JUDGMENT
Reva Khetrapal, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for a direction to the Police of Police Station Sultanpuri, Delhi to add Sections 307/384/506/120-B/34 of IPC in the case registered by them at the behest of the petitioner, being case FIR No. 56/2007 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC.
2. The facts are in a narrow compass. The petitioner on 20th September, 2006 laid a detailed complaint before the Crime Against Women Cell, Pitampura, New Delhi alleging the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 498-A/406/307/384/506/120-B/34 I.P.C. The said complaint on 10th January, 2007 culminated in the registration of FIR No. 56/2007, under Sections 498A/406/34 of I.P.C, Police Station Sultanpuri, Delhi. Aggrieved by the registration of the said FIR only under the aforesaid sections, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner for addition of offences under Sections 307/384/506/120-B/34 I.P.C on the ground that the police cannot be allowed to tone down the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused persons in the complaint and to register a case for the commission of less grave offences at its own whims and fancies.
3. For the purpose of delving into the question involved in the case, which is essentially of a legal nature, it is deemed necessary to refer to certain facts set out in the complaint by the petitioner Priya Gupta, in adverting to the attempt made on her life by her husband and other members of her in-laws family on 13th June, 2006 and, with regard to the commission of offences of extortion and criminal intimidation, allegedly committed by the aforesaid persons on 5th August, 2006.
4. The petitioner alleges that on 13th June, 2006, on the occasion of her husband (Sameer’s) birthday, at about 7 P.M., when her father and brother-in-law (jija) came to her matrimonial home with gold ring, gifts, sweets and a birthday cake too, her father-in-law, mother-in-law, sisters-in-law (Amrita and Meenakshi), brother-in-law (Vikas Gupta) and husband (Sameer) abused them for not giving dowry articles and threw away all the gifts brought by them including the sweets, and turned away her father and brother-in-law (jija). After they left, upon her protesting, they started beating her and threatened her that they would pour acid on her face. Her husband and both her sisters-in-law above-mentioned also threatened her that they would pour petrol on her and kill her. On her again protesting against the threats advanced by them, her husband pulled her inside the bath room. Her sister-in-law Amrita brought a can of kerosene oil from the kitchen and handed over the same to Himanshi (husband’s sister). Her mother-in-law told Himanshi to pour kerosene oil upon her, which she did. Upon this, she (the petitioner) started shouting Bachao Bachao, and on her screaming, her sister-in-law’s husband, Vikas Gupta (husband of Meenakshi) tried to shut her mouth and her other sister-in-law Amrita also joined him. Upon the exhortation of her mother-in-law, her father-in-law took a match box and handed over the same to her husband, who took out a match stick, ignited the same and threw the same on her. However, the match stick went out due to throwing upon her. On seeing her death in front of her, she was so shocked that she fell upon her knees and begged them not to kill her, but to give her two days time to ask her parents to fulfill all their demands. On her begging them and extending the aforesaid promise, they locked her in the bathroom and went for their dinner. She spent the entire night in the bathroom without dinner.
5. According to the petitioner, on 5th August, 2006, her father-in-law Om Prakash Gupta, his brother Jai Prakash Gupta and the latter’s wife Kusum Gupta insisted that she should sign some stamp papers and also blank papers. She saw that the stamp papers had been written upon and contained statements from her side that her in-laws had returned to her all her dowry articles, jewellery, etc. and that they were not making any demands for dowry. She accordingly refused to sign the same. Thereupon, her sister-in-law (Himanshi), her father-in-law (Om Prakash Gupta), his younger brother Jai Prakash Gupta and the latter’s wife Kusum Gupta mercilessly beat her. Her mother-in-law stated that she should leave her matrimonial home and divorce her husband, Sameer Gupta, so that they could re-marry their son with a foreigner, who was the younger sister of Kasha, wife of Deepak Gupta (her brother-in- law). Thereafter, she was locked in a room without food or medical treatment. On the following day, she was compelled to do all the house work even though she was running high fever.
6. The petitioner alleges that on the above facts set out in her complaint, all the aforesaid persons be tried for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Penal Code, and be also charged and tried for the offence of extortion punishable under Section 384 of the Code, as she was put in fear of injury to sign the stamp papers and other papers, which may be got converted into valuable security by the aforesaid accused persons. Accused not only threatened her with dire consequences, but threatened to implicate her parental family members in false cases. Hence they were guilty of the offence punishable under Section 506 of the I.P.C. as well.
