High Court Madras High Court

T. Mary Isabel vs The Special Officer, Alandur … on 16 December, 2002

Madras High Court
T. Mary Isabel vs The Special Officer, Alandur … on 16 December, 2002
Author: S Jagadeesan
Bench: S Jagadeesan, K Govindarajan


JUDGMENT

S. Jagadeesan, J.

1. The appellant herein is the Plaintiff in C.S. No. 14 of 1983, who filed the said suit for specific performance of the agreement, Ex.P1 dated 23-11-1975. Under the said agreement, the appellant agreed to purchase the property of an extent of 1.80 acres for a price of Rs.1,17,001/-. On the date of the agreement, the appellant paid a sum of Rs.1,001/- as advance. As per the terms of agreement, the appellant has to obtain the sale deed after getting approval from the Town Planning authorities in respect of the layout plan prepared by the appellant. The appellant also prepared the plan for layout and submitted an application on 20-02-1976 to the authorities. The said application was returned for payment of necessary fee. In the meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 came into force on 03-08-1976 as such the appellant was informed that the layout plan cannot be approved or sanctioned. Inspite of the same, the appellant pursued with the authorities for getting the approval of the layout sanctioned and ultimately she failed to get the same. Thereafter, the appellant filed the suit in the year 1983.

2. The first defendant, who contested the suit died. Defendants 3 to 11 are the legal representatives of the deceased first defendant. The first defendant filed his written statement stating that the appellant has to get the sanction from the Directorate of Town Planning within six months and to complete the sale in six months thereafter. Since the appellant failed to discharge her obligations and prolonged the matter with the authorities without any reference to the first defendant, the first defendant cannot be compelled to execute the sale deed in view of the long lapse of time. Apart from that, with the intervention of Land Ceiling Act, the suit agreement itself become void and unenforceable. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

3. On the above pleadings, the learned Judge framed as many as five issues. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Judge found that the appellant was not entitled for the relief of specific performance of the contract for the simple reason that after the intervention of Land Ceiling Act, the agreement cannot be enforced. Further, the learned Judge held that the appellant, without any reference to the first defendant had simply dragged on the proceedings with the authorities and she never sought any extension of time from the first defendant. The learned Judge also felt that considering the lapse of long period i.e., from 1975 to 1983, the appellant is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of the contract and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant has come forward with this appeal.

4. Mr. Varadachari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that the conditions stipulated in the suit agreement is that the appellant is entitled to get the sale deed executed after obtaining permission from the Directorate of Town Planning in respect of the layout. Since the process took considerable time, it is not open to the first defendant to refuse to execute the sale deed on the ground of delay. The learned Judge also failed to consider that the appellant was all along ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by continuing the proceedings before the authorities to get the approval. Hence, the finding that the appellant had committed delay and that too without any reference to the first defendant cannot be a ground to refuse the relief sought for by the appellant. As per the terms of agreement, the appellant has to obtain planning permission for the layout and the first defendant had no option except to execute the sale deed subsequent to the sanction of the layout and as such the finding of the learned Judge that the appellant is not entitled for the specific performance cannot be sustained.

5. On behalf of the first respondent, it was contended that though it was agreed by the appellant to get the sanction of the layout and get the sale deed executed, the time granted is only six months and a further period of six months was granted to complete the process. Either within that time or after that the appellant did not obtain permission from the Town Planning Authorities and also did not seek any extension of time from the land owner. Hence, the learned Judge has rightly appreciated the factual position and held that due to considerable delay on the part of the appellant, the appellant is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of the contract. Further, because of the intervention of the Land Ceiling Act also the first respondent cannot entertain any application for approval of the layout.

6. The other respondents who are the legal representatives of the first defendant did not appear.

7. We have carefully considered the contentions of the counsel for either side. The short question arise for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled for the relief of specific performance of the agreement or not?

