ORDER
T.N. Singh, J.
1. Two points arise for decision in this appeal preferred under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, for short, ‘the Act’. Claimants are appellants.
2. An award was passed in appellants’ favour on March 3, 1987 by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner’s Court No. 1, Gwalior. That is challenged as incomplete and invalid on that account because the claimants have been denied 1 their statutory dues of penalty and interest contemplated under Section 4A of the Act. The other point is of maintainability of the appeal, which is seriously challenged by Shri V.G. Knot, Deputy Government Advocate. Counsel contended that only an order awarding interest and penalty under Section 4A is appealable because that is so specified in Clause (aa) of Section 30(1) of the Act.
3. Because the questions raised are of some importance, for proper appreciation of legal position relevant portions of relevant provisions of the Act are being extracted ;
“4-A. Compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default–(1) Compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. (2) In cases where the employer does not accept the liability for compensation to the extent claimed, he shall be bound to make provisional payment based on the event of liability which he accepts, and, such payment shall be deposited with the Commissioner or made to the workman, as the case may be, without prejudice to the right of the workman to make any further claim. (3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner may direct that in addition to the amount of the arrears, simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the amount due together with, if in the opinion of the Commissioner there is no justificition for the delay, a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent of such amount, shall be recovered from the employer by way of penalty”.
“19. Reference to Commissioner.–(1) If any question (that) arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether a person injured is or is not a workman) or as to the amount or duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature or extent of disablement), the question shall, in default of agreement, be settled by (a Commissioner). (2) No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act”.
“22. Form of application –(1) No application for the settlement of any matter by a Commissioner (other than an application by a dependant or dependants for compensation) shall be made unless and until some question has arisen between the parties in connection therewith which they have been unable to settle by agreement”.
“30. Appeals — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely —
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;
(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A:
Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unles the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees”.
4. Counsel cited a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Komaldas Bhagel v. Maqsood Khan @ Pappu Seth and Anr., 1 1985 ACC 46, wherein the view taken is that refusal to award interest and penalty cannot be challenged in appeal under Section 30 on the ground that Commissioner’s jurisdiction in that regard was; merely discretionary. That view was taken albeit on the interpretation solely of Clause (aa) of Section 30(1) holding that it “provides for an appeal against an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A”. The judgment did not, evidently, purport to lay down any law; the decision rendered summarily was of first impression. Neither any case law was discussed, nor even provision of Section 4A examined. Indeed, the view cryptically expressed is countered by the decision at the summit level in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case AIR 1976 SC 222. At para 8 of the report in that case it has been held that when award of compensation by Court becomes necessary as a result of the employer defaulting in his duty to pay the same as mandated by Section 4-A(1) of the Act, the Commissioner will be “justified” in making an order for payment of interest and penalty; employer’s objection in that regard was overruled by their Lordships.
5. Law, is, accordingly, clearly established in my view that the award which could be passed by the Commissioner could be not merely for compensation provided in the schedule of the Act but for interest and penalty also. Indeed, the Commissioner was required to pass a just award to settle fully the claim preferred to discharge its own statutory duty contemplated under Sections 4A, 19 and 22 of the Act. The same view was expressed aliunde by a Division Bench of this Court in Divisional Engineer, M.P.E.B. v. Mantobai (1990-I-LLJ-25), wherein it was held further that the liabilty contemplated under Section 4A of payment of interest and penalty was indefeasible ‘despite use of the word “may” in Sub-section (3) thereof. It was also held that on the ground of non-framing of issue in regard to that liability there was no necessity of remitting the matter to the Commissioner for making award in regard to penalty and interest. That decision has a precursor, Omprakash v. Ramkali 1987 ACJ 803, cited with approval in the Division Bench case. The Court in dealing with the appeal preferred under Section 30 of the W.C. Act, held the insurer legally liable to pay interest as also penalty in terms of Section 4-A(3) of the Act taking the view that the corpus of the “compensation” payable to the claimant would be made up of the penalty and interest contemplated under the said Section 4-A(3).