7. I have heard Shri Vijay Aggarwal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Mukta Gupta, Standing Counsel for the State. Ms. Gupta urged that a preliminary inquiry had been made into the veracity of the allegations made in the complaint with regard to the incidents alleged to have occurred on 13th June, 2006 and 5th August, 2006 and no substance in the allegations of the complainant had been found. Registration of serious offences under Sections 307 IPC and 384 IPC thus could only lead to harassment of the accused persons.
8. Per contra, Mr. Vijay Aggarwal, learned Counsel for the petitioner vociferously contended that the Police is under a statutory obligation to register the FIR on the basis of complaint made, disclosing cognizable offence(s) and has no discretion to make preliminary inquiry into the veracity and correctness of the allegations made in the complaint.
9. Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Aggarwal on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 (Supp.) 1 SCC 335 to urge that the above point of law is set at rest by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal’s case, where the Court after examining the entire gamut of law on the mandatory nature of the provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has laid down as under:
31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present context). In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.
32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression information without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1) (a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, reasonable complaint and credible information are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word information in Section 154(1) unlike Section 41(1) (a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word information without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that ‘every complaint or information’ preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter reads that ‘every complaint’ preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing. The word ‘complaint’ which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word ‘information’ was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is the sine qua non for recording a first information report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.
33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
10. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Aggarwal on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. State to strenuously urge that the Police authorities were under statutory duty to register the FIR based on the allegations made in the complaint of the petitioner and it was not permissible for the Police to register an FIR only in respect of the minor offences mentioned in the complaint, and to defer the registration of the case to hold an inquiry and depending upon the result of the inquiry to decide whether to register a case or not for the commission of the more grave offences. He pointed out that time and again judicial notice had been taken of the fact that the Police is loathe to register crimes of any magnitude even in genuine cases possibly with a view to conceal the crime graph from the public eye, and various such cases had come to the notice of the Courts where the police adamantly refused to register the heinous crimes despite the victims crying hoarse.
11. Ms. Gupta on behalf of the State, on the other hand, urged that there were various reported judgments of the Apex Court holding that it is perfectly permissible for the Police officer to make a preliminary inquiry before registering a case. It was contended by her that it cannot be lost sight of that the complainants in many cases are inclined not only to embellish and embroider their cases, but cases are not unknown where the complainants resort to spinning yarn and concocting altogether false stories, merely with a view to vex and harass the accused and to somehow gain the vicious pleasure of seeing him behind the bars. Such is the fury of vindictiveness. And in such like cases, she contended, the Police could not and should not register the FIR disclosing the commission of cognizable offences, when once the allegations of the complainant are found to be altogether vague, unsubstantiated and of doubtful veracity.
12. Undoubtedly, in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi where offences under the provisions of Corruption Act, 1947 were being probed, the Supreme Court noted that since there was no prohibition under the Criminal Procedure Code, it was open to the police officer to make a preliminary enquiry before registering an offence and making full scale investigation.
13. In the case of P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras also, where also the matter related to an offence under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Supreme Court observed that before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with the acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct and a first information report is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer.
14. Both these decisions have been referred to with approval in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and in fact the Supreme Court recorded that the Superintendent of Police exhibited some over enthusiasm to please someone in the said case while recording the First Information Report.
15. In Satish Kumar Goel v. State and Ors. 2000 II AD (Delhi) 841, however, a Division Bench of this Court was concerned with the similar vexed question, and held that where there were allegations of extortion or illegal gratification and the complaint disclosed commission of cognizable offences, the First Information Report should be recorded. But herein too the Division Bench had drawn a clear distinction between the cases where the information laid before the officer in-charge was vague, indefinite or doubtful and cases where the complaint lodged before the police clearly and specifically disclosed commission of cognizable offences.