8. The suit agreement Ex.P1 is dated 23-11-1975 where under the appellant agreed to purchase the property for a sum of Rs. 1,17,001/- of an extent of 1.80 acres. It was also agreed that the appellant has to get the sanction of the layout within six months and to get the sale deed executed in six months thereafter. Pursuant to the agreement, the appellant submitted an application for sanction of layout which was returned by the authorities under Ex.P3 dated 26-05-1976 stating that the application cannot be processed for non-payment of necessary fee. Thereafter, under Ex.P4 dated 09-06-1976, the appellant paid necessary fee and re-submitted the plan for approval. Under Ex.P5 dated 30-06-1976, the first respondent herein/ Municipality refused to accord sanction for the layout. Thereafter it was stated by the appellant that she was moving with the other authorities for sanction of the layout for which absolutely there is no evidence . The appellant also did not get any extension of time from the first defendant mentioning the reason for the delay in getting the approval of the layout. Hence, the fact remains that the appellant did not obtain any extension of time from the land owner to get the sale deed executed.

9. Admittedly, in the meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act came into force on 03-08-1976. By the intervention of the said act, there was a restriction with regard to the alienation of urban lands and consequently, unless the alienee as well as the alienor gets the exemption from the appropriate authority to exclude the lands from the purview of the Act, the transaction cannot be completed. Hence, by the intervention of the Act, the suit agreement itself become void and unenforceable as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Gopirathnam, P. Versus Ferrodous Estate (Pvt) Ltd., and as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Mariamma Varghese Vs. K.V. Balasubramaniam & 11 others, 1994 (1) L.W. 391). Whatever steps the appellant pursued with the authorities after the Act came into force cannot be taken for granted that the time stipulated under the agreement automatically gets extended.

10. It may be worthy in this context to refer the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (K. Narendra Vs. Rivera Apartments (P) Ltd.,) , wherein the learned Judges have held as follows:-

“35. …We are only noticing the subsequent event. Possession over a meager part of the property was delivered by the appellant to the respondents, and simultaneously with the agreement but subsequently at some point of time. To that extent, the recital in the agreement and the averments made in the plaint filed by the respondents are false. On a major part of the property, the appellant has continued to remain in possession. As opposed to this, the respondents have neither pleaded nor brought material on record to hold that they have acted in such a way as to render inequitable the denial of specific performance and to hold that there would be a case of greater hardship over the hardship of the appellant. Upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the performance of the contract would involve such hardship on the appellant as he did not foresee while the non-performance would not involve such hardship on the respondents. The contract though valid at the time when it was entered, is engrossed in such circumstances that the performance thereof cannot be secured with precision. The present one is a case where the discretionary jurisdiction to decree the specific performance ought not to be exercised in favour of the respondents….”

36. We have already held that until the repal of ULCRA in the year 1999 the property agreed to be transferred was incapable of being transferred for failure of the requisite permission under ULCRA which situation continued to prevail for a period of about 16 years from the date of agreement until the repeal of ULCRA. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think it appropriate to extend the benefit of the subsequent event of repeal of ULCRA in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs after a lapse of 16 years from the date of the contract. Permission for constructing a multi-stored compled on the premises was reused time and again by NDMC until the suit for specific performance came to be decreed by the trial court. On none of the two events either of the parties had any control. We are clearly of the opinion that at one point of time the contract had stood frustrated by reference to Section 56 of the Contract Act. We do not think that the subsequent events can be pressed into service for so reviving the contract as to decree its specific performance.”

11. The suit agreement is of the year 1975 and the suit was laid in the year 1982. Now, we are in 2002 i.e., after nearly 27 years from the date of the agreement. Considering the increase in the cost of the lands and also considering the meager advance amount of Rs.1,001/- paid by the appellant, if we grant the relief for specific performance, it would be an inequitable relief. After the rejection of the application for layout sanction by the Municipality, there is absolutely no material to show as to what action the appellant took either to get the sanction of the layout or otherwise. Further, in 1975, one acre and 80 cents i.e., nearly 2 acres had been agreed to be sold for a sum of Rs.1,17,001/- and the appellant has paid only a sum of Rs.1,001/- on condition that the appellant has to obtain sanction for the layout. Considering the present market value of the lands and also the conduct of the appellant in merely delaying the process and failure to take any steps to get the sanction of the layout, the appellant is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of the contract. Moreover, as already held, because of the intervention of the Land Ceiling Act also the suit agreement became frustrated and unenforceable. We also therefore do not find any infirmity in the findings of the learned Judge.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed as devoid of merits. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected CMP is closed.