , the learned Vacation Judge of the Apex Court held thus :
“12. An order for release on bail under proviso (a) to section 167(2) may appropriately be termed as an order-on-default indeed, it is a release on bail on the default of the prosecution in filing charge-sheet within the prescribed period. The right to bail under section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. It is a legislative command and not Court’s discretion. If the investigation agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry of 90/60 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody should be released on bail. But at that stage merits of the case are not to be examined. Not at all. In fact, the Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds.
13. The accused cannot, therefore, claim any special right to remain on bail if the investigation reveals that the accused has committed a serious offence and charge-sheet if filed, the bail granted under proviso (a) to section 167(2) could be cancelled.”
It is clearly laid down by the Authority that right to bail under section 167(2) is absolute because it is a legislative command and no discretion is left in a Court. The Court, however, observed that upon filing of the charge-sheet, an application for cancellation of bail may be made and the offender is liable to be rearrested.
In the decision of Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishan Lal, , the question directly for decision was whether the power of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. is subject to the limitation contained in the amended section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act and the restriction placed on the power of the Court under the said section is applicable to the High Court also in the matter of grant of bail.
It appears that Delhi High Court had taken a view that the power to grant bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. could not be controlled by the amended section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Delhi High Court and held that the power of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 is subject to the limitation contained in the amended section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act and restrictions placed on the power under that section are applicable to the High Court also in the matter of grant of bail. What, therefore, emerges from this authority is that grant of bail by the High Court must be with reference to section 37 alongwith all its restrictions.
The last decision relied upon by Shri Sen is that of Aslam Baba v. State of Maharashtra, . The question for consideration in this case was that once an offender is released by the aid of proviso to section 167(2) Cr.P.C., for failure to file the charge-sheet, whether the bail can be cancelled as a matter of course and offender rearrested upon presentation of the charge-sheet before the Court. On a review of several decisions, the view taken earlier by the Vacation Judge in the case of Rajnikant cited supra was diluted. In other words; it was laid down in this Authority that solely because charge-sheet is filed in the Court that by itself cannot make the offender, who was released under section 167(2) to lose his liberty and unless there exists special reasons for cancellation of bail, ordinarily it cannot be done so.
9. On conspectus of all these authorities the contention of Mr. Sen is that section 167(2) abhors the complacency in the matter of investigation and once the given period of 60/90 days as the case may be is over, the provision being mandatory the Court must release the offender on bail and section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act, however, stringent cannot whittle down the mandate of section 167(2). We find substantial merit in this contention.
Mr. Ahmad, the learned A.G.P. indeed contended that regard being had to the menace of drug traffic and its abuse, section 37 N.D.P.S. Act is a special provision. Ordinarily a matter relating to bail is taken care of by the provisions of Cr.P.C. but with a view to make the provision of bail stringent and further to eliminate repetition of offences, section 37 was specially enacted and incorporated by way of amendment laying emphasis on denial of bail except for the predicates mentioned therein. Upon reading section 37, he says that a bare look of the mandate of non-obstante clause in clear term – “Notwithstanding anything contained in section 439 Cr.P.C., 1973” is self explanatory. He, therefore, urged that this non-obstante clause does away with the procedural section of Cr.P.C. as also power to grant bail under Cr.P.C. According to him in the decision of Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kisanlal, , clearly supports this proposition that section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. has no part to play in so far as offences under N.D.P.S. Act are concerned and to that extent all the powers under Cr.P.C. must be read subject to the provisions of relevant sections and more particularly section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. He contended that on failure to file charge-sheet if the offenders are released by the aid of proviso to section 167(2), the very purpose of that Act will be defeated and, therefore, the interpretation of the Act must be to advance object and purpose of the Act and not to defeat it. He read passages from the case of Narcotic Control Bureau v. Kisanlal and from the statement of facts pointed out that the charge-sheet had been presented to the Court belatedly and yet the Supreme Court has viewed that non-obstante clause must be given its meaning which is due.
10. We are unable to agree with Shri Ahmad that the case of Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kisanlal, , the Supreme Court even considered the question of the effect of section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. vis-a-vis section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. The authority itself makes it clear that only limited question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the power of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. was subject to the limitation contained in the amended section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act and whether the restrictions placed upon the powers under the said section govern the High Court. For that matter, the Authority itself says that Special Leave was granted for that limited purpose. We do not think that, therefore, that authority assists the State in contending that this Court should take a view that section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is not attracted for releasing offenders upon failure of the prosecution agency to file the charge-sheet either within 60 days or 90 days as the case may be.
11. The first question is whether the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to the proceedings before the Special Court set up under N.D.P.S. Act. Section 36-A reads as under :-
“36-A(1) – Notiwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) :-
(a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more special courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Government;
(b) where a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) or sub-section (2-A) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), such Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days in the whole where such Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate:
Provided that where such Magistrate considers –
(i) when such person is forwarded to him as aforesaid; or
(ii) upon or at any time before the expiry of the period of detention authorised by him, that the detention of such person is unnecessary, he shall order such person to be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction ;
(c) the Special Court may exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under Clause (b), the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise under section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that section ;
(d) A Special Court, may, upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf, take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.”
