JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
1. In this appeal, preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the appellants have called in question the sustainability of the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Betul, in Claim Case No. 18 of 1992.
2. The facts, as have been unfurled, are that the respondent, a minor being represented by his guardian, filed an application under Section 166 of the Act putting forth a claim of Rs. 1,19,000 against the present appellant, namely, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) and its employees. It was pleaded before the Tribunal that on December 22, 1989, at about 2.30 p.m. the claimant accompanied by a girl named Sangeeta was proceeding on the side of the road from PK-1 to PK-2. At that juncture the vehicle, which was engaged by the Board for loading coal, dashed against a wall being negligently driven by the driver as a result of which the said wall fell on the claimant who sustained serious injuries. He availed of treatment from December 22, 1989, to January 5,
1990, and eventually his leg was amputated. Because of the injuries sustained by him he put forth a claim of Rs. 1,19,000 on various heads.
3. The claim petition of the claimant was resisted by the Board contending
that the claimant had sustained injuries due to the fall of the wall and the
vehicle, the bulldozer, was driven carefully by the driver of the Board, and
hence, no liability could be fastened on the Board. It was further put forth
that the vehicle was driven inside the private premises and vehicle in
question being not a motor vehicle, the claim application was not maintainable before the Tribunal.
4. The Tribunal framed as many as ten issues. Dealing with the contention of the Board that the bulldozer is not a motor vehicle within the ambit and sweep of the definition of Motor Vehicles Act, it came to hold that the bulldozer is a motor vehicle as per the definition of the Act. The Tribunal took into consideration the injuries sustained by the claimant and the amount spent by his guardian in his treatment and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,15,000 towards compensation. The Tribunal also awarded interest at the rate of 12 per cent. from the date of presentation of the claim petition.
5. R.S. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant, has raised a singular
contention that the vehicle involved in the accident was a bulldozer and
the same being not a motor vehicle as defined under the Act the application before the Tribunal was not maintainable.
6. Resisting the aforesaid submission, G.P. Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, has contended that the bulldozer is a motor vehicle as defined under the Act. He has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Harrisons and Crosfield Ltd. v. Kerala State, AIR 1971 Ker 329 and State of Gujarat v. Danabhai Bhulabhai [1991] 2 Gujarat LJ 404,
7. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar it is apposite to
refer to the definition of “motor vehicle” under Section 2(28) of the Act
which reads as under :
“‘Motor vehicle’ or ‘vehicle’ means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding thirty-five cubic centimetres.”
8. From a fair reading, of the aforesaid definition it is graphically clear that a “motor vehicle” means any wheeled conveyance which is propelled mechanically arid is adapted for use on the road and does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of special type for use only in a factory or any another enclosed premises. The word “adapted” came to be interpreted by the apex court in the case of Bolani
Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17, wherein their Lordships have held as follows (page 26) :
“The meaning of the word ‘adapted’ in Section 2(18) of the Act is itself indicated in entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which confers a power on the State to tax vehicles whether propelled mechanically or not and uses the word ‘suitable’ in relation to its use on the roads the words ‘adapted for use’ must therefore be construed as ‘suitable for use’. At any rate, the words ‘adapted for use’ cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles which are not ‘suitable for use’ on roads. In this sense, the words ‘is adapted’ for use have the same connotation as ‘is suitable’ or ‘is fit’ for use on the roads.”
