JUDGMENT
H.S. Bedi, J.
1. The present petition is directed against the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority against the petitioner-tenant whereby his eviction has been ordered from the premises in dispute on the ground that he had used the shop in question for a purpose other than the one for which it had been let out to him. The facts of the case are as under:-
2. The landlord-respondent Shashi Bhushan filed an application in the year 1971 for eviction of the petitioner, on various ground. On a consideration of the eviction application as also the reply filed by the tenant-petitioner, the following issues were framed.
1. Whether respondent No. 1 has sublet the shop in dispute to other respondent? OPA.
2. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exist between the applicant and respondent No. 1 ? OPA.
3. Whether the value of the shop has been materially impaired? OPA.
4. Whether the tender of the amount is full and legal ? OPR.
5. Whether respondent is not liable to pay the house tax except Rs. 265/- for six months which includes the house tax? OPR.
After the recording of the evidence on the above quoted issues, the respondent moved an application for the amendment of the eviction application and on the same being allowed, an additional issue 5-A was framed which is also re-produced below: –
5-A. Whether respondent No. 1 has used the shop in dispute for purpose other than one for which it was let out ? OPA.
3. The Rent Controller as also the Appellate Authority decided all the issues No. 1 to 5 in favour of the petitioner but issue No. 5-A was decided in favour of the respondent-landlord with the result that the eviction of the petitioner has been ordered. The petitioner-tenant has thereafter come up to this Court in the present proceedings.
4. Mr. V.K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has argued that there was no concrete evidence not even of the landlord himself to prove that the petitioner had taken the demised premises for running a confectionery business and the rent legislation being basically for the welfare of the tenant, this Court must lean on his side. On facts it has been urged that even assuming that the shop had been let out for sale of confectionery, even then there was no change of user as there was no damage to the premises. He has relied on Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan, (1988-1) 93 P.L.R. 670 (S.C.) in support of this plea. Mr. Jain has finally stressed that even assuming that there had been a change of user yet the evidence clearly indicated that the respondent has consented to it as the change had been made way back in 1972 and the additional issue had been framed in 1978. For this purpose, he has placed reliance on D.C. Oswal v. V.K. Subbiah and Ors., 1992 H.R.R. 34 (S.C).
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find no merit in the petition. Before the Appellate Authority, the counsel for the petitioner had conceded that there was sufficient evidence on the record to show that the shop in dispute had been let out initially for the purpose of running a confectionery shop and that thereafter the change had been made, and the business of selling shoes was being carried on. However, after making this statement, the counsel then went oh to say that even in this admitted situation, there could be no change of user as the basic idea was that the tenant should not be allowed to make use of a building for the purpose for which the landlord might have not agreed to give the, same on lease. Reliance has also been placed by the counsel on certain judgments of this Court This argument was repelled by the Appellate Authority on- the basis of a number of judgments of this Court which need not burden this judgment, but I am of the view that once a property has been let out for a specific business than any change made in the use thereof which is not connected with that business, would be a case of misuser. Admittedly, there can be no connection between the selling of shoes and selling of confectionery and in this view of the matter, it cannot be said that judgment relied upon by the petitioner have any relevance to this case.
6. Mr. Jain has also urged that die misuse had taken place if at all as per the showing of the witnesses of the respondent in the year 1972 and the ejectment application having been; filed and the additional issues having been framed in 1978, it could be held by this Court that efflux of time, the respondent-landlord had condoned the change of user made by the petitioner.
7. I have also considered this argument and find no merit in it. In the cited case, the demised property which had been let out for a residential purpose was being put to commercial use over a period of seven years. This judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the present case as the change in user made in the case before the Supreme Court was too apparent to be ignored whereas the change herein is more subtle and clouded. Mr. Jain finally argued that there was no proper evidence to show that the premises in dispute had been let out for a specific purpose. This argument too is without force as admittedly the attorney of the landlord did appear and was subjected to a lengthy cross examination at the hands of the petitioner’s counsel but nothing substantial had emerged therefrom. Moreover it was after due consideration of the entire evidence, that the findings of fact were recorded by the Rent Controller as also by the Appellate Authority. It has also been very clearly held by the apex Court in Smt. Rajbir Kaur and Anr. v. M/s. Chokesivi and Ors., 1989 H.R.R. 134 (S.C.) that interference in findings of facts in revisional jurisdiction is very limited as where these findings are supportable by evidence on record, the revisional Court must be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence to supplement a conclusion of its own.
8. For the reasons recorded above; the present petition is dismissed. The tenant is allowed six months time to vacate the premises provided he deposits the entire amount of the rent plus six months rent in advance within a period of one month from the date a copy of the order is supplied to the Rent Controller. There shall, however; be no order as to costs.