JUDGMENT
S.P. Khare, J.
1. This is a Second Appeal Under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. The substantial question of law which was formulated by this Court at the time of admission of the appeal is : “Whether the learned trial judge was justified in law in proceeding against the appellant under Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code in the context of the facts and circumstances.” This appeal can be heard only on the question so formulated as held recently by the Supreme Court in Chandra v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 2517.
2. The facts relevant for the decision of the aforesaid question are that the suit for eviction for rebuilding the house based on Section 12(1)(h) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act’) was filed on 29-9-1976. Some of defendants were minors and their uncle defendant No. 1 Pratap Singh was appointed as their guardian-ad-litem. The progress of the case was not smooth as happens in most of the eviction suits. The first witness of the plaintiffs was examined on 23-3-1982. He was cross-examined on 24-3-1982. His cross-examination could not be done on behalf of some of the defendants. The case was adjourned several times. The trial Court issued several warnings to the defendants but that had no effect on them and they kept on moving for adjournments on one ground or the other. In Civil Revision No. 1692 of 1992 decided on 12-11-1982 this Court recorded : “Shri Shukla appearing for the applicants undertook to keep the witnesses ready for a date to be fixed by the transferee Court and assured that he would not seek any further adjournment for the purpose of adducing evidence.” Before that in Civil Revision No. 644 of 1982 decided on 4-5-1982 a direction was given in these words : “It is further directed that the Court below shall proceed with the suit expeditiously and dispose it off.” The trial Court also recorded its anguish in several order sheets keeping in view the recalcitrant attitude of the defendants. The cross-examination of the first witness of the plaintiffs was done on behalf of the legal representatives of the defendant No. 2 and the deposition runs into 61 paragraphs (13 typed sheets) but it was expressed that still his cross- examination was not complete. A perusal of the deposition-sheet shows that most of the cross-examination was irrelevant, rambling and repetitive. On 27-3-1984 the defendants and their counsel did not appear in the Court in time. The trial Court again recorded that they were unnecessarily prolonging the trial contrary to the undertaking given before this court. The plaintiff’s three witnesses were examined and cross-examined on that date. The case was fixed for evidence of the defendants on 28-3-1984 with a warning that they must keep their counsel present on that date as the case had already become very old. On that date the appellant No. 1 was present in person and other appellants were present through their counsel. Several applications were made only with a view to delay the trial. It was brought to the notice of the Court that the senior counsel engaged by the defendant No. 1 had left for Delhi. As a last resort it was expressed on behalf of the defendants that they want to move a petition for transfer of the case to some other Court. The trial Court found that they do not want to lead evidence and therefore proceeded under Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. The first appellate Court has held that they were rightly proceeded against under this provision.
3. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that the conditions precedent for invoking the provision of Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code were not present and therefore that step could not be taken. Reliance is placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ramarao v. Shantibai, 1977 MPLJ 364 : Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code as amended in 1976 reads : “Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, (a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith; or (b) if the parties, or any of them is, absent proceed under Rule 2”. Thus in order to attract Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, three conditions must be satisfied, (i) that the suit must have been adjourned at the instance of a party to carry out any of the things set out in the rule, (ii) that there must be default by that party in carrying it out and (iii) the parties must be present either personally or through counsel at the adjourned hearing.
4. It will appear from the above narration that time had been granted to the defendants to produce their evidence. It was undertaken on their behalf before this Court also in the Civil Revision referred above that they would not seek any further adjournment and produce their evidence. The defendants No. 1 and 2(a) were present in the Court. The counsel for the defendant No. 1 left for Delhi without making any arrangement for proper conduction of the ease in spite of the warnings given by the trial Court. The counsel for the defendants who were present declined to examine witnesses, they committed the default. Therefore, the trial Court could proceed under Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. The order-sheet dated 28-3-1984 shows that the defendants tried to browbeat the trial Court and ignored the undertaking given before this Court. All the conditions for the applicability of Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code existed. The suit has been decided on merits. There was contumacious conduct on the part of the defendants. They made all attempts to procrastinate the proceedings. It should be a matter of appreciation that the trial Court dealt with the case with requisite firmness.
5. The Supreme Court observed in Prabhakaran v. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 1987 SC 2117 : “Litigations in landlord-tenant cases must come to end quickly”. This Court in Kailashchand v. Vinod, 1993 MPLJ 961 has observed : “None should opt to see justice crying in silence for such a long time. Procedural wrangle should not be seen in action for erosion of faith in the system. People are tired of waiting. The dispensation of justice should be sure and swift. Justice should not be made to appear as a teasing illusion. Tardy pace in such cases, built on bona fide requirements, should be spurned and verdict, one way or the other should be expeditious.” The present case illustrates that the plaintiffs were required to spend 22 years – eight years in the trial Court, nine years in first appeal and five years in second appeal to prove a simple fact that they need the house for rebuilding. It is a travesty of justice. The M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is a beneficial legislation – beneficial both to landlord and tenant. It protects the tenants against unreasonable eviction, but at the same time ensures that the accommodation is made available to the landlord on proof of specified grounds. The legislature does not discourage the persons from constructing buildings. In case the landlord files the suit for eviction on the basis of his bona fide requirement he should have an opportunity to prove the same within a reasonable time and in any case should not be required to spend 22 years as has happened in the present case.
6. It was also sought to be argued that defendants Kiran Kumari and Raj Kumar Singh became major during the pendency of the suit and therefore a fresh notice ought to have been issued to them by the trial Court before proceeding ex parte against them. They arc not appellants. They were not proceeded under Order 17, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. The appeal has not been admitted on the point which is sought to be raised on behalf of respondents, Kirankumari and Raj Kumar. Therefore, it cannot be considered.
7. It was also urged on behalf of the appellants that they should be given a fresh option Under Section 18 of the Act for re-entry after the rebuilding of the house as the time given by the first Appellate Court has expired. The appellants chose to file this appeal and obtained stay order instead of availing the benefit given by the first Appellate Court Under Section 18 of the Act. It has been held by this Court in Ghanshyam v. Nathmal, 1975 MPLJ 509, that the Appellate Court is not bound to give a fresh schedule. Almost 22 years have passed since the date of institution of this suit. The appellants did not adhere to the schedule fixed by the first appellate Court. Now it would not be in the interest of justice to give fresh option to the appellants for exercising the right of re-entry. Right of re-entry is forfeited when the tenant docs not deliver possession on fixed date. The right of re-entry is a concession given to the tenant on the fulfilment of the condition precedent, that he must deliver possession to the landlord on or before the date specified in the decree. If he fails to do so he forfeits the right of re-entry. The provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act have to be construed strictly.
8. In the result this appeal is dismissed.