JUDGMENT
Ashutosh Mohunta, J.
1. This petition is directed against the judgment dated January 4, 2000, passed by the Additional District Judge, Barnala, vide which the suit filed by the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction of the Court, and the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 was allowed.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that M/s Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd., Barnala (respondent No. 3) purchased 16179.31 Kgs. Viscose Staple Fibre from M/s. Sought India Viscose Ltd., Udaipur, which was packed in 29 bales on May 27, 1993. The said material was booked with New Moga Transport Co., Udaipur (for short the Transport Co.), respondent No. 1, for Barnala from Udaipur. The goods were loaded in truck No. HYN-6973. The consignment reached Barnala on May 23, 1993 at about 9 A-M. As the truck was heading towards the godown of plaintiff No. 2 (respondent No. 3), for unloading the material, it caught fire due to electric short circuiting. The material loaded in the truck was damaged due to fire. United India Insurance Co. (petitioner) and Malwa-Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. (respondent No. 3) filed, a suit against the Transport Co. (respondent No. 1) and the National Insurance Co. (respondent No. 2) for the recovery of Rs. 4,63,516/- along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent. The Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barnala, allowed the suit and passed a decree for Rs. 4,63,516/- in favour of the plaintiffs and against the Transport Co. (respondent No. 1) alongwith costs and allowed the future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The Transport Co. filed an appeal against the judgment and decree dated May 23, 1997 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barnala, and the same was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Barnala, vide judgment dated January 4, 2000, on the ground that the Court at Barnala, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiffs. Against the said order the United India Insurance Co. has filed the present revision
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the case file.
4. Admittedly, 29 bales of viscose were booked through the Transport Co. from Udaipur for Barnala and the material was loaded in truck No. HYE-6973. It has also admitted that the material had reached Barnala on May 23, 1993 at 9.30 A.M. at the factory of M/s Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd., Barnala. However, it has been denied that the truck was going to the godown for unloading the material when the fire broke out and that the material has been destroyed. It has also been denied that the incident of fire took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck driver. Whether the driver of the truck was at fault or not or whether the fire had actually broken out or not or whether the goods of the plaintiff No. 2 had been destroyed or not are the questions of fact and are to be decided on the basis of the evidence brought on record. At present the only question before this Court is whether the Court at Barnala had the jurisdiction to try the suit or not. As already stated above that it is the admitted case of the defendants that the truck had reached Barnala on May 23, 1993. It also stands proved in evidence that the goods were destroyed. The photographs (Exhibits P4 to P45) show that cotton yarn bales in the damaged condition and truck No. HYN-6973 is also visible in the photographs. Anyhow, the admitted position is that the truck in question had reached Barnala with the goods in the safe condition. However, the claim of the plaintiffs is that the goods were destroyed in fire in the godown of plaintiff-respondent No. 3, Whether the truck driver is at fault or not is not the question to be decided by this Court in the present revision petition. The only question to be determined by this Court is whether the Court at Barnala has the jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiffs or not.
5. As per Section 20(c), C.P.C. that Court has the jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part has taken place. The truck reached Barnala alongwith the material which was booked with the Transport Co. at Udaipur. The incident of fire took place at Barnala and the goods were damaged at Barnala. It prima facie shows that a substantial part of cause of action had taken place at Barnala. Thus, the Court at Barnala had jurisdiction to try the suit.
6. It has been contended by Mr. Sanjay Mittal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that on the heading of consignment receipt (Ex.PW.2/H) the words subject to Udaipur jurisdiction only have been printed, which implies that M/s Malwa Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd., had agreed to the condition of the Transport Company to file the suit at Udaipur. Thus, the Courts at Udaipur only had the jurisdiction to try the suit and the jurisdiction of the Courts at Barnala stood ousted with this agreement. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on Globe Transport Corporation v. Travel Engineering Works and Anr., II(1984) A.C.C. 34, wherein it was observed that the contracting parties can by agreement opt for jurisdiction at one particular place of suing by excluding other places, which otherwise are open to them for suing.
7. 1 do not agree with the contention raised by Mr. Mittal. In the case reported as Prakash Roadlines Pvt. Ltd. v. United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd and Anr., 1994 A.C.J. 1069, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, by following the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported as Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Company,3 1991 A.C.J. 1001, has held that the jurisdiction of a Court at ‘A’ or ‘C’ could not be excluded with the insertion of the clause “subject to jurisdiction at place “B”. Thus, in the present case, the insertion of the clause “subject to Udaipur jurisdiction only” in the consignment receipt will not exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts at Barnala.
8. Consequently, I allow the revision petition and set aside the judgment dated January 4, 2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Barnala, and restore the judgment dated May 23, 1997 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior division), Barnala. The case is remanded to the Additional District Judge, Barnala, who is directed to decide the appeal on merits. The stay order passed by this Court on February 5, 2001 stands vacated.
9. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Additional District Judge, Barnala, on May, 30, 2003.