Bombay High Court High Court

Shri. Vasu Malik, Son Of Vithal … vs Smt. Thelma Da Rocha And Ors. on 31 August, 1993

Bombay High Court
Shri. Vasu Malik, Son Of Vithal … vs Smt. Thelma Da Rocha And Ors. on 31 August, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994 (3) BomCR 66
Author: G Kamat
Bench: M Pendse, G Kamat


JUDGMENT

G.D. Kamat J.

1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated June 28, 1991 made by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 110/B of 1977 whereby the writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed.

2. The respondent No. 1 is the owner of an agricultural property which had been let out to the petitioner. There is no dispute that the petitioner had become a statutory tenant under the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. It is common ground that the petitioner raised a cultivation of banana plantation in part of the land let out to him by respondent No. 1. The banana plantation having come to the notice of respondent No. 1, a notice dated March 13, 1973 followed by another notice dated June 16, 1973 were served under section 11(2) of the Act terminating the tenancy of the petitioner. Some time on November 29, 1973 respondent No. 1 instituted an application before the Mamlatdar of Bardez Taluka for permission to terminate the tenancy of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had utilized the paddy field for purposes other than agricultural, which is forbidden under the Act. This application of respondent No. 1 was rejected by Awal Karkun on the ground that the breach complained of had been removed by the petitioner and, therefore, the question of granting permission to terminate the tenancy did not arise. Respondent No. 1 challenged this order of Awal Karkun before the Collector in appeal, in which respondent No. 1 succeeded. The Deputy Collector, North Goa, held that the cultivation of bananas did not come within the purview of `agriculture’ as defined in the Act 1964. As against this decision of the Deputy Collector the petitioner moved Administrative Tribunal but without any success. Upon rejection of the revision by the Tribunal by its order dated November 28, 1976 the writ petition was instituted, in which the impugned order has been made.

3. There is no dispute on facts in the matter and the question turns on interpretation of definition of `agriculture’ in the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964. Before, however, we turn to the definition of `agriculture’ in the Act, we may refer to the findings of the learned Single Judge in paragraph 18, to which our attention has been invited by learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Rebello. The learned Single Judge recorded that there is no dispute that banana plantation should be deemed as falling within the meaning of the word `agriculture’ in its wider connotation, being thus a part of the agriculture in a larger sense but then the learned Single Judge observed that the question that is required to be considered is whether raising of banana plantation would come within the ambit and scope of definition of `agriculture’ within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act? It was recorded thereafter that a bare reading of the provision as contained in section 2(1) in simple and precise connotation would mean and include only crops and cultivation of such plants or trees as given in the Act. According to the learned Judge the definition was essentially not the raising of all types of food crops but crops like paddy, wheat, pulses and millet as well as vegetable crops besides sugar-cane and groundnut crops. It was further recorded that the word `includes’ in section 2(1) of the Act signifies `means’ and could not be treated as intending to enlarge or expand the scope of the word `agriculture’ to all types of cultivation of agricultural activities and similarly the use of the word `like’ shows on the contrary the intention of the Legislature to restrict the meaning of the definition to a field of the food crops aimed at for the purpose of bringing them within the purview of the word `agriculture’ and it was, therefore, concluded that the word `agriculture’ in section 2(1) relates only to the raising of food crops specified in the definition as well as crops of vegetables, sugar-cane and groundnut. Learned Counsel took us to the definition of the expression `agriculture’ in section 2(1) before the same was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976 which reads thus:

” `Agriculture’ with its grammatical variation and cognate expressions, includes the raising of food crops like paddy, wheat, pulses, millet and vegetables and of sugar-cane and ground nut but save as otherwise expressly provided by or under sub-section (1) of section 3 does not include raising of produce from fruit bearing trees including coconut, areca nut, cashew or ground nuts.”

4. However by the Amendment Act of 1976 sub-section (1-A) was incorporated in section 2 of the Act which defind `agriculture’ as including horticulture and raising of food crops, grass or garden produce, but does not include allied pursuits.

5. Admittedly the proceedings were initiated by respondent No. 1 before the Amendment Act of 1976 was brought in force though the orders of the Authorities under the Act were brought into being after the Amendment Act of 1976. For the controversy involved in the matter it is not necessary to decide whether the first or the amended definition of `agriculture’ would govern the fate of this case. Suffice at this point of time to mention that on the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 18 itself, it is sufficient to note that plantation of banana must be included in the meaning of the word `agriculture’ in its ambit and scope. Raising of banana plantation also has to be held to be part of agriculture. Having regard to the definition of `Agriculture’ it is not possible to exclude raising of banana plantation from the purview.

6. In this view of the matter this Letters Patent Appeal succeeds. The impugned orders of November 22, 1975 made by the Deputy Collector, of October 28, 1976 made by the Administrative Tribunal and of June 28, 1991 made by the learned Single Judge are quashed and set aside. The order of the Awal Karkun is restored but, however, for different reasons. There shall be no order as to costs.