JUDGMENT
Faizanuddin, J.
1. This case, on a reference by a learned single Judge of this Court, was placed before this Full Bench, for consideration and opinion of a question of law as to the ambit and scope of Section 23-J read with Section 23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Act No. 41 of 1961).
2. The necessary facts giving rise to the legal question are not in serious dispute and lie in a narrow compass. The non-applicant is a co-sharer-owner of the suit premises along with her two major sons, she being the widow of her late husband G. D. Bhingardive who had purchased the same. The non-applicant being a widow initiated proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur, by filing an application under Section 23-A(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity referred to as ‘the Act’) for eviction of tenant, the applicant herein, from the premises in his occupation originally on the plea that the said premises were required bona fide by her for occupation as residence for her two married sons and their children. The landlady/non-applicant being a widow claimed that she belongs to the special category of landlord defined in Section 23-J(iii) of the Act and, therefore, she was entitled to pursue her remedy in summary proceedings as provided in Chapter II1-A of the Act, before the Rent Controlling Authority on whom jurisdiction is conferred by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 23-A of the Act.
3. The tenant applicant entered appearance and besides denying the bona fide requirement as alleged by the landlady also took objection that the alleged ground of bona fide requirement of accommodation for residence of married sons of the landlady/non-applicant was not covered by Section 23-A(a) and the Rent Controlling Authority having no jurisdiction, the landlady could not be permitted to take recourse to the special summary procedure provided in Chapter III-A of the Act. Thereupon the landlady/ non-applicant moved an application for amendment of her origional eviction application proposing an amendment to the effect that the premises in question were not only required bona fide by her for occupation as residence for her married sons and their families but also for her own residence. The Rent Controlling Authority allowed the said amendment by his order dated 28-12-1987, overruled the objection and continued the eviction proceedings.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Rent Controlling Authority, the tenant/applicant preferred Revision before this Court under Section 23-E of the Act. The Revision came up for hearing before the learned single Judge of this Court before whom the learned counsel appearing for the tenant/applicant assailed the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority by contending that in the present case the advantage of the special forum provided under Chapter III-A of the Act is available only to the widow in case she required bona fide the residential accommodation for her own occupation as specified in Clause (a) of Section 23-A because she alone falls in the category of ‘landlord’ within the meaning of Section 23-J of the Act and not her married sons and their children. It was, therefore, urged that the Rent Controlling Authority has no jurisdiction to entertain an application of the widow/landlady for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide need of accommodation for residence of her married sons or even for joint need of the accommodation for herself and her married sons in which event the remedy is by way of civil suit under Section 12 of the Act.
5. During the course of arguments, learned single Judge noticed conflicting precedents and divergent views of different Single Benches of this Court on the aforesaid legal controversy. In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Kedar-nath Gupta, AIR 1987 Madh Pra 65 : 1987 MPRCJ 197, Rampal Singh, J. while construing the provisions of Chapter III-A of the Act took the view that incorporation of Section 23-J in the parent Act, by way of amendment in 1985, is only for the benefit of the widow and none else and if the bona fide requirement is not of the widow but that of her major sons who are also co-owners/landlords of the premises belonging to the general category of landlords, then the widow who alone is the landlady of the Special Category as defined in Section 23-J, would not be entitled to make an application to the Rent Controlling Authority, for eviction of tenant. Quite contrary to this Dr. T. N. Singh, J. in Saroj Thareja v. Tara Bai, 1988 MPLJ 22 : (AIR 1985 NOC 3) and in Ghanshyarndas v. Shivaldas, 1988 MPU 260 : (AIR 1989 NOC 15) took the view that an application for eviction made by a widow landlady for her bona fide need as also of her son would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23-A read with Section 23-J of the Act, and that plurality of ownership of any accommodation was no disqualification to disentitle a widow from getting the premises vacated from the tenant merely because there were some other persons also the owners of the premises. In view of these conflicting decisions which involved a serious question of frequent occurrence and great significance, the learned single Judge was persuaded to make a reference to a larger Bench to resolve the controversy and the conflict in various decisions. This is how the matter was before this Full Bench.
6. Learned single Judge while making a reference has not precisely formulated the question in controversy for determination by us and, therefore, having regard to the brief facts set out in the referring order, we shall ourselves formulate the question which looms for our adjudication. In our view the legal question, that arises for our consideration may be formulated as under:
“Whether out of several landlords of an accommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23-A(a) read with Section 23-J(iii) of the Act.”.
