CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 311 of 2007 PETITIONER: GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2007 BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench
of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant
questioning correctness of the conviction recorded by the Fast Track Court.
The said Court found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under
Section 302 of the India Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
Rs.8,000/- with default stipulation.’
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
One Chengapa (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’), his wife Smt.
Baby Chengappa (PW-1), the accused and most of the witnesses are the
residents of Garvale village. There is no much dispute that the accused
and the deceased were related. According to the prosecution the Geejaganda
family to which the accused and the deceased belong owned nearly 348 acres
of land. Out of the same, donation of about 48 acres, was made and the
remaining area was with the family. There were six sharers in the said
Geejaganda family. The said six sharers were in possession of the
respective portion of the remaining area. The deceased was claiming
equitable partition and share in family land which was opposed by the
accused and this resulted in ultimate murder of the deceased Chengappa on
23.9.1995 at 8.00 p.m. It is relevant to note that there is no much
dispute that on 21.9.1995 i.e. two days before the incident, the Revenue
Inspector had visited and inspected the family lands on the request made by
the deceased for having equitable partition. On 23.9.1995 in the morning
the deceased left the house informing his wife PW-1, that he is going to
Madapura to meet the Revenue Inspector. At that time, he was wearing one
HMT Watch, gold ring with inscription “GDC”, a gold chain and a sum of
Rs.2,500/-. He informed PW-1 that he may return in the evening and if he
does not, he will come back on the next day morning. Since the deceased
did not come back even in the morning of 24.9.1995, PW-1 went to the coffee
land to attend the work and on the way on Thakeri-Garvale Road, saw the
dead body of her husband lying by the side of the road with injuries on his
person. On seeing it she went back to the house and informed the incident
to her children and all the family members came back to the place. By then
the police who had received incomplete information also arrived at the spot
and after recording the statement of PW-1 and treating the same as first
information report, registered a case in Crime No.215/1995 for the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC against the two
accused persons including the appellant- accused no.1 and investigation was
taken up.
4. After registration of the case the mandatory procedures like holding of
mahazar, drawing up of inquest proceedings were conducted. Statements of
witnesses were recorded and search for the accused was carried out. On the
same day, i.e., on 24.9.1995, accused no.1 voluntarily appeared before the
Investigating Officer and surrendered. He was taken into custody and
interrogated and from his voluntary statement, the permissible portion
marked as Ex.P-14 was recorded. On the basis of the voluntary statement,
gold chain, ring belonging to the deceased and the weapon alleged to have
been used in the crime in question were discovered from the house of the
accused no.1. Those were seized along with the bloodstained clothes which
were subjected to forensic science examination. On receipt of all the
reports including F.S.L., autopsy, serologist and on completion of the
investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons for the
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
5. In order to establish its accusations the prosecution examined 16
witnesses. The accused persons pleaded innocence and stated that because of
enmity they have been falsely implicated.
6. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record found the
appellant guilty. However, the co-accused was given the benefit of doubt
and order of acquittal was recorded.
7. The entire case of the prosecution revolves around the evidence which is
circumstantial in nature, as there were no eye witnesses to the actual
assault. The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are:
(i) Motive;
(ii) Last seen together’
(iii) Discovery/recovery of the golden ornaments by the deceased and the
murder weapon seized from the house of the accused no.1 along with the
bloodstained clothes of the accused no.1; and lastly
(iv) absence of any explanation by the accused no.1.
8. The High Court found that the circumstances were conclusive to prove
guilt of the accused and, therefore, confirmed the conviction and the
sentence by dismissing the appeal.
9. In support of the appeal leaned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the factual scenario as projected by the prosecution does not establish the
guilt of the accused and the circumstances highlighted by the prosecution
to establish its case does not present a complete chain of circumstances to
warrant any interference of guilty.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the
judgment of the High Court affirming that the judgment of the Trial Court.
11. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case
rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be
justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found
to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any
other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063,
Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of
Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, AIR (1985) SC
1224, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, and Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. ,AIR (1989) SC 1890. The circumstances
from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected
with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In
Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR (1954 )SC 621 it was laid down that where
the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the
cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the
innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable
doubt.
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy
v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:
“21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that
the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be
fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover,
all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in
the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally
inconsistent with his innocence.”
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR (1990) SC 79, it was laid down
that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must
satisfy the following tests:
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be
drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete
that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human
probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with
the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.”
In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) Crl. LJ 1104, it was
pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial
evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two
inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also
pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been
fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established
must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
12. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book `Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence’
(Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the
case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any
legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt
connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on
the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal
accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial
evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case
admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory
facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable
of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his
guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.
13. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial
evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to
circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.
In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR (1952) SC 343, it was
observed thus:
“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and
all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be
a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must
be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622, Therein, while dealing with
circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the
prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna
in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The
conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be
based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and
not may be established;
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable
on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved; and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
14. Some of the circumstances which need to be highlighted are recovery of
the gold ornaments of the deceased as well as the weapon used in the crime.
The bloodstained clothes of the appellant were also seized. Prosecution has
relied on the evidence of PWs 6 and 12 to establish its stand about the
recovery. PW-6, the goldsmith who was called for testing and weighing gold
ornaments. He admitted that he accompanied police officer for recovery of
the ornaments from the accused but resiled from certain parts of the
statement made during investigation. PW-12 specifically stated that the
appellant led the police and the mahazar witness for discovery of the
articles namely, gold chain MO 10, bloodstained clothes i.e. MO 14 of the
accused. These are along with clothes were sent for forensic examination.
The evidence of FSL Officer and his report equally established that the
bloodstains were there. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short ‘Evidence Act’) has also application. As held by this Court in J.P.
Anand v. D.G. Baffna, AIR (2002) SC 141, and Ezhil and Ors. v. State of
Tamil Nadu, AIR (2002) SC 2017, in the absence of explanation of the
accused as to legitimate or origin of their possession of articles
belonging to the deceased, keeping in view of the time within which the
murder was supposed to have been committed and the body found and the
articles recovered from the possession of the accused an inference can be
can be safely drawn that not only the accused was in possessions of those
articles belonging to the deceased but also committed murder of the
deceased. The articles belonging to the deceased were in possession of the
accused who had voluntarily disclosed and as such presumption under Section
114 of the Evidence Act was clearly applicable.
15. The most important circumstance for the prosecution in the case is the
disclosure statements of the accused persons and recoveries of the stolen
property, blood stained shirt and weapon of offence consequent upon such
statements. The admissibility of the statements made by the accused persons
to the police is challenged on twin grounds, i.e., (i) factually no such
statement was made, and (ii) the statement made was inadmissible in
evidence.
Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to a police
officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence.
Similarly Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that confession by the
accused person while in custody of police cannot be proved against him.
However, to the aforesaid rule of Sections 25 to 26 of the Evidence Act,
there is an exception carved out by Section 27 the Evidence Act providing
that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,
may be proved. Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26. Such
statements are generally termed as disclosure statements leading to the
discovery of facts which are presumably in the exclusive knowledge of the
maker. Section 27 appears to be based on the view that if a fact is
actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is
afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly it can be
safely allowed to be given in evidence.
As the Section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the
courts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must
ensure the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is
vulnerable to abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in
terms of the aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot
be discarded only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during
investigation. The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the
prosecution to make out a statement of accused with a simple case of
recovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions
of Section 27 the Evidence Act.
16. The position of law in relation to Section 27 of the Evidence Act was
elaborately made clear by Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. v.