9. We are conscious that their Lordships were dealing with the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930, but the meaning given by their Lordships would cover the field as far as the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned. We may note here that their Lordships did not accept the contention that dumpers and rockers were not vehicles which are not adapted for use upon roads. In this context, we may refer to the decision rendered in the case of Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1992] 3 Supp. SCC 133 wherein the apex court observed that if certain types of vehicles like dumpers are adapted for use on roads, i.e., to say they are suitable for being used on public roads and they are not manufactured or adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises they will come within the definition of motor vehicles. While so observing their Lordships made a distinction between dumpers and vehicles which run on chain plates like caterpillar or military tanks. In the case of Chief General Manager, Jagannath Area v. State of Orissa [1996] 10 SCC 676 their Lordships referred to the decisions rendered in the cases of Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17 and Central Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1992] 3 Supp. SCC 133 and came to hold that dumpers and rockers are motor vehicles as in these vehicles there is use of rubber tyres and they are suitable for being used on public roads. Their Lordships negatived the contention that these vehicles were required to move at a low speed and cannot be run for more than 5 kms. at one stretch.
10. The question that falls for consideration is whether a bulldozer can be held to be suitable ,to be run on public roads.
11. On a perusal of the findings of the Tribunal it”appears that there is a
cover of iron chain over the tyres. We have also perused the deposition of
the driver of the bulldozer who has clearly stated that the bulldozer runs
on the iron chain. In this context we may profitably refer to the description of bulldozer as has been given in Words and Phrases volume 5-A. It is
as under:
“A ‘bulldozer’ is a blade, the arms of which are fastened to a tractor. The blade is fastened onto a caterpillar tractor by heavy steel arms which
hold the blade in front of the tractor. Eldredge v. Sargent 96 P. 2d 870, 871, 150 Kan. 824.
A ‘bulldozer’, held by repairman, was not a ‘motor vehicle’ under garageman’s lien law, so that lien of repairman was an artisan’s lien rather than a garageman’s lien, which was superior to that of assignee of conditional sales contract, and such result was not affected by adoption of Uniform Commercial Code. National State Bank of Newark v. Rapp, 231 A. 2d 222, 49 N.J. 457.
Term ‘motor vehicle’ as used in garageman’s lien law, was intended to include only those self-propelled vehicles which were used on highway primarily for purposes of transporting persons and property from place to place, such as automobiles trucks and buses, and since a ‘bulldozer’ is used primarily for excavation and building purposes and only incidentally to transport persons or property from place to place it should not be included in such a definition. Ferrante Equipment C. v. Foley Machinery Co. 231 A. 2d. 208, 211, 49 N.J. 432.”
12. Hence, keeping the ordinary concept of bulldozer and taking into consideration the distinction made by the apex court with regard to vehicles that run on chain plates we are of the considered view that a bulldozer is not a motor vehicle. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Danabhai Bhulabhai [1991] 2 Gujarat LJ 404 a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court took note of the definition of motor vehicle and considered the fact that the bulldozer in question was being plied on a public road. The Division Bench further considered the ratio laid down by their Lordships of the apex court in the case of Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1975 SC 17, and observed that the apex court had not dealt with the bulldozer but had recorded findings with regard to dumpers, rockers and tractors and proceeded to lay down as under :
“The test is laid down by the Supreme Court is adaptability or the suitability for a vehicle or mechanism or a device to be plied as a vehicle on a road which within the meaning of the expression ‘public place’ as defined in the Section 2(24) of the Motor Vehicles Act is a public place. Even going by that concept as the evidence in the case shows the bulldozer was being taken from the workshop to the Kadana Dal site on a road which was a public road, it was being driven in a public place. It was, therefore, a motor vehicle which answered the general concept of the expression as given in the earlier part of the definition of the expression motor vehicles and does not attract the latter exemption p”
13. With great respect we are not able to subscribe to the aforesaid view inasmuch as in the present case there is evidence that the tyres of the bulldozer are covered by iron chains and they are not allowed to be plied on the road and are not registered under the provisions of the Act. Hence, we hold with certitude that the bulldozer is not adapted or suitable for use on public
roads, and, therefore, is not a motor vehicle under the definition of the Act. Being of this view we further hold that the application under Section 166 of the Act was not maintainable before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the award is set aside. However, there shall be no order as to costs. It is hereby directed that if any amount has been paid in pursuance of the award, the same shall not be refunded by the claimant-respondent.