16. In another Division Bench decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. State 1994 Cr.L.J. 2502, Shri Y.K. Sabharwal, J (as His Lordships then was) drew a fine line of demarcation between cases registered against public servants where preliminary enquiry before the registration of the crime was permissible and other cases which do not pertain to commission of offences by public servants, as follows:
27. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Sethi on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, and in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, noticed by the Supreme Court in the aforequoted passages. In these decisions while dealing with the cases of public servant under Prevention of Corruption Act the Supreme Court held that before registering a case against a public servant which may do incalculable harm not only to him but also to the department he belongs to, the holding of preliminary enquiry before going ahead with the registration of the offence leading to a full scale investigation under Chapter XII of the Code is permissible. In the present case, we are not concerned with such eventuality. In the cited decisions, the Supreme Court has not held that when an information about commission of cognizable offence is given to an officer in-charge of a police station he can withhold registration of a case and embark upon an enquiry and refuse registration as a result of the said enquiry. Many offences are non-cognizable. Many are cognizable. The acceptance of contention of Mr. Sethi would mean that on receipt of information about commission of cognizable offence a police officer may embark upon an enquiry and refuse registration of a case on the ground that as enquiry shows commission of a non-cognizable offence or it shows that the information is not genuine. That does not appear to be the law as pronounced in Bhajan Lal’s case.
17. In paragraph-35 of its judgment, the Division Bench summarized the law as follows:
35. In our view the legal position is clear that on information being laid before the Police about the commission of a cognizable offence the police has no option but to register the case and then to proceed with investigation of the case under the provisions of Chapter XII of the Code. The police can also decide not to investigate in terms contemplated by Section 157(1) of the Code. The Police has no right to refuse registration of a case on information being laid before it about commission of cognizable offence and instead proceed with an enquiy and refuse registration as a result of the said enquiry. If it is left to be determined by the Police to decide in which cases of disclosure of commission of cognizable offence it would first hold preliminary enquiry and then decide to register or not to register the case, it would also lead to delay in registration of the crime and in the meantime the material evidence may not be available. The conduct of enquiry itself may entail a long period. There may be then challenge to the said enquiry. The enquiry of the nature suggested by the respondents is not permissible in law.
18. In Abhey Nath Dubey v. State of Delhi and Ors. 2002 VI AD (Delhi) 528, yet another Division Bench of this Court succinctly dealt with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code as follows:
13. The position that emerges and which is reiterated is that Section 154(1) casts a statutory obligation on an officer to enter substance of information laid before him disclosing commission of cognizable offence in the prescribed form/book and to register an FIR. He may conduct some enquiry if he finds the information and allegations contained in the complaint/report indefinite, uncertain and vague raising doubts on the commission of cognizable offence. But where such offence was, prima facie, disclosed, he had no option to embark on full-fledged enquiry to ascertain the genuineness or reliability of such information and allegations and draw his conclusions and render the investigation redundant and to refuse registration of FIR. He would be breaching the mandate of Section 154(1), thereby.
Refusal to register an FIR is loaded with some serious consequences for informant/complainant. It seals the fate of his complaint for good and deprives him of participation in investigation in which he could substantiate his allegations. It also deprives him of a second opportunity to support his case before Magistrate in the event Police Officer files a closure report in the FIR in which he is entitled to a notice and to oppose such closure report. The officer is neither empowered nor could he be allowed to assume the role of investigator before registration of FIR. His role begins with registering the FIR and ends with presenting charge sheet or challan before the competent court on the alleged offence.
14. In the present case, all this seems to have been overlooked and given a go-by. Respondents claim to have conducted a full-fledged enquiry into the petitioner’s complaint, and found no substance in it. This amounts to putting cart before the horse and runs counter to the scheme of Chapter XII. It is not their case that allegations in petitioner’s case were indefinite and uncertain or ambiguous causing any doubt on commission of cognizable offence. But their case, on the contrary, is that they had conducted an enquiry on their own and found the allegations in the petitioner’s case without substance. The course adopted appears to be untenable on the face of it. Needless to emphasize that it cannot left to sweet will of police officer to assume the role of trial court and sit over judgment on the merit and substance of informant/complainant’s information/complaint.
19. The legal position thus appears to be well established that Section 154(1) casts a statutory obligation on a police officer to enter the substance of the information laid before him, disclosing commission of cognizable offences, in the prescribed form and to register an FIR. He may conduct some enquiry, if the information disclosed is indefinite, uncertain, vague, hazy or the like, but he certainly does not enjoy the liberty of embarking on a full-fledged enquiry to ascertain the genuineness or reliability of such information and thereafter breach the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code and refuse to register an FIR on the ground that the allegations made in the complaint are unsubstantiated. The police officer however wide his powers of investigation, can by no means don the mantle of a judge. His role perforce must remain confined to registering the FIR, investigating the case and thereafter presenting to the Court either a chargesheet or a closure report, as the case may be.