7. Learned counsel for the tenant/applicant contended before us that the premises in question were let out by the late husband of the landlady/non-applicant and after his death, landlady/non-applicant being his widow, as well as her children succeeded to the tenanted premises by inheritance and, therefore, the widow and her children all became the co-owners and joint landlords thereof. It was, therefore, urged that the widow alone cannot maintain an application under Section 23-A(a) of the Act, either for her own bona fide need or for the joint need of herself and her married sons who are also joint landlords but do not belong to the special class envisaged in Section 23-J of the Act and have not joined the widow in making application for eviction.
8. Here it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act with a view to properly appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant/applicant, particularly when their construction and interpretation is mainly the subject of controversy. Section 23-A of the Act which falls in Chapter III-A contemplates a special provision conferring a right on a landlord to submit an application to the Rent Controlling Authority for eviction of a tenant on one or more of the grounds specified in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 23-A of the Act. The ground specified in Clause (a) which alone is relevant for the purposes of the instant case is reproduced hereunder:
“Section 23-A(a): that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required ‘bona fide’ by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family, or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.”
It would be equally relevant to refer to Section 23-J also which also falls in Chapter III-A of the Act and provides the definition of ‘landlord’ for the purposes of Chapter III-A only which is reproduced hereunder :–
“Section 23-J : Definition of landlord for purposes of Chapter III-A :–
For the purposes of this Chapter “landlord” means a landlord who is–
(i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Service; or
(ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central Government; or
(iii) widow or a divorced wife, or (iv) physically handicapped person, or
(v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent on his posting to such a place.”
9. In the instant case, the question formulated for consideration for the sake of convenience, may further be divided into twin questions as–
(i) Whether the widow/landlady who is a co-owner of the premises with others, alone can initiate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/applicant since she is not the sole owner of the premises but a sharer along with her sons, the property having been inherited from her late husband who originally owned the property; and
(ii) Whether the widow/ non-applicant who alone falls in the special category of landlords as defined in Section 23-J(iii) can seek an order for possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of her own bona fide need for residence and that of her married sons who do not fall within the special category of landlords as defined in Section 23-J.
In connection with the first part of the question, it may be stated that some of the decision of the highest Court of land provide a complete answer to the problem. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 : (AIR 1976 SC 2335) relying on certain precedents and a passage from “Salmond on Jurisprudence” it was observed that under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant and, therefore, it is inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such. Further, it has been held in the said report that jurisprudentlally it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. This position will change only when partition takes place. This view was accepted and again reiterated by Supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 : (AIR 1977 SC 1599) wherein it was held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner and the absence of other co-owners will not disentitle a co-owner from maintaining an action for eviction when the other co-owners do not object to the same. This view was followed in a recent decision by the Supreme Court in Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SVLR (C) 54 : (AIR 1989 SC |758). This being the position of law, it has to be held that the widow/ non-applicant, who is a co-owner/landlady of the premises with some others, can initiate eviction proceedings against the tenant in the absence of other co-owners if they do not object for the same.
10. This brings us to the question whether the widow/non-applicant, who alone falls in the special category of ‘landlord’ as defined in Section 23-J(iii) can maintain an application before the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23-A(a) of the Act for the joint need of herself and her married sons who do not fall in the Special Category of landlords defined in Section 23-J. But before we plunge into the aforesaid moot question posed by the learned counsel for the tenant/appellant, we would prefer first to look into the background and legislative history of the Rent Act, 1961, with a view to focus the real intent and purpose behind the provisions contained in Sections 23-A and 23-J of the Act.
