JUDGMENT
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
1. The suit has been filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 by the plaintiff herein. The plaintiff claims to have been in lawful authorised occupation of flat No. G-2, Connaught Place, New Delhi comprising of four rooms, one kitchen, one bathroom, verandah and courtyard on the first floor of the property till 19.7.1990. The property in question was requisitioned for the first time in July 1948 by the Collector, Delhi and its possession was handed over. The premises in question was allotted to the plaintiff in June 1972 by the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi since the plaintiff was serving as a Judicial Officer. The property was placed in the judicial pool for such allotment and that is the reason why the allotment took place in favor of the plaintiff. The property was finally derequisitioned but the plaintiff did not hand over the possession of the suit property.
2. The allotment in favor of the plaintiff was cancelled on 4.3.1987 and it is the case of the plaintiff that there could not be any cancellation of allotment to the plaintiff since the flat had been placed in the judicial pool.
3. The plaint notes that the defendant had filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 445/1988 being the owner of the property which was decided on 26.4.1990. The said decision is reported as in S. Rajdeo Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. being the decision of a Division Bench of this Court. The pleas in relation to the allotment and the derequisitioning of the property were considered in depth. It was held that the possession of respondent No. 6 therein (plaintiff herein) had become unlawful and the competent authority was justified in passing the order for him to hand over possession. Thus, the plaintiff was dispossessed in accordance with law as held by the Division Bench. The Division Bench also held that the appropriate relief to be granted in the writ petition was that if there was a dispute about as to whom the property was to be handed over, an enquiry would be held by the Collector (Requisition) after possession is taken over from the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was bound to deliver possession to the competent authority.
4. The present suit is the second round filed after the categorical observations of the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment which really made the matter res integra between the parties. This suit has also been dismissed on three occasions for non-prosecution and restored. The issues in the suit have not even been framed and thus on the last date of hearing taking into consideration the nature of the controversy the Court directed that the admission/denial of documents would be carried out before the Joint Registrar on 22.3.2007 and the case was listed for framing of issues. The plaintiff was required to remain present in Court for recording of his statement under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’).
5. The plaintiff did not file any original documents and the matter was renotified by the Joint Registrar but to no avail. Today again the same request is made that the plaintiff wants to file original documents. The plaintiff is not present in Court for recording of statement.
6. Frivolous, vexatious and misconceived litigation like the present one cannot be permitted to be dragged on by the plaintiff. The matter in issue stands determined by the Division Bench. The plaintiff has filed the suit and has been carrying on the suit at his own leisure. Repeated indulgence has been shown to the plaintiff by restoration of the suit after the same was dismissed. The plaintiff is refusing to appear in Court for recording of his statement knowing fully well the consequences which would follow.
7. Another important aspect is that the plaintiff was a Judicial Officer and in fact occupied the post of Registrar of this Court till he was dismissed from the service. It is most unfortunate that such kind of judicial proceedings are initiated and that too by a Judicial Officer. An end must be put to such litigation and the plaintiff be put to heavy terms for the same.
8. It may be also taken note of that the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC provide for rejection of the plaint on the grounds set out therein. The Supreme Court in Raj Narain Sarin (Dead) Through LRs and Ors. v. Laxmi Devi and Ors. had observed that this power can be exercised to reject the plaint where litigation was utterly vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. An earlier judgment in the case of T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467 was relied upon where it was categorically laid down that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint it manifestly appears to be vexatious and meritless in the sense not disclosing a clear right to sue, the trial court should exercise its powers under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfillled since bogus litigation ought to be shut down at the earliest stage. It has already been noticed in the facts hereinabove that though the Division Bench in the present case had settled the issue in respect of the rights of the plaintiff to occupy the pool accommodation, the present suit has been filed. The aspect of frivolous litigation cluttering the courts and consequently the requirement of dealing with the same has been set out by the Apex Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi and Ors. . It was observed in para 44 as under:
44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of Court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the Court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The re-agitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be re-agitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of Court especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of Courts’ discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised and exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding.
9. The aforesaid observations show that re-litigation is an abuse of the process of the Court and is contrary to justice and public policy. The earlier litigation between the parties determined the issue and in view of the observations of the Division Bench, it is really not in doubt that the aspects sought to be agitated by the plaintiff cannot be re-agitated.
10. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das , the Court while imposing exemplary costs observed in para 47 as under:
47. There is an increasing tendency on the part of the litigants to indulge in speculative and vexatious litigation and adventurism which the fora seem readily to oblige. We think such a tendeny should be curbed. Having regard to the frivolous nature of the complaint, we think it is a fit case for award of costs, more so, when the appellant has suffered heavily. Therefore, we award costs of Rs. 25,000/- in favor of the appellant. It shall be recovered from the first respondent. C.A. No. 4584 of 1994 arising out of SLP (C) No. 272 of 1994 is allowed accordingly.
11. In view of the aforesaid, I deem it appropriate to dismiss the suit with costs of Rs. 50,000/-.
