ORDER
S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order dated 25-9-1998, passed by 12th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, in M.C.A. No. 100/97, arising out of the order dated 6-11-1997, passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, in Case No. 2-A/90(i)/96-97.
2. This appeal has been filed against, the impugned order dated 25-9- 1998, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, in exercise of its power, under Section 11 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth ‘the Act’)-
3. It has been argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the power to fix interim rent was not appealable before the learned Additional District Judge and, therefore, the order of remand dated 25-9-1998, passed by 12th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, be set aside and the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 11 of ‘the Act’ dated 6-11-1997 be maintained.
4. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent argued that this is an exceptional case, where the Court below was entitled to entertain an appeal against the interim order. It was submitted that the appellant-tenant had filed an application for fixation of standard rent, when the respondent filed a civil suit for his ejectment. Now, taking advantage of this order of interim rent, fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority, the respondent is depositing arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- (Rupees One Hundred Fifty) per month and not at the agreed rent or the real standard rent. Looking to these facts, it should be held that it is an exceptional case and appeal lies.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court must consider the scope of appeal under Section 31 of ‘the Act’. It is, therefore, necessary first to reproduce Section 11 of ‘the Act’ which is as follows :-
“Section 11. Fixation of interim rent. – If an application for fixing the standard rent or for determining the lawful increase of such rent is made under Section 10, the Rent Controlling Authority shall, pending final decision on the application, make, as expeditiously as possible, a provisional order specifying the amount of the interim rent or lawful increase to be paid by the tenant to the landlord and shall appoint the date from which such interim rent or lawful increase so specified shall be deemed to have effect.”
6. It is clear from the aforesaid section that interim rent is fixed pending final decision i.e. the Rent Controlling Authority retains seisin over the matter for fixing the final rent. The wordings of the section also shows the interim rent is only fixed for the time being till the final order is passed. The effect of passing of an order of fixation of interim rent during the pendency of the application under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ is liable to be modified theoretically as well as in actuality by the final order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority.
7. Section 31 of ‘the Act’ may now be reproduced as under :-
“Section 31. Appeal to District Judge or Additional District Judge. –
(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under this Act to the District Judge or an Additional District Judge having territorial jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the Judge) and the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order made by the Rent Controlling Authority :
Provided that in computing the period of thirty days the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded : Provided further that the Judge may for sufficient reasons allow an appeal after the expiry of the said period.”
8. It is true that sub-section (1) of Section 31 of ‘the Act’ says that an appeal lies from every order. What is then the meaning of every order of Rent Controlling Authority? Did the legislature intend to include in the words “every order” an interim order. If that be so, the interim order shall be appealable. If that be not so, then no amount of hardship shall make the interim order appealable. In the opinion of this Court, though widely expressed, the words “every order” only refer to a final order and not to an interim order. This is so for the reason that it has been stated in the last line of Section 31 of the ‘the Act’ that the decision of the Appellate Court shall be final. Now an interim order cannot be made final by the Appellate Court because the initial interim order could be modified by the Rent Controlling Authority itself. The legislature never intended to include in the words “every order” in the interim order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. Even otherwise, life of an interim order is very short as per Section 11 of ‘the Act’ itself. It is subject to the final order of the Rent Controlling Authority. The aggrieved party has an alternative remedy in shape of the final order, It is likely to create more confusion if sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the ‘the Act’ is interpreted widely to include an interim order. In fact, the use of the words “every order” was intended to apply all kinds of final orders passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under ‘the Act’. They are not necessarily confined to orders for fixation of standard rent. Therefore, the words “every order” were used by the legislature. The scheme of the Act’ clearly indicates in favour of the aforesaid interpretation. Therefore, the words “every order” mean the final order and not interim order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority. A similar view was taken in the case of Ajodhya Prashad v. Shambunath, reported in 1972 MPLJ SN 132, but this case was in respect of an application to leave to amend the written statement. That amendment was not permitted by the Rent Controlling Authority. It was held that that order was not appealable under Section 31 of ‘the Act’. In this case, the reliance was placed on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand reported in AIR 1967 SC 799. It was stated in that case that the Supreme Court held that an interlocutory order is not appealable unless it affects the rights of a party. Although the facts of the case of Ajodhya Prashad, 1972 MPLJ SN 132 (supra) are distinguishable, this Court finds that principle stated therein, that an interlocutory order is not ordinarily appealable, is applicable to the facts of this case. The further principle that any interlocutory order which affects any right or liability of the party may be appealable need not be discussed in this case because that question does not arise. The order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority was in the real sense an interim order and it would not affect the substantive rights of the parties.
9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 25-9-1998 is hereby set aside and the order dated 6-11-1997 is hereby maintained.
10. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Rent Controlling Authority is directed to decide the application under Section 10 of ‘the Act’ within a period of one month from today. The parties are directed to appear before the Rent Controlling Authority on 26-4-1099 for taking a date for further proceeding.
C.C. as per rules.