JUDGMENT
Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. By these Orders I shall dispose of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which accompanied the filing of the Plaint. The prayers in the Plaint pertain to the passing of a permanent injunction and the grant of damages amounting to Rupees one crore. Copious and lengthy arguments have been filed with photocopies of decisions from across the globe. Counsel have made their submissions within the parameters of the decision of the Division Bench in Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi which holds that an injunction should not be granted at the pre-publication stage. However, it does not inexorably or logically follow that an injunction cannot be granted postpublication. The Division Bench was only concerned with an injunction at the pre-publication stage; yet it specifically took note of prior publications which had been made in respect of some of the defamatory statements which the Plaintiff had prayed to be injuncted. This is for the reason that the preponderant view in India as well as in other judicial systems is that once an allegedly defamatory statement has become common knowledge or has fallen within the public domain it is damages and not injunction that would be the appropriate relief. The Division Bench also specifically discussed the aspect of the Defendant stating that it would justify the comments made in the Article. Llearned Counsel for the Defendant has categorically stated that the Defendant intends to justify every statement made in the Article.
2. Briefly stated, it prima facie appears to me that if injunctions cannot be granted at the pre-publication stage, and that if they should not be granted once information is in the public domain, the jural approach should be that an injunction ought not to be granted at all. This is all the more so where the Plaintiff claims damages, as in the present case. The emphasis on ascertaining from the Defendant whether it intends to justify the alleged defamatory comments is salutary in that it would not be open to the Defendant, after defamation has already been carried out, to tender an apology or to say that it was misinformed.
3. Reference has been made to the pleadings in the Written Statement where the Defendant has relied on litigation pending in this Court. Llearned Counsel for the Defendant laid great store on the payment by the Plaintiff of certain amounts at the initial stages of the litigation. Mr.Chitale has quickly pointed out that these amounts were paid without prejudice to the contention of the Plaintiff in those proceedings. Had the Defendant relied purely on those events, since they had transpired after the writing and publishing of the Article, they would have been clearly anachronistic. It would, therefore, not have been open to the Defendant to rely on those events. Llearned Counsel for the Defendant, however, submits that the author already had sufficient and independent material on the basis of which the article was written. Therefore, the litigation was only an additional justification for the alleged defamatory writing. It is clear that the Defendant intends to prove the veracity of the publication.
4. At the present stage the Court must only consider the three cardinal principles i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury. As I have already observed above, in defamation cases it appears that the existence of a prima facie case is extremely important. The need to ascertain from the Defendant whether it proposes to justify its statements is an aspect of the existence of a prima facie case. Claim in the nature of defamation is essentially one of tort. If the Defendant has caused injury to the Plaintiffs reputation, he will have to make recompense at the end of the trial.
5. Persons who aspire for high public office must be prepared for myriad assaults to their reputation. If the Plaintiff succeeds in substantiating his complaint that these assaults have been launched with ulterior motives and that the dissemination of material has been carried out flippantly and without requisite investigation, heavy damages will soften the pain as well as vindicate the honour. In these circumstances, keeping the interest of the public in view i.e. that they have a right to know true details and facts of persons who are in the public glare, I find that a prima facie case has not been made out.
6. So far as the balance of convenience is concerned, the damage, if there is no truth to the statements made in the offending article has already taken place.
7. Finally in the context of irreparable injury, although the Plaintiff has stated that whatever sums of money may eventually be decreed will be donated to public charities, once reputation has been quantified in monetary terms the question of irreparable injury vanishes.
8. No grounds for the grant of an ad interim injunction are disclosed. Interim injunction stands recalled.
9. The application is dismissed.
CS (OS) No. 65/2004
10. Renotify on 9th November, 2006.