ORDER
K.L. Shrivastava, J.
1. This first revision petition by the husband is directed against the revisional order dated 29-7-88 passed by the V.A.S.J., Indore in Cr. Rev. No. 7/87.
2. Circumstances giving rise to this petition are these:– The N.A. on 26-7-78 as applicant’s undivorced wife filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code’) for monthly allowance for her maintenance and the maintenance of her two daughters aged 3 and 5 years. It was stated in the application that on 18-4-1977 the applicant had kicked her out of the matrimonial home and later on 29-10-78 has married another woman.
3. The allegations Were controverted by the applicant. One of the grounds of contest was that as the N.A. had been divorced on 17-4-77 she is not entitled for the claim in view of the provisions of the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (for short the ‘Act’).
4. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 29-10-87 dismissed the application. It was held that the N.A. had been divorced and in view of the provisions of the ‘Act’ was not entitled to the relief claimed for her. Observing that the application was not filed on behalf of the daughters, they were directed to file a separate application.
5. By the impugned order the learned A.S.J. has partly allowed the revision petition preferred by the N.A. and had made an order for monthly maintenance of Rs. 200/- in favour of the daughters.
6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the application filed by the N.A. deserved to be dismissed as it was not in accordance with the provisions in Section 5 of the ‘Act’. It was further contended that the claim for monthly allowance for maintenance for the children who were not parties and were above 2 years of age could not be entertained in view of Section 3(1)(b) of the ‘Act’. It was also urged that the order is vitiated as it does not proceed on a consideration of the requirements laid down for such an order. It was lastly contended that there was no reason for making the amount payable from the date of the application.
7. On a careful consideration of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties I am of the view that the revision petition deserves to be dismissed summarily.
8. In the decision in Shaik Mahboob Basha’s case 1989 Cri LJ 2295 (AP), it has been pointed out that the transitional provision in Section 7 of the ‘Act’ is not attracted in cases of children who have crossed the age of 2 years and the cases of such children are governed by Section 125 of the ‘Code’. In the decision in Rizwana Begum’s case (1989 Cri LJ NOC 155), with advertence to Sections 3 and 5 of the ‘Act’ it has been pointed out that the scope and the ambit of the provision in Section 125 of the ‘Code’ is not abrogated by the ‘Act’. The decision in Tajjuddin’s case (1989 Cri LJ 2285) (AP) is also pertinent. It deals with the various provisions of this beneficial legislation for the protection of the rights of the divorced Muslim women. According to the decision the transitional provision in Section 7 of the ‘Act’ is directory and the non-compliance therewith does not have the effect of nullifying the proceedings under Section 125 of the ‘Code’ irrespective of the question of prejudice to the party complaining of its non-compliance.
9. The contention regarding the nonjoinder of the minor daughters is also without merit. In the decision in Radhamani’s case, 1986 Cri LJ 1129 : (1986 JLJ 413), it has been pointed out that non-joinder of minor sons as the petitioners was mere irregularity and did not come in the wife’s way for claiming maintenance for the children living with her.
10. On a careful consideration of the other submission I find that they are also devoid of merit. The amount of monthly maintenance is proper and maintenance has rightly been granted from the date of the application.
11. In the end, it may be pointed out that the revisional jurisdiction is not only limited in scope but is also discretionary. On a careful consideration I am of the view that the impugned order subserves the cause of justice and no interference therewith is called for in exercise of this jurisdiction.
12. In the result, the revision petition is summarily dismissed.