20. In a recent decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Lallan Chaudhary and Ors. v. State of Bihar 2006(3) JCC 1731, the Apex Court emphasized the need for the SHO of the concerned police station to ensure registration of an FIR on the basis of the offences disclosed in the complaint petition, and not so as to incorporate certain offences in the FIR and deliberately omit the registration of other offences disclosed in the complaint. The facts in the Lallan Chaudhary’s case were somewhat akin to the facts of the instant case. The cognizable offences disclosed in the complaint in the said case were under Sections 147/148/149/448/452/323 and Section 395 I.P.C. The complaint was first filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the same was endorsed to the SHO of the concerned Police Station for registering the FIR under Section 154 of the Code. The concerned SHO of the Police Station however registered the case only under Sections 452/380/323/34 I.P.C. against the accused. Section 395 I.P.C. which had been disclosed in the complaint was excluded from the purview of the FIR and resultantly no investigation was carried out by the police in terms of Section 156 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No case was registered against the accused for offences disclosed in the complaint under Sections 147/148/149/448 I.P.C. as well. After referring to its earlier decision in Rakesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. (2006) 2 SCC 677, wherein the provisions of Section 154 were held to be mandatory, the Supreme Court at page 1734 of the Report endorsed the view of the High Court holding that non-framing of the charge under Section 395 I.P.C. had resulted in grave mis-carriage of justice. In this regard, the following pertinent observations were made: (Para-10 of the Report)
…It is well settled principle of law that in criminal trial, investigation is proceeded by an FIR on the basis of written complaint or otherwise disclosing the offence said to have been committed by the accused. In the present case, a grave miscarriage of justice has been committed by the SHO of concerned Police Station by not registering an FIR on the basis of offence disclosed in the complaint petition. The concerned police officer is statutorily obliged to register the case on the basis of the offence disclosed in the complaint petition and proceed with investigation in terms of procedure contained under Sections 156 & 157 of the Code. The FIR registered by the Police would clearly disclose that the complaint for offence under Section 395 IPC has been deliberately omitted and, therefore, no investigation, whatsoever, was conducted for the offence under Section 395 IPC.
21. At this juncture, reference may be usefully made to a recent decision of the Apex Court in Anuran Rastogi and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 2007 II AD (Cr.) (S.C) 114. In the said case, the first information report was registered for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A/323/504 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The informant filed an application before the concerned Magistrate to the effect that on the basis of the evidence collected by the investigating officer, cognizance ought to have been taken for offences punishable under Sections 307 and 406. The Magistrate was of the view that the prayer of the informant could be considered after evidence was adduced and commission of the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 406 I.P.C. was made out. The complainant asserted before the High Court that the materials collected by the Investigating Officer and contained in the case diary itself justified trial under Sections 307 and 406 I.P.C. The High Court held that the Magistrate should at the time of framing charges consider and decide the point. Endorsing the view of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate was not bound to take cognizance of the offences indicated in the police report and was entitled to consider the material at the time of framing of charge.
22. Keeping in mind the above legal position, the inevitable conclusion is that after the first information report is registered for the aggravated offences under Sections 307/384/506 I.P.C. and investigated upon, not only the SHO concerned will be at liberty to submit a challan or a closure report thereon, as he may deem fit, but it will be open to the concerned trial court to see if the charges for the commission of the aforesaid offences are made out or not.
23. The complainant claims that the accused persons attempted to set her on fire, but she was providentially saved on account of the fact that the match stick was extinguished. She also claims that though she has not received her dowry and stridhan articles, her signatures were obtained by the accused persons on blank stamp papers by putting her in fear of her life and criminally intimidating her by other means as well. The acts complained by her prima facie disclose commission of cognizable offences under Sections 307/384/506 I.P.C. Therefore, having regard to the legal position that a statutory duty is cast upon the police to register and investigate the case on receipt of a complaint, the first information report, in my considered opinion, ought to have been registered for the offences under Section 307 and 406 I.P.C. and investigation taken up thereon. Indisputably, if as a result of the investigation, it was subsequently found that the allegations made in the complaint could not be substantiated or were false, the investigating agency would have been at liberty to recommend initiation of criminal proceedings against the complainant in terms of Section 182 I.P.C.
24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the investigating officer is directed to register the case on the basis of the complaint made by the complainant/petitioner under the appropriate provisions of law viz. Sections 307/384/506/120-B/34 I.P.C by addition of the said sections in the case diary and to investigate the same fully and fairly in accordance with law.
25. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 123/2007 stands disposed of accordingly.