JUDGMENT
J.B. Koshy, J.
1. This Writ Petition is filed by the All India Lawyers Union, Kerala State Committee as a public interest litigation challenging Ext.P2 order of Taluk Land Board, Kozhikode in so far as it exempted 35 acres of land from the property owned by late P.V. Sami and family in the suo motu land revision case. Petitioner has also arrayed as respondent Mr. M. Ratna Singh, Advocate General and Mr. Raj an Joseph, Additional Advocate General by name as respondents 3 and 4 in this case imputing mala fides and impropriety on their parts. Apart from the prayer for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing Ext. P2 there was also a prayer for directing the State Government to take appropriate steps by filing a regular Civil Revision Petition to protect Government land from being given to unauthorised persons. Shri G. Janardhana Kurup, a very senior member of the Bar argued on behalf of the petitioner. We have heard Senior Government Pleader M. Ajay for respondents 1 to 4 at the time of admission stage itself. Apart from questioning the maintainability of the Writ Petition challenging the order of the Taluk Land Board and locus standi of the petitioner to challenge the same, respondents also denied all allegations made in the Writ Petition.
2. Before we consider the contentions raised in the Writ Petition, we may refer to the brief facts of the case. Section 83 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) provides that no persons shall be entitled to own or possess lands in excess of the ceiling area with effect from 1st January, 1970 (notified date). Section 82 fixes ceiling area for family as well as individual persons. Section 81 exempts certain lands from the purview of ceiling area. Lands occupied by educational institutions including land necessary for the convenient use of the institutions and playgrounds attached are also exempt as per Section 81(1)(r) of the Act. Section 85 of the Act deals with surrender of excess lands. The scheme of the Act as can be seen from Section 96 shows that excess land surrendered is mainly intended for distributing the same to the landless agricultural labourers and smallholders. Section 96(1A) also gives power to use such surrendered land for any public purposes. Family of Sri. P.V. Sami and his wife Smt. P.V. Madhavi were holding a total of 77.5 acres of land in Kozhikode Taluk. Suo motu proceedings was taken against the family of the assessee Shri P.V. Sami under the above provisions and draft statement was issued provisionally fixing excess land as 63.35 acres. After hearing objections, the Taluk Land Board passed a final Order on 27th June, 1986 excluding an extent of 68.50 acres out of the total extent of 77,75 acres possessed.
3. State filed Revision Petition against the above order before this Court under Section 103 of the Act. By Ext.Pl Order in C.R.P. No. 1333 of 1987, one of us (Justice J.B. Koshy), sitting single, remanded the matter with regard to 35 acres found by the Land Board as transferred before the relevant date and which was in possession of the School Committee in which Shri P.V. Sami himself was the Vice-President and also 8.5 acres said to have been given on lease to Smt. Kamalam, daughter of the declarant. While remanding the matter, this Court observed as follows in Ext.Pl order:
“No document is produced to show that the School was in possession of this land before 1970 and the exact extent of land actually in possession of the school even if the school was in possession of the property. Since the Taluk Land Board did not advert to these facts the finding regarding the exclusion of 35 acres of land has to be set aside and it has to be reconsidered after giving notice to the concerned parties.”
With regard to 8.5 acres of land also, this Court found as follows:
“The Taluk Land Board has to reconsider the same after giving notice to the parties. The parties can adduce evidence to prove their claim.”
The order of the Taluk Land Board with regard to other portions of the land was upheld. While remanding the matter, it was stated that both parties will be free to adduce evidence. While remanding the matter, it was also noticed that Land Tribunal rejected the application of purchase of land made by the School Committee as well as Kamalam and at that time it was not pointed out that appeals were filed against the order of the Tribunal. After the remand, affidavits were filed. Land Board also got an inspection report through the authorised officer as provided under Section 137 of the Act to ascertain the actual facts regarding possession etc. It was pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that appeal was filed actually against the order of the Land Tribunal. The appeal was allowed by way of remand and set aside the order. Again, order was passed and the matter is now pending in the Appellate Authority. Even though the order of the Land Tribunal regarding certificate of purchase under Section 72K is binding, the Taluk Land Board can examine whether it is inaccurate in its face and the scope of enquiry in these two proceedings are different as held by the Supreme Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk Land Board and Ors. (AIR 1979 SC 1573). In paragraph 28 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“While the High Court was justified in taking the view that the scope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board is that relating to the surplus land with which the Land Tribunal is not concerned, the certificate of purchase has its own ‘conclusive’ evidentiary value to the extent provided in Section 72K(2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board. It will therefore be for the Board to arrive at is own decision under Sub-section (5) of Section 85 according to the law, and it will be permissible for it to examine, where necessary, whether the certificate is inaccurate on its face, or has been obtained by fraud or collusion.”
Before remand also, there was a report of the Authorised Officer. After considering the evidence, again, the Taluk Land Board found that 35 acres of land given to the School Committee and 8.5 acres assigned to Kamalam has to be deleted from the land ceiling area of the declarant. Petitioner questions mainly the exemption given to the 35 acres of land given to the School Committee. Hence, we are considering that matter only in this judgment.
4. The concerned file was placed before us by the Government Pleader. We have gone through the same and we see that there is no basis for allegations of mala fides or impropriety on the part of the Advocate General of Additional Advocate General. The allegation is that the Advocate General is related to the family of Shri P.V. Sami, especially sixth respondent, and due to his influence Ext.P3 opinion was given by the Additional Advocate General that there is no scope for preferring revision application. It is further argued that the Additional Advocate General has no right to give such an opinion. The file shows that when requests for opinions for filing revisions/appeals are sought, in the usual course, Advocate General marks it to various Government Pleaders. In this case, it was marked to the Additional Advocate General. It is true that as held by the Supreme Court in M.T. Khan and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and Ors. ((2004) 2 SCC 267) post of Additional Advocate General is not a constitutional post and he cannot perform any constitutional or statutory functions of Advocate General. However, in paragraph 11, the Apex Court held as follows:
“11. The Government of a State as a litigant can appoint as many lawyers as it likes to defend it. For the said purpose, the State is not prohibited from conferring such designation on such legal practitioners as it may deem fit and proper. But, the State, in our considered view, cannot appoint more than one Advocate General.”
