Supreme Court of India

Mmrda Officers Association, … vs Mumbai Metropolitan Regional … on 10 December, 2004

Supreme Court of India
Mmrda Officers Association, … vs Mumbai Metropolitan Regional … on 10 December, 2004
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, S.H. Kapadia
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  8260 of 2004

PETITIONER:
MMRDA OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, KEDARNATH RAO GHORPADE

RESPONDENT:
MUMBAI METROPOLITAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/12/2004

BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

2004 Supp(6) SCR 866

The Order of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : Head learned
counsel for the parties. Leave granted.

Though may points were urged in support of the appeal relating to the
eligibility of respondent No. 2 to be appointed as Chief, Town and Planning
Division, we do not think it necessary to go into this aspect in detail.
While issuing notice on 8.10.2004, it was indicated that the impugned order
of the High Court being practically non-speaking and non-reasoned, the
matter required to be set aside and remitted to the High Court for fresh
considera-tion and disposal by a speaking order. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned
Senior counsel appearing for appellant submitted that the High Court did
not even indicate reasons as to why the respondent No. 2 was held to be
eligible and/ or to have fulfilled the eligibility criteria. In response
Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1
submitted that respondent No. 2 clearly fulfilled eligibility criteria and
made reference to various documents in the counter affidavit filed before
the High Court and in this Court in this regard.

We find that the writ petition involved disputed issues regarding eli-
gibility. The manner in which the High Court has disposed of the writ
petition shows that the basic requirement of indicating reasons was not
kept in view and is a classic case of non-application of mind. This Court
in several cases has indicated the necessity for recording reason.

Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v.
Amalgamated Engg. Union observed, [1971] 1 ALL E.R. 1148 “The giving of
reasons in one of fundamental of good administration.” In Alex-ander
Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, [1974] ICR 120 NIRC it was observed :
“Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live
links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question
and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity
by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision
reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinux”, it can, by its silence,
render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity
of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound
judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why
the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of
natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words,
a speaking-out. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily
incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. Chairman and
Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar,
[2003] 4
SCC 364.

One of the main points raised by Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned Senior Council
is that since respondent No. 2 had obtained degree in Master of Planning
with specialization in Housing, she fulfilled the requisite qualifi-cation.
This basic question was not even discussed by the High Court, though there
was dispute as regards the acceptability of such a stand.

Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we
remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. It
goes without saying that the High Court shall pass a speaking order record-
ing reasons in support of its conclusions.

It is pointed out by Mr. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel that on 28th
September, 2004 respondent No. 2 has assumed officer after resigning from
her earlier office. In the fitness of things, therefore, till fresh
decision is taken, she shall be premitted to continue. It is, however, made
clear that by granting this interim protection we have not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the case.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.