PETITIONER: STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs. RESPONDENT: S.S.KOSHAL DATE OF JUDGMENT12/01/1994 BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) HANSARIA B.L. (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC Supl. (2) 468 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court allowing the writ petition filed
by the respondent. The respondent was the Branch Manager in
the State Bank of India, Bhopal branch. A disciplinary
inquiry was held against him in respect of six charges. The
Enquiry Officer held charges 1 and 5 established but held
that charges 2, 3, 4 and 6 were not established. After
perusing the report of the Enquiry Officer the disciplinary
authority agreed with the Enquiry Officer that charges 1 and
5 are established and charges 3 and 4 are not established.
So far as charge 2 is concerned he disagreed with the
Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority held that the
said charge to have been fully established. So far as
charge 6 is concerned, he again disagreed with the Enquiry
Officer and held it partially established. Accordingly, he
imposed the punishment of removal from service by an order
dated 8-5-1984. The respondent filed an appeal to the
appellate authority prescribed by the service regulations.
The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 25-1-1985
under the following order:
“With reference to your appeal dated 31-8-
1984, we have to advise that the said appeal
was placed by us before the Local Board, the
appellate authority, on 25-1-1985. We further
advise that the Board in the meeting held on
the aforesaid date, resolved as under:
“THE BOARD considered at length the facts of
the case including the fact that the
disciplinary authority has differed from the
findings of the inquiring authority in respect
of two charges. After having considered the
appeal and other relevant papers and having
applied their minds, the Board concluded that
there are no grounds to sustain the appeal and
accordingly RESOLVED that the order of the
disciplinary authority be upheld and that the
appeal made by Shri S.S. Koshal, be
dismissed.”
+ Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8147 of 1992
470
3. The respondent then approached the High
Court by way of a writ petition, wherein he
urged three grounds viz.,
(1) [N]on-supply of copy of the Enquiry
Officer’s report,
(2) the failure to give a fresh notice to
him when the appellate authority disagreed
with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on
some of the charges, and
(3) the fact that the appellate authority
passed a non-speaking order in violation of
the principles of natural justice.
4. The High Court upheld all the three grounds and allowed
the writ petition against which the present appeal is
preferred.
5. The first contention stands negatived by the
Constitution Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL,
Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar1, inasmuch as the order of
punishment is prior to 20-11-1990.
6. So far as the second ground is concerned, we are unable
to see any substance in it. No such fresh opportunity is
contemplated by the regulations nor can such a requirement
be deduced from the principles of natural justice. It may
be remembered that the Enquiry Officer’s report is not
binding upon the disciplinary authority and that it is open
to the disciplinary authority to come to its own conclusion
on the charges. It is not in the nature of an appeal from
the Enquiry Officer to the disciplinary authority. It is
one and the same proceeding. It is open to a disciplinary
authority to hold the inquiry himself. It is equally open
to him to appoint an Enquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry
and place the entire record before him with or without his
findings. But in either case, the final decision is to be
taken by him on the basis of the material adduced. This
also appears to be the view taken by one of us (B.P. Jeevan
Reddy, J.) as a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India’. The second contention
accordingly stands rejected.
7. Now coming to the third ground on which the High Court
has allowed the writ petition, the relevant rule [Rule
51(2)] reads as follows:
“An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days
from date of receipt of the order appealed
against. The appeal shall be addressed to the
appellate authority and submitted to the
authority whose order is appealed against.
The employee may, if he so desires, submit an
advance copy to the appellate authority. The
authority whose order is appealed against
shall forward the appeal together with its
comments and records of the case to the
appellate authority. The appellate authority
shall consider whether the findings are
justified and/or whether the penalty is
excessive or inadequate. Authority may pass
an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or
setting aside the penalty or remitting the
case to the authority which imposed the
penalty or to any other authority with such
directions as it deems fit in the
circumstances of the case.”
8. The High Court has taken the view that the rule
requires the appellate authority to pass a speaking order
even if it is an order of affirmance. For the purpose of
this case, we shall assume the said view to be the correct
one. Even so we are not satisfied that the appellate order
is not a speaking order. We have already extracted the
appellate order in full hereinbefore, which shows that it
1 (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184: (1993) 25 ATC 704:
JT (1993) 6 SC 1
2 (1983) 3 SLR 319, 324 & 325 (AP HC)
471
considered at length the facts of the case including the
fact that the appellate authority (sic disciplinary
authority) had differed from the findings of the Enquiry
Officer in respect of the two charges. The appellate
authority then says that it considered the relevant grounds
of appeal and after considering the facts of the case came
to the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal.
In view of the fact that it was an order of affirmance, we
are of the opinion that it was not obligatory on the part of
the appellate authority to say more than this as the order
as it is, shows application of mind. The order cannot be
characterised as a non-speaking order.
9. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The
order of the High Court is set aside and the order of
punishment is restored. No costs.
472