ORDER
B.R. Arora, J.
1. The petitioner has sought the review of the order dated 30-8-1993, passed by this Court, on the ground that at the time of argument in the writ petition, his counsel could not point-out the important provisions of law on the subject, which have a material bearing on the question, which has resulted in failure of justice. The order has, also, been sought to be reviewed on the ground that the relevant case-law on the subject, laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the High Court, could not be brought to the notice of the Court which have a binding nature.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a combined reading of the statutes 9B and 7 makes it clear that the Academic Council requires jurisdiction to legislation the subject only when there is a recommendation of the Equivalence Committee and the Statutes are always subject to the provisions of the Act and the Ordinances are subject to the Act and the Statutes and, therefore, the Statutes override the Ordinance because the Ordinances are promulgated under Sections 23 and 24 and as these relevant provisions could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of deciding the writ petition, the controversy in the matter could not be properly adjudicated. It has, also been submitted by the learned cousel for the petitioner that the petitioner pussed the concerned-examination with four subjects from the concerned Institute, which was recognised by the respondents at the time when the petitioner took admission, which is clear from Annexure. 1 and when at the time of taking the admission the recognition was accorded to the (sic) the withdrawal of the recognition later-on by the respondents will not disentitle the petitioner from being admitted in the course. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in: Suresh Pal v. State of Haryana, 1987 (2) SCC 445 : (AIR 1987 SC 2027). It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the time of arguments, the Resolution dated 3-4-1993, was placed on record and as the petitioner had not seen the Resolution earlier, he could not make the submission in right perspective which amounts to discovery of new document and, therefore, the law relating to the point could not be brought to the notice of the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Court is not precluded from recalling or reviewing its order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to give justice to the parties concerned and to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court.
2A. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over : Gulam Ibbas v. Adbul Kaddar (deceased) through his executors, 1970 (3) SCC 643, O. N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge, Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 107, Northen India Catering (India) v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674 : (1980 Tax LR 1657) the State of Rajasthan v. Mehta Chetan Das Kishan Das, 1980 WLN 13 : (AIR 1981 Rai 36) Durga Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 HP 1 and S. Nagaraj v. The State of Karnataka, 1993 (5) JT 27.
I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
3. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is founded on equity and if the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake which has resulted in miscarriage of justice then the Courts are not precluded from rectifying its own mistake and can review its own order. It is the constitutional obligation on the Courts to set its mistake right by recalling or reviewing its earlier order which was passed on account of some mistake, but while reviewing the order the Court must, also, not overlook the fact that the decision, once given by the Court, is final and normally it should not be set at naught by the same Court but the Court can correct the accidental mistake or miscarriage of justice. Finality of the judgment will not be reconsidered where an error has been committed in a judicial decision. While exercising the power for reviewing a judgment the Court must not overlook the fact and the finality of the judgment, delivered by the Court, should not be reconsiderd unless there is a glaring mistake or omission crept-in in the earlier order. The powers of review cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case and the judgment should not be reviewed merely on the asking of the party when there is no error apparent on the face of the record.
4. The first ground, on which review of the judgment has been sought by the petitioner, is that the petitioner could not make the submission effectively as the copy of the Resolution dated 3-4-1993, was placed on record only at the time of hearing and, therefore, the placing of the Resolution on record may be treated as discovery of new fact and the law on the point and the judgment should be reviewed. The Resolution dated 3-4-1993 was placed on record at the time of hearing. Reference to this Resolution was, also, made in the reply. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised arguments with respect to this Resolution and the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner were considered and decided by this Court in its judgment and if some arguments relating to the Resolution could not be advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner then that cannot be a point which could not be decided and that cannot be a ground for review because it is not a discovery of any fresh evidence or material.
5. The next ground, on which review has been sought, is that the relevant provisions of law, i.e., Ordinance 36-B, Statutes 7 and 9-B and Appendix ‘A’ have not been considered in the right perspective. The review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case and the writ petition cannot be reheard only on the ground that the law has not been properly considered and applied. Whatever arguments were raised before the Court, were considered and decided in the judgment and the petitioner, if he has any grievance against the judgment, can prefer an appeal but if the provisions of law have not been considered in a particular manner, in which the petitioner wants to agitate it then that cannot be a ground for reviewing the judgment. If the view taken by the Court in the judgment is a possible view having regard to the facts discernible from the facts on record then it cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record and no review can be made. The controversy, raised in the writ petition and the provisions of law, i.e., Ordinance 36-B, Statutes 7 and 9B and Appendix ‘A’ as well as the powers of the Equivalence Committee recognised by the University and the passing of the Resolution by the Academic Council and Syndicate, were all considered by the Court is its judgment and no case for reviewing the judgment in this case is made out.
6. The last point, on which the review has been sought by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the petitioner took admission in the year 1991 in the Certificate Course and the Indian School Certificate Examination for the year 1991, which was recognized by the University as equal to Senior Higher Secondary Examination and as he completes that course, therefore, the petitioner cannot be denied admission in the First Year T.D.C. on the ground that the University has, later on, withdrawn the recognition to the Certificate Examination in four subjects and has given recognition only to the clearance of Certificate Examination with five subjects. His further submission is that as the petitioner joined the course before the date of de-recognition rendering the certificate obtained by the petitioner useless, it would be unjust to refuse recognition to the certificate obtained by the petitioner and decline to give him admission. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over the judgment of the Supreme court rendered in : Suresh Pal v. The State of Haryana, 1987 (2) SCC 445. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this point is that this judgment of the Supreme Court could not be brought to the notice of this Court which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Failure of consideration of the judgment of the Supreme Court materially affecting the result of the case, amounts to an error apparent on the face of record but whether, at all, this judgment is applicable in the present case or not, no foundation has been laid down by the petitioner in this regard in this writ petition. Neither there is a pleading to this effect nor was this point agitated even during the course of arguments and, therefore, no case for review is made out. The review can be ordered only on the ground which existed on the date the order was passed by the Court. When it was not the case of the petitioner in the writ petition nor was it agitated at the time of hearing then it cannot be said that any question of law materially affecting the result of the case, has not been considered. The power of review can be exercised in a suitable case in order to impart justice to the parties but the judgment cannot be reviewed merely to allow the petitioner to agitate new grounds.
7. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same in hereby dismissed.