11. It may be pointed that originally when the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was enacted; and brought into force, it did not contain Chapter III-A at all as it finds place in the Act now carving out a Special Class of Landlords distinct from the remaining other landlords, who deserve the benefit of the Special Procedure and a special forum on account of their need being more pressing because of the handicap from which they suffer as compared to the remaining other landlords. Originally a tenant may be evicted on one or more of the grounds contained in Clauses (a) to (p) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Principal At by filing a suit in a Civil Court. Out of the aforesaid clauses, Clauses (e) and (f) relate to the eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement of accommodation for residential and non-residential purposes respectively. This Act was enacted for the protection of tenants and to save them from harassment by unscrupulous landlords. But in certain genuine cases pursuing the remedy by a lengthy and cumbersome procedure in Civil Courts, it caused real and great hardship to some of the landlords on grounds of bona fide needs as the litigation originating from the Civil Court went up to the highest Court of the land and it took decades to reach finality. It is common knowledge that by the time the eviction decree attains finality after a long lapse of time in most cases either the soul of the landlord attains eternal peace or the ground which provided him a cause of action becomes extinct. If somehow or the other, the landlord survived the bad whether of legendary length of eviction suit, one will find the landlord with his ever expanding family on the street as he will have to face another round of legal battle in never ending execution proceedings.
12. It is in this background and the circumstances as well as with a view to provide a quick, expeditious and efficacious remedy to the handicapped landlords for eviction of tenants based on ground of bona fide need, that the Legislature was compelled to extricate and physically lift Clauses (e) and (f) from Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the parent Act, along with some other corresponding subsections of Section 12 and to amend and omit some other provisions (mention of which is not necessary for purposes of this case) and install them in a separate and new Chapter III-A in the parent Act which contained Sections23-A to Section 23-1 by Amending Act of 1983. The effect of this amendment on account of the non obstante clause in Section 23-A was, that the proceedings for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord could be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority regulated by the speedy and special procedure prescribed in the newly added Chapter III-A.
13. But some times later, it was experienced that some unscrupulous landlords misused the special forum and procedure in evicting the tenants and, therefore, it was suggested that the availability of special forum be confined only to certain specified categories of landlords such as retired Government Servants including retired members of Defence Services; retired servants of a compny owned and controlled by Central Government, a widow or a divorced wife and physically handicapped persons etc. Consequently the parent Act was again amended by Ordinance No. 1 of 1985 which was subsequently replaced by M.P. Accommodation Control (Amendment) Act 1985 (No. 7 of 1985) whereby a new Section 23-J (reproduced in paragraph 8 above) was introduced in Chapter III-A of the parent Act which defined ‘Landlord’ for the purposes of Chap. III-A only. A new Section 11-A was also added which provides that the new forum and the special procedure was limited only to the Landlords of the Categories specified in Section 23-J. Section 12 of the Principal Act was again amended amended by re-inducting Clauses (e) and (f) in Sub-section (1) of Section 12 along with all other corresponding provisions. Thus from the Legislative history and above discussion, it is evidently clear that the dominant object in all this exercise of amending and re-amending the Act was to afford some protection to handicapped landlords placed in special category by removing the rigour and the complicated cumbersome procedure of a suit in a Civil Court and instead to provide a special summary procedure for a speedy expeditious and efficacious remedy for the Special Class of landlords contemplated by Section 23-J read with Section 23-A of the Act.
14. From the above discussion, it is also apparent that according to the law as it now exists, two types of procedure have been prescribed for eviction of tenants based on the ground of bona fide need for residence — a general procedure under Section 12(e) of the Act for landlords in general and a special summary procedure for special class of landlords under Chapter III-A of the Act, introduced by the Amending Act, Section 11-A whereof confers exclusive jurisdiction to the Rent Controlling Authority. Further, Section 23-C of the Act contemplates that a tenant shall not be allowed to contest the prayer of the landlord for eviction from the accommodation, unless he discloses the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Authority to defend. Thus besides placing certain landlords as defined in Section 23-J in special category and prescribing special summary procedure for them, the Legislature gave further protection to them inasmuch as the application of a landlord belonging to the special category, filed for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need for residence has been treated analogous to the summary procedure for suits under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as Section 23-C of the Act provides that if the Authority is satisfied that the tenant had disclosed facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for possession it may grant leave to defend, otherwise the order of eviction may be passed straightway by the Authority, after leave to contest is refused.
