JUDGMENT
Gulab Chand Gupta, J.
1. This is plaintiff’s first appeal under Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, whose suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion has been dismissed by the judgment dated 29th June, 1990 passed by Shri P.N. Pareshar, III Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Suit No. 23-A/87.
2. That the parties are legally married husband and wife is not in dispute. They were married on 19.11.1973 at Aligarh and lived together upto May, 1983 when the respondent is said to have gone to Dabra to her parents to deliver the child. It is also not in dispute that the parties have two daughters born to them out of this wedlock and living, one being born on 1979 and the other in 1983. Though the suit was filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion, the desertion alleged was within a period of two years from the date of the suit and was, therefore, rejected. It has not been pressed as a ground in this appeal. Under the circumstances, it is not required to be considered. The only question requiring consideration of this Court is whether the cruelty sufficient to dissolve marriage between the parties is established on the basis of material on record ?
3. After good deal of questioning by this Court, the learned Counsel for the appellant has been able to cite three instances which according to him, would amount cruelty sufficient to dissolving the marriage. They are; (i) respondent’s not living with the appellant at Bhopal continuously after marriage; (ii) casting unwarranted aspersions about his character on account of his niece Aparajeeta living with him since 1981 & (iii) making unnecessary allegations against him in reply to the notice (Ex. P/14) : It may, at once, be noticed that in the original plaint, which was filed on 18.9.1984, the appellant did not make any allegation either about his relationship with his niece Aparajeeta or about character assassination, allegedly made in Ex. P/14. Original plaint paragraphs 3 & 4 only mentioned that during the married life span of about 11 years, the respondent had lived with him only for a period of three years and the rest of the time, she had spent at Dabra and other places, without his consent and reasonable excuse. Even after the plaint was amended on 9.4 1986, no allegation based on appellant’s relationship which his niece Aparajeeta had been made out. Under the circumstances, it is not required to be considered in this appeal. The question requiring consideration, therefore, is whether she other two instances would amount to cruelty of the type, which would be found sufficient to dissolve an otherwise legal marriage ? Marriages, in order social conditions, are not supposed to be dissolved easily and hence the burden of proving a ground sufficient to dissolve such marriages is always on the party claiming dissolution. Then cruelty is not every act causing strain in married life. It is supposed to be an act, which gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that it is no longer safe to live as husband and wife. Under the circumstances, act of cruelty, sufficient to cause dissolution of marriage, will have to be considered in its proper perspective and distinguished from an ordinary strain of married life. Keeping this distinction in view, the facts of the case may now be examined to ascertain whether the conduct of the respondent has been so cruel as to amount to cruelty sufficient to dissolve the marriage.
4. There appears to be no dispute that the parties have not lived together as husband and wife continuously after their marriage. The respondent had gone to live with her parents several times and stayed on. From the documentary evidence (Ex. P/l to Ex. P/13), it appears that she had stayed at Dabra for three reasons, namely, (i) on account of sickness; (ii) because of her examination: & (iii) for purposes of delivering the child. Evidence of appellant appears to be that whenever, she had been to Dabra, he had tried to get her back, but she had refused to come on one pretext or the other. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that she had been coming and going to and from Bhopal. He himself had gone to Dabra and Gwalior. He has also admitted that whenever, the respondent lived at Bhopal, she had been doing all house-hold work and taking care of his old aged parents. He has also admitted that they had enjoyed happy married life, whenever they lived together and had maintained balance in their life in every manner upto 1983. Inspite of it; he has admitted that there had been occasions when they had difference of opinion between them and that was perhaps because there were too many members in the family and-they-could not meet each other as freely as they desired. This statement of the appellant would itself give rise to the conclusion that there war no defiance on the part of the respondent wife in living with him and she had in between tried her best to give the husband the best satisfaction out of the married life. This is more than established by the fact that during this period, she had given birth to four children, out of which two are still alive. Dissatisfied married life would neither prompt the appellant to make such a confession in this Court nor would produce such a result. Under the circumstances, this Court is not able to believe his statement that simply because she had not lived with him continuously, it amounts to cruelty. It is also not his case that the illness, which is apparent from the documentary evidence produced by him, was fake or he had over made any effort to arrange for her treatment at Bhopal. Apparently, he had thought it better to let the respondent’s parents take the responsibility presumably because he himself was busy, looking after his big family and parents. If he had any difficulty in this regard, he would not have accepted the lady subsequently. In this view of this matter, this Court is not able to accept his submission that he had been subjected to cruelty by the respondent. Indeed, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant seems to have exaggerated notions of his rights as a husband. Literate and enlightened, as he claims to be, this Court expects him to be little more tolerant end considerate for the womon, as liberation of women and their upliftment is the present national policy and need. He is not showing any regard to this new discipline and is trying to assert his right as if he is living in the last Century, which had long past and forgotten. Be that as it may, this Court is not the place where he could succeed in asserting his right. Under the circumstances, this Court finds, no justification for the appeal on that account alone.
5. As regards allegations made in reply to the notice (Ex. P/14), not much can be made out of the same. The allegation was in reply to the notice sent by his Advocate making allegations cruelty and desertion. It was in that context that it was alleged that “husband of my client is trying to find fault with his wife on the instigation of a woman who may be a concubine”. The name of the woman is not mentioned. Even the relationship has not been firmly stated, though it is stated as a reason for service of notice. Since allegation of cruelty has been made as a preparation to seeking divorce through law Court, such a reply is natural and should have been taken in that light. Then, there is no allegation that this was the cause of cruelty. The, notice was put to the respondent and she denied having given such an instruction to the Advocate. In view of such a statement, it is not possible to make anything, much less cruelty, on the basis of the said notice. Since nothing else is pleaded as a justification for seeking’ divorce, the appeal is found to be devoid of substance and dismissed with’ costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500/-.