JUDGMENT
T.N. Singh, J.
1. At the admission stage counsel for parties are heard.
2. Shri R.D. Goyal has entered appearance for the claimants Smt. Mandakini Kishnarao and he is also heard.
3. Because I have found no ground to admit the appeal and I am satisfied that there is no warrant for my interference with the impugned order I have considered it unnecessary to notice the other two respondents.
4. Shri Bansal has chellanged rightly the impugned order with reference mainly to the provisions of-Sub-section (2-A) of Section 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, for short, the Act.
5. There could be no doubt that in view of the provisions of Section 96(2) of the Act the insurer-appellant is statutorily handicapped in challenging award passed under Section 110-B of the Act on merits and as such I have merely to consider the grievance made in this appeal with respect to the provision aforesaid, which I quote:
110-C (2-A). Where in the course of my inquiry the claims Tribunal is satisfied that.
(i) there is collusion between the personal making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or.
(ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.
6. In this connection the few facts which are to be stated are about the averments of the insurer-appellant made in the written statement and the disposal of the objection in that regard by the Tribunal. It appears that “special plea” in regard to the objection aforesaid was taken on 4-1-1988 by the Insurer and by application made on that date amendment of the Written statement was prayed. The amendment was allowed and para II was added in the written statement. That is quoted here:
It is unfortunate that the insurer did not state any fact in para 11 in regard to the alleged “collusion” between the claimant and the registered owner, who was covered under the policy in question by the insurer-appellant on the basis of which award has been passed in the instant case against the insurer. The only fact stated is that the registered owner, who has taken under the policy, has not cooperated with the insurer in opposing the claim and beyond that there is nothing to be read in para 11. That being the pleading no wonder that the Tribunal found that there was no material before it to be satisfied that there was a “collusion” between the claim and the registered owner of the concerned Motor Vehicle involved in the accident. Let it also be noted in this connection that despite deficient pleading Tribunal still allowed the insurer to adduce evidence with respect to the averment aforesaid and the insurer examined was none else that the Assistant Administrative Officer in the Gwalior Office of the company. The only statement that he made in his evidence in regard to objection aforesaid is that notice issued to the registered owner by post and that returned unserved. He also stated that he could learn that the vehicle had been transferred to one Jaipal son of Jethanand. There is nothing else to be read in the evidence of the sole that examined by the insurer on which indeed could any finding be recorded by the Tribunal and in this court that there was “collusion” between the registered owner and the claimant No facts are stated to establish any kind of privity between the two and on the other hand the plea of “collusion” is negated by insurer’s own statement that the vehicle had been transferred and the person who could be responsible for the claim could only be the transferee, Jaipal.
7. In the instant case it is also not possible to observe the insurer of the liability under the awards as the Tribunal has rightly recorded its conclusion on due appreciation of entire evidence adduced in the case that the alleged transfer has not been proved. Mere allegation of a witness made in evidence that transfer had taken place and that information he had gathered from undisclosed source could be no basis for the plea to claim exemption from liability on the ground that insurer’s liability had ceased on the vehicle being transferred and the transfer not being notified to the insurer,
8. As earlier alluded, it is not open to me to consider on merits challenge of the insurer-appellant either as to the validity of the liability adjudged or of the quantum adjudged payable to the claimant. A sum of Rs. 42, 000A only has been awarded for the death of a person employed in a responsible post by the State Government, though he was aged about 58 years and was at the verge of retirement. No case is made out about breach of any of the conditions of policy, which are to be read in Sub-clause (b) of section 96(2) of the Act. It is difficult for me to accept the contention pressed by Shri Bonsai that the liability saddled on the Insurer be voided for breach of the condition by which the registered owner of the insured person was required under the terms of the policy to notify the accident to the insurer. Such a condition is not one of the prohibited/prescribed conditions to be read in Section 96(2) (b).
9. For all the aforesaid reasons I find no merit in this appeal and indeed mainly for the reason that the appeal at the instance of the insurer is not maintainable. It Is dismissed.