15. Now having held that the widow/ non-applicant alone can maintain an action for eviction of the tenant with the consent of other co-owners, the position is crystallised by the above discussion. Admittedly the landlady is a widow. Having regard to the provisions of Clause (iii) of Section 23-J of the Act which defines landlord for purposes of Chapter III-A, there can be no dispute that the widow/non-applicant belongs to the special class of landlords who are entitled for the special summary procedure of making an application to the Rent Controlling Authority for eviction of the tenant. A bare perusal of the clear language employed in Clause (a) of Section 23-A will show that it confers a right on a landlord belonging to any of the categories enumerated in Clauses (i) to (v) of Section 23-J of the Act to make an application to the Authority for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the accommodation is required “bona fide” by him for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held by him. The precise and plain words used in Clause (iii) of Section 23-A pointedly disclose the intention of Legislature that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant either for his own bona fide need or for the bona fide need of any member of his family or even for the bona fide need of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held even though such member of his family or other person does not fall in any of the categories of landlords enumerated in Clauses (i) to (v) of Section 23-J, The requirement of the provisions of Section 23-A(a) read with Section 23-J will be satisfied if the person who makes the application belongs to the special class of landlords. No other meaing can be assigned to the provisions of Clause (a) of Section 23-A except the one stated above. This was also the view expressed by single Bench of this Court in cases of Saroj Thareja, (AIR 1985 NOC 3) and Ghanashyamdas, (AIR 1989 NOC 15) (supra). The same view is subscribed by yet another single Bench in Jagdish Prasad v. Sumitra Bai, 1986 MPRCJ 289. In a recent decision in the case of Shivraj v. Ashalata, 1989 MPU 202 a Division Bench of this Court in which two of us (G. G. Sohani, Hon’ble Acting C.J. and K. M. Agarwal, J.) were the members, overruled the decision in Sushila Devi’s case, (AIR 1987 Madh Pra 65) (supra) and held that a suit by joint landlords out of whom one is a landlord within the meaning of expression as defined by Section 23-J of the Act, can be entertained by the Rent Controlling Authority and when the other co-owners, if any, do not object to eviction, the relief of eviction can be granted if the accommodation is bona fide required by the landlord for starting the business of the major son or daughter.
16. Learned counsel for the tenant/ applicant, however, urged that having regard to the reasons and objects of the Act, no application for eviction of a tenant would be maintainable unless the eviction was sought for the bona fide need of such member of the family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held, who belongs to any of the special categories of landlord. He, therefore, urged that the provisions of Sections 23-A and 23-J of the Act, should be viewed and interpreted in the light of aims and objects of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. There is no doubt that the Courts always lean towards a construction which would help in giving effect to the true intention of Legislature and the object underlying a statute. But if the language used by the Statute is plain and unambiguous, then Court cannot construe the enactment differently because what the Court thinks was the object of Legislature. It is almost an elementary principle of interpretation of a statute that neither the preamble nor the supposed object of an Act can control the express language of the Statute. They merely help in the matter of construction if there is any ambiguity. But where the language is clear, the Court is bound to give effect to the language. If there is some ambiguity and if more than one constructions are possible then the Courts accept the one which is consistent with the objects of the Act and as explained by the preamble. See Kanailal v. Paramnidhi, AIR 1957 SC 907 and Senior Superintendent, R.M.S. v. K. V. Gopinath, AIR 1972 SC 1487, Para 3.
17. In the present case before us if we examine the language of Section 23-A and Clause (a) thereof it would be clear from the plain and unambiguous words and language used therein that they are capable of only one construction that the person who falls in the category of special class of landlords is authorised to take action for eviction of the tenant either for his own bona fide need or for the bona fide need of any member of his family who may not belong to any of the special class of landlords. If we accept the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the tenant/ applicant then in that event we would be doing violence to the plain language and words used in the provisions under consideration by reading into the said provisions the words that the member of the family for whose bona fide need, the application has been filed by the special class of landlord, should also belong to that category.” But law of Interpretation of Statute does not permit such a course. Consequently the result is that the application made by the widow/non-applicant under Section 23-A(a) of the Act for eviction of the tenant/ applicant herein on the ground of her bona fide need and that of her married sons who are members of his family is competent and maintainable before the Rent Controlling Authority.
18. In the light of the above discussion, our answer to the question referred to in paragraph No. 6 of this opinion is that out of several landlords of an accommodation including a widow, an application for eviction of the tenant by the widow alone, on the ground of her own bona fide need or joint need of herself and that of her married sons and their children, who are members of his family would be competent before the Rent Controlling Authority under Section 23-A(a) read with Section 23-J of the Act.
19. The case shall now be placed before the learned single Judge for disposal in accordance with law in the light of the opinion rendered herein. The costs of these proceed-ings shall abide by the ultimate result of the revision on merits.