By giving legal opinion, the Additional Advocate General was not exercising any constitutional or statutory function. The duties of the Advocate General are enshrined in the Notification dated 1st November, 1956 as rules regulating the conditions of service, duties, remuneration, etc. of the Advocate General and Additional Advocate General, Kerala in Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978. The officers may consult the Advocate General before taking decision in cases where an appeal or revision is to be filed in the High Court (Rules 58(3)). Therefore, the query was issued to Advocate General and it seems that without looking into the contents, it was marked to the Additional Advocate General and the Additional Advocate General gave the opinion. If the Advocate General himself had given the opinion; the petitioner would have argued that a biased opinion was given due to the relationship with parties. The file was marked to the Additional Advocate General in the routine course and he gave the legal opinion. There is no basis for the allegations that the Advocate General might have influenced the Additional Advocate General to give such an opinion. Unfounded allegations based on surmises and insinuations cannot be considered by this Court. According to the learned Government Pleader, petition was filed to tarnish the image of the Advocate General, a constitutional functionary, with ulterior motives and it is only a politically motivated and publicity oriented litigation. He also referred to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2003 AIR SCW 6105). Since the allegations against the Advocate General were not seriously pursued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, we are not considering the bona fides of the petitioner. However, we are reminded of the following observations of the Apex Court in Sachidanand Pandey and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. ((1987) 2 SCC 295).
“61. It is only when Courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such is required. But this does mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants.”
This Court cannot transgress of the jurisdiction and would not step out of the known area of judicial review. But, we are unable to understand how a copy of the legal opinion given by the Additional Advocate General was received by the petitioner. It is a confidential previleged document between the client and the advocate. (See also Sections 126,128 and 129 of the Evidence-Act.) A photostat copy of the legal opinion including the signature portion is produced. It is for the Government to enquire how the legal opinion was leaked out from the office and take appropriate action.
5. We are unable to accept the next plea that this Court should direct the State Government to take appropriate steps by way of regular Civil Revision Petition. In this connection, we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Dass and Ors. v. State of Haryana (2003 (1) KLT (SC) (SN) 5 = (2003) 1 SCC 204). In that case, the Supreme Court was considering jurisdiction under Sections 374 (2), 378 and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The following observation was made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 11:
“Before proceeding further in the matter, be it noted herein that the High Court does not have authorisation by and under the existing legal system to exercise any advisory jurisdiction. The Government has its agencies to advise and in the event the Government feels it expedient to obtain the advice from such agency or agencies, it is for the Government to decide and not for the High Court to suggest. Direction to file appeal not only stands as an excessive user of jurisdiction but indicates exercise of advisory jurisdiction which the High Court does not possess and is unknown to law.”
This Court is not sitting in an advisory jurisdiction to the Government to file appeal or Revision Petition in a particular case. It is for the Government to consult law officers or any other advocate or advocates to give legal opinion whether appeal or revision can be filed or not.
6. Finally, it was argued that this Court should quash Ext.P2 by exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as finding in Ext.P2 order of the Land Tribunal is erroneous. There is a prayer for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order. For issuing a writ of certiorari to quash the order, the impugned order should be prima facie illegal or perverse on the face of the record. In this case, the authorised officer has reported that the assessee has assigned 35 acres of land to the Vice-President of the School Committee by virtue of a verumpattam kychit executed on 28th March, 1964. It has also come out in evidence that the school was in existence from 1958 onwards. Even though it was executed in favour of Pantheerankavu High School Committee (to P.V. Sami in the capacity as Vice-President of the School Committee) and portion of that land is being used as playground and now part of the school building is also in the said land. The property is in the possession of Pantheerankavu High School Committee. The school was in possession of this land since 1963. It has also come out in evidence that the said school was started in 1958 and the land around the school was being used for the purposes of the school-. The District Educational Officer, Kozhikode also produced records to show that staff fixation order was issued during the period 1959-60 also. After the remand also, the authorised officer has reported that he has inspected the land and 35 acres in R.S. No. 50/2A was in the possession of the School Committee and the land is in hard laterite rock and it cannot be used for agricultural purposes and not fit for distribution to agricultural labourers. It is not disputed that the above property is in use by the school. Part of the school building and playground is situated in the property. It is submitted that more than 2000 students are studying in this school and there is a proposal for further development of the school. These are findings based on evidence. We are not sitting in appeal to reappraise the evidence.
7. The Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash (2004 (2) KLT (SC) (SN) 5 = 2004 AIR SCW 4221) held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for correcting the errors of the Subordinate Court, cannot act as Appellate Court and reappreciate evidence and set aside the judgments of the Lower Court. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003 (3) KLT 490 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 3044) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the Court or authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging into a long drawn process of reasoning cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinion on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other cannot be called a patent error. Jurisdiction is not available to be exercised for indulging into reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors like a Court of Appeal. From the evidence available before the Land Board, we are of the opinion that it cannot be stated that there is any errors apparent on the face of the record so as to exercise certiorari jurisdiction. In view of the above findings, we are of the opinion that it is unnecessary to consider the question of locus standi of the petitioner to file the Writ Petition challenging the order of the Taluk Land Board. The Writ Petition is dismissed.