JUDGMENT
Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The defendants are in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, whereby the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale was decreed.
2. As per the plaintiff, on 21.4.1989 the defendants agreed to sell land measuring 7 kanals 8 marlas for a total sale consideration of Rs. 24,000/-. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid as earnest money. It was agreed to execute the sale deed on or before 11.5.1989 on payment of the balance sale consideration. It is the case of the plaintiffs that on the date fixed for the execution of the sale deed, the defendants failed to execute the sale deed and that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Therefore, the present suit for specific performance was filed on 13.9.1991.
3. Both the Courts have recorded a concurrent finding of fact in respect of execution of agreement of sale dated 21.4.1989 Exhibit P.1 by the appellant. Such finding has been returned on the basis of statement of defendant No. 1. Bhaiya Ram DW2 himself, wherein he has admitted his signatures on the agreement. He has also admitted that he received Rs. 10,000/- as earnest money at the time of execution of the agreement of sale and that no fraud was committed by the plaintiffs upon him. In fact, no attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant to dispute such finding recorded by the Courts below.
4. The sole argument raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the suit for specific performance has been filed after two years of the date fixed for the execution of the sale. Therefore, the plaintiff are not entitled to decree for specific performance. Reliance is placed on K.S. Vidyanadam and Ors. v. Vairavan ; Ram Niwas Gupta v. Mumtaz Hasan and Ors. 2002(1) P.L.J. 175 and Smt. Ralli and Ors. v. Smt. Satinderjit Kaur (1998-1) 118 P.L.R. 666.
5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents relies upon a judgment of this court in Smt. Jaggo bai v. Balbir Singh and Anr. (2006-2) 143 P.L.R. 31 and Piru v. Fakir (2006-3) 144 P.L.R. 411, to contend that the defendant has not raised a plea of hardship in execution of the sale deed in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Since such a plea was not raised before the Courts below, the defendant-appellant cannot be permitted to raise such argument in second appeal for the first time. In fact, reliance is placed on V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal , to contend that since the plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance within the period of limitation, therefore, the argument that the plaintiff is not entitled to decree for specific performance is not tenable.
6. The judgment of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam’s case (supra) has been considered in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal . In Veerayee Animal’s case (supra), it has been held that it may be unreasonable to give the exact definition of the word reasonable. The dictionary of ‘reasonable time’ is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In Pechimuthu’s case (supra), it has been held that rise in price of land agreed to be conveyed may be a relevant factor in denying relief of specific performance but such argument may be relevant factor when decree for specific performance is being considered by the Court for the first time.
7. Admittedly, the defendant-appellant has not pleaded any hardship so as not to exercise the discretion in granting a decree for specific performance in terms of Section 20 of the Act before the Courts below. In the absence of any pleading or proof of any hardship, mere fact that the suit has been filed after two years of the date of performance of the agreement is not a ground to decline the decree for specific performance when both the Courts below have granted such decree in favour of the plaintiff.
8. In view of the above, I do not find any patent illegality or material irregularity in the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, which may give rise to any substantial question of law in the present second appeal.
9. Dismissed.