Emperor, AIR (1947) PC 87, wherein it was held:
“Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the
prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain
statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition
necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact
in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence
in the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so
much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if
a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some
guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and
accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the
extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the
fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally
the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody
produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a
weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the
informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown has argued that in such a
case the ‘fact discovered’ is the physical object produced, and that any
information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon
this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a
person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in
the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a
dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of section 27,
little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding
sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police
custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature
that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the
exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be
the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object
subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive
powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice
the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their
Lordships think that the proviso to S.26, added by S.27, should not be held
to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships’ view it is
fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent
to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which
the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to
past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to
its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information
supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in
the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives
were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if
the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the
fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be
added ‘with which I stabbed A’ these words are admissible since they do not
relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”
17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR (1960) SC 1125, this
Court held that Sections 25 and 26 were manifestly intended to hit an evil,
viz., to guard against the danger of receiving in evidence testimony from
tainted sources about statements made by persons accused of offences. These
sections form part of a statute which codifies the law relating to the
relevancy of evidence and proof of facts in judicial proceedings. The State
is as much concerned with punishing offenders who may be proved guilty of
committing of offences as it is concerned with protecting persons who may
be compelled to give confessional statements. Section 27 renders
information admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact pursuant
to a statement made by a person in custody is a guarantee of truth of the
statement made by him and the legislature has chosen to make on that ground
an exception to the rule prohibiting proof of such statement. The principle
of admitting evidence of statements made by a person giving information
leading to the discovery of facts which may be used in evidence against him
is manifestly reasonable. In that case the High Court had acquitted the
accused on the ground that his statement which lad to the recovery of
gandasa, the weapon of offence was inadmissible. The accused Deoman had
made a statement to hand over the gandasa which he stated to have thrown
into a tank and got it recovered. The trial court convicted the accused for
the offence of murder. The Full Bench of the High Court held that Section
27 of the Evidence Act which allegedly created an unjustifiable
discrimination between persons in custody and persons out of custody
offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
‘Constitution’) was unenforceable. After the opinion of the Full Bench a
Division Bench of the Court excluded from consideration the statement made
by the accused in the presence of the police officer and held that the
story of the accused having borrowed a gandasa on the day of occurrence was
unreliable. The accused was acquitted but at the instance of the State of
U.P., the High Court granted a certificate to file the appeal in this
Court. This Court did not agree with the position of law settled by the
High Court and decided to proceed to review the evidence in the light of
that statement in so far as it distinctly related to the fact thereby
discovery being admissible. Dealing with the conclusions arrived at by the
High Court and on the facts of the case, this Court observed:
“The High Court was of the view that the mere fetching of the gandasa from
its hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself had put it in the
tank, and an inference could legitimately be raised that somebody else had
placed it in the tank, or that Deoman had seen someone placing that gandasa
in the tank or that someone had told him about the gandasa lying in the
tank. But for reasons already set out the information given by Deoman is
provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered;
and his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information
which distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa. Discovery from
its place of hiding, at the instance of Deoman of the gandasa stained with
human blood in the light of the admission by him that he had thrown it in
the tank in which it was found therefore acquires significance, and
destroys the theories suggested by the High Court.”
In Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR (1976) SC 483 it was
held that expression ‘fact discovered’ includes not only the physical
object produced but also place from which it is produced and the knowledge
of the accused as to that. Interpreting the words of Section “so much of
the information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, the
Court held that the word “distinctly” means “directly”, “indubitably”,
“strictly”, “unmistakably”. The word has been advisedly used to limit and
define the scope of proveable information. The phrase “distinctly” relates
“to the fact thereby discovered”. The phrase refers to that part of
information supplied by the accused which is the direct cause of discovery
of a fact. The rest of the information has to be excluded.
In Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, [1983] 2 SCR 552,
it was held that for the applicability of section 27 of the Evidence Act
two conditions are pre-requisite, viz., (i) information must be such as has
caused discovery of the fact, and (ii) the information must ‘relate
distinctly’ to the fact discovered. Under Section 27 only so much of the
information as distinctly relates to the fact really thereby discovered, is
admissible. While deciding the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, the Court has also to keep in mind the nature of presumption under
Illustration (a) to (s) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court can,
therefore, presume the existence of a fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human
conduct and public and private business, in their relations to the facts of
the particular case. In that case one of the circumstance relied upon by
the prosecution against the accused was that on being arrested after a year
of the incident, the accused made a statement before the police leading to
the recovery of some of the gold ornaments of the deceased and her six silk
sarees, from different places which were identified by the witness as
belonging to the deceased. In that context the court observed:
“There is no controversy that the statement made by the appellant Ex.P-35
is admissible under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Under S.27 only so much of
the information as distinctly relates to the facts really thereby
discovered is admissible. The word ‘fact means some concrete or material
fact to which the information directly relates.”
In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, S/o Gopinath Shinde & Ors., JT (2000) 5 SC
575 has held that the Section 27 the Evidence Act was based on the doctrine
of confirmation by subsequent events and giving the section actual and
expanding meanings, held:
“The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine
of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength
of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee
that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information
might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but it results in
discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the
legislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by
restricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well settled
that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in
section. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor,
AIR (1947) PC 67, is the most quoted authority for supporting the
interpretation that the ‘fact discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces
the place from which the object was produced; the knowledge of the accused
as to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.”
18. Besides Section 27 the Evidence Act, the courts can draw presumptions
under Section 114, Illustrations (a) and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
In Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. AIR (1995) SC 1598, where ornaments of the
deceased were recovered from the possession of the accused immediately
after the occurrence, this Court held:
“It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference
can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty
of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid
offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the
nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat
Khan v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1956) SC 54, that no hard and fast rule can
be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain
circumstances. It has also been indicated that where only evidence against
the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the
circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been
committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the
person in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. A
note of caution has been given by this Court by indicating that suspicion
should not take the place of proof. It appears that the High Court in
passing the impugned judgment has taken note of the said decision of this
Court. But as rightly indicated by the High Court, the said decision is not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High
Court has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court rendered in
Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR (1954) SC 1 In the said decision, this court
has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114,
Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be drawn under the ‘important
time factor’. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in
possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be
permitted. But if several months had expired in the interval, the
presumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the
circumstances of the case. In the instant case, it has been established
that immediately on the next day of the murder, the accused Gulab Chand had
sold some of the ornaments belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days
the recovery of the said stolen articles was made from his house at the
instance of the accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has
been indicated by this Court as an ‘important time factor’, should not be
lost sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that
in a latter decision of this Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka,
[1993] 2 SCC 330, this Court has held that the nature of the presumption
and Illustration (a) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend upon
the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can be laid down to
determine whether possession in the recent or otherwise and each case must
be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent
possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according
as the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from hand to
hand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily
from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be
too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that
period. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the
accused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the
nature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the
said articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the
deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of
the commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant.
Excepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the
accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation
for lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder
has been given by the accused. In the facts of this case, it appears to us
that murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the
same transaction and therefore the presumption arising under Illustration
(a) of Section 114 Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed
the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments.”
19. In the instant case also, the disclosure statements were made by the
accused persons on the next day of the commission of the offence and the
property of the deceased was recovered at their instance from the places
where they had kept such properties, on the same day. In the same affect
are the judgments in Mukund Alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v. State of M.P. AIR
(1997) SC 2622 and Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR (1998) SC 1251 . In the latter case the Court held:
“Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Ohol family from the
possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the
deceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol. Mrs. Runi Ohol and Mr. Rohan Ohol) which
possession has remained unexplained by the appellants the presumption under
Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act will be attracted. It
needs no discussion to conclude that the murder and the robbery of the
articles were found to be part of the same transaction. The irresistible
conclusion would therefore, be that the appellants and no one else had
committed the three murders and the robbery.”
20. These aspects were illuminatingly highlighted in Sanjay @ Kaka v. State
(N.C.T. of Delhi) [2001] 3 SCC 190.
21. Above being the position, the appeal is clearly without merit, deserves
dismissal which we direct.