ORDER
Archana Wadhwa, Member (J)
1. After hearing Shri S.N. Sinha Mohapatra, Ld. Adv. for the appellant and Shri. T.K. Kar, Ld. SDR for the Revenue we find that the appeal can be disposed of on the point of limitation itself.
2. The appellants were issued a show cause notice on 22.3.99 raising demand of duty against the appellant for the period 16.3.95 to 25.2.97 on the ground that the motor vehicle parts manufactured by them were not classifiable as motor vehicle parts under heading 8708.00 but the same being handles and hinges were properly classifiable under heading 8702.00. The appellants’ contention is that they had been filing the classification lists under the provisions of Rule 173 B prior to the said period claming the classification as motor vehicle parts under heading 8708.00 and the same was being approved by the proper officer. During the said period, the provisions of Rule 173B were changed and instead of classification list, assessees were required to file declarations. They had filed declarations during the period in question and no objection was ever raised by their jurisdictional central excise authorities to the effect that the classification claimed by them under chapter 87 was not proper. The appellants’ contention is that inspite of accepting that the appellants had filed the declarations under Rule 173B the Commissioner has invoked the longer period on the gound that there was mis-declaration in the classification of the product. Shri S.N. Sinha Mohapatra submits that the above reasoning has been held to be unjustificable in a number of cases inasmuch as the same cannot amount to misstatement and suppression so as to invoke the extended period of limitation.
3. The Commissioner in his impugned order, while invoking the extended period limitation has observed as under;
“The second point to be decided in the instant case is the issue of limitation. In other words, whether the invocation of extended period in the SCN as per proviso to Section 11 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 have been correctly alleged or not?
The noticee submitted that they had been submitting declaration under Rule 173B classifying their product under TSH 8708.00 on and from 30.10.95 regularly as per requirement. Receipt of such declarations were acknowledged by the department and nothing contrary to their claim for classification of the products in question had been received from the department. As such misdeclaration or suppression of facts cannot be sustained in law and no demand can be raised for the extended period.
The plain reading of Rule 173 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 indicate that every assessee was required to submit a declaration with the department relating there in full declaration of goods manufactgured/produced by them, chapter heading & sub-heading number of CETA’85 under which the goods fall and appropriate rate of Central Excise duty leviable/payable on the goods. I find in the instant case the noticee had made mis-declarations in the declarations filed by them under Rule 173B by classifying/declaring their manufactured products i.e. ‘Handles & Hinges’ under TSH 8708 and consequently the rate of duty, This mis-declaration has led to suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty.”
4. A reading of the above paragraph would show that the appellants had filed the declarations during the relevant period claming the classification under chapter 87. The same have also been produced before us. The Commissioner’s observations that the appellant had mis-declared the classification, which mis-declaration has led to suppression of facts does not weigh favourably with us. The appellants have declared classification of the product according to their own understanding. If the Revenue felt that the classification claimed by the assessee was not proper, they were within their powers to amend the same after following the principles of natural justice. It is not the Revenue’s case that the appellants have not given the proper description of the product in the declarations made by them. In these circumstances we are of the view that the appellant did not suppress anything from the Revenue so as to give them the powers to invoke the longer period of limitation. The notice having been admittedly issued after the normal period of limitation of six months, the demand raised therein is barred by limitation. Accordingly we set aside the impugned order on the point of time bar itself without going into the merits of the case. Appeal is thus allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.