From the aforesaid, it is clear that the designated Special Court is bound by the provisions of section 167 Cr.P.C. which is explicit in sub-clause (c) of Clause (i) of section 36-A. Section 36-C read thus –
“36-C Application of Code to proceedings before a Special Court–
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), (including the provisions as to bail and bounds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purpose of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.”
From the above, it is explicit that section 36-C in terms provide that a Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 apply to all the proceedings before the Special Court including the provisions as to bail and bonds. It is, therefore, clear that section 167 Cr.P.C. applies in so far as offences falling under N.D.P.S. Act are concerned. Once we come to this position, the next question to consider is whether in view of section 37 proviso to section 167(2) stands obliterated. In our view, this question is not difficult to answer and we will presently point out that the very N.D.P.S. Act contains some provisions which in terms exclude some of the specific provisions of Cr.P.C. and of some other Act. Take for instance in section 32-A, there can be no suspension, remission, or commutation in any sentence awarded under N.D.P.S. Act. Whereas under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, power has been given to suspend, remit or commute a sentence by appropriate authorities, such a power is tacitly excluded under this section.
There is another exclusion made in section 33 of the Act. This time the exclusion is that section 360 of Cr.P.C. relating to release on probation of good conduct and after admonition and the provisions of Probation of Offenders’ Act, 1958 are also excluded. In other words, whenever Legislature intended that certain provisions of Cr.P.C. are intended to be excluded, they have been tacitly excluded by making provisions in respect thereof. Therefore, if Legislature intended to exclude the provisions of section 167(2) Cr.P.C., the Act would have done so. In the absence thereof, therefore, the only logical conclusion is that section 167(2) proviso is not exlcuded and is, therefore, applicable in so far as the proceedings before the Special Court are concerned.
11-A. The mandate of section 167(2) is clear, that the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared and does furnish bail on expiry of the period of 60 days or 90 days as the case may be upon failure of the prosecution agency to file the necessary charge-sheet. In our view, coming back to the authority of the Supreme Court in Rajnikant Patel v. Intelligence Officer, N.C.B., New Delhi, cited supra and Aslam Baba v. State of Maharashtra, cited supra, there can be no two opinions that section 167(2) is a legislative mandate and such a mandate cannot be whittled down merely because the provisions relating to grant or refuse bail has been made more stringent under N.D.P.S. Act.
12. There is another way of looking at it. Grant of bails under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure falls in Chapter XXXIII. The provisions in this Chapter are general provisions as to how bail matters are to be decided in bailable and non-bailable offences and also bestows special powers in the High Court. The power of granting bail under section 37 N.D.P.S. Act though over-rides the power of grant of bail contained in Chapter XXXIII of Cr.P.C., it is again a general provision with regard to grant of bail. The release of a person upon his agreeing to furnish bail bond, once a charge-sheet is not filed within 60 days or 90 days as the case may be, operates in a very different field and that way it has nothing to do either with the General power of grant or refusal of bail under the provisions of Cr.P.C. in Chapter XXXIII or the power of grant of bail under section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. Once the prosecution agency is complacent and whatever reason that be does not file charge-sheet within the time stipulated, the Court has no power to grant any further remand once the accused person offers to furnish bail bond. The mandate requires that the Court is bond to release the accused person. This type of release for failure to file the charge-sheet has nothing to do with the general provisions with regard to the grant of bail under section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act. The non-obstante clause “Notwithstanding anything contained in …..” in section 37 is in relation to the general power of grant of bail under Chapter XXXIII of Cr.P.C. and does not and cannot apply to section 167 in Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. The nature of the crime cannot carve out any exception nor the gravity of the offence and sentence can whittle down mandate of section 167(2) Cr.P.C. We, are, therefore, of the considered view that section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act cannot whittle down the mandate of proviso to section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. for that provision is mandatory.
13. The next question is as to what relief we can grant to the present petitioners in this petition. It is true that until the petitioners moved the application for their release on bail no charge-sheet was filed although 90 days had expired from the date of their arrest. But the further fact shows that thereafter a charge-sheet has been filed under sections 17 and 21 of the N.D.P.S. Act and under some provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Once the charge-sheet is filed in the Court, as the matter stands today, section 167(2) has no application. Such is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision of Abdul Wahid v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1991 Mah. Law Journal, 1219. A question directly arose before the Court whether the accused could be released on bail under section 167(2) proviso after the charge-sheet was filed, though belatedly. After viewing a number of authorities, the Division Bench held that power to release and right to get oneself released can only be exercised after the passage of 60 days or 90 days as the case may be but before the charge-sheet is filed and not after the charge-sheet is filed. We respectfully agree with the view of the Division Bench. Since now it is a common ground that the charge-sheet has already been filed before the Special Court, we are unable to grant the relief to the petitioners in the present petition viz. their release on bail.
14. From the averments made in the petition and from the order dated 8-4-1993, it is clear that the petitioners did not seek their release on bail on merits under section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. The application was restricted to section 167(2) of Criminal P.C. The petitioners are at liberty to move the Special Court for their release on merits under section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act, if so advised.
15. Rule partly made absolute as indicated and prayer for release on bail rejected.
Rule partly made absolute.