6. Evidently, Apex Court’s aforesaid view was not brought to the notice of the Court in Komaldas (supra) and this Court’s both decisions were rendered later. Komaldas is not to be regarded any more as stating the law correctly. Other substantial reasons too are there to be stated instantly which compel me to take a contrary view and to hold that a reference to the larger Bench will be merely an exercise in futility and indeed is not warranted in the context of the view expressed in Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Mantobai (supra). Precedents become binding authority when supreme judicial mandates are heeded and law is laid down after due deliberation. A decision ceases to be good law when contrary view is expressed by a Court of superior jurisdiction. Law is well settled that for interpretation of any statutory provision its context and setting are to be examined and to divine its purpose and intendment it is necessary further to examine the object it proposes to subserve. That exercise not being undertaken in Komaldas (supra), I am discharging my duty in that regard, although Mantobai (supra) has already rendered Komaldas ineffective.
7. The Act is a piece of beneficient legislation, meant to protect dependants of a workman from sudden destitution as a result of the workman meeting his death or suffering serious personal injury in the course of employment. Section 4A therefore makes “compensation” payable to dependants by the employer directly to discharge his statutory liability and as held in Mantobai (supra) and Omprakash (supra), the liability is deliberately meant to arise soon after the event takes place. That, indeed, is also the view expressed in Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case. Sudden loss or disablement of the workman exposes his dependants to starvation of which the employer is required to take immediate care directly and for that he is even allowed to enter into “agreement” with them. In all the three decisions the right of the dependants to claim interest and penalty is recognised and is made enforceable at higher levels too, to penalise employer’s uncondonable default of its inexorable duty. True the question of maintainability directly was not in issue, for the question was advisedly not raised.
8. Commissioner’s jurisdiction envisaged under Section 19(1) is to decide “any question (that) arises in any proceedings under the Act….” Civil Court’s jurisdiction is pari passu barred, therefore, “to settle, decide or deal with any question, which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner, to enforce any liability under this Act”. That would include clearly the question of interest and penalty contemplated under Section 4-A(3). Evidently, therefore, an order “disallowing a claim in full or in part” which is made appealable under Section 30(1)(a) would also be an order disallowing the claim in respect of interest and penalty. On the language of Clause (a) there is no scope for taking any other view indeed, it would be a “substantial question of law” for which scope of appeal is duly reserved in the proviso, when the award or the order passed by the Commissioner disallows claim made by the dependents for interest and/or penalty. Merely because right to appeal is contemplated against an order awarding interest or penalty in favour of the employer under Clause (aa) it is not to be assumed that the intention of Legislature was to syphon the content of the crucial right reserved deliberately, specifically and indefeasible of the claimant/ dependant under Section 4-A(3). Taking any other view would be running in the face of the well-established canon of harmonious construction.
9. For the reasons aforesaid I hold the appeal maintainable and I also hold following Mantobai (supra) that non-framing of issue in regard to disallowance of claim for interest and penalty does not warrant remittance of this matter to the Commissioner’s Court to entail further protraction in disposal.
10. The question that I have to decide now is that what penalty is to be levied and made a part of the award. In that regard judicial discretion is to be exercised in terms of Section 4A as an upper ceiling of 50% is fixed. I have failed to read in any material gross negligence of the employer in responding to claim made, in regard to its duty despite letter Ex.D.1 of the claimant. Deceased Khachchuram was a Chowkidar at the godown of the respondent when he was hit at 9.00 a.m. on July 17, 1986 by hand-bomb hurled at him. Nothing has come on record to suggest that there was unpardonable laxity at the department level in dealing the case of payment of provisional compensation contemplated under Section 4-A(2). Indeed, in the instant appeal as well respondent has not raised any cross-objection disputing his liability. It is a fit case for award of penalty not to the full extent of 50% but to the extent of 30% of the compensation awarded. Be it noted that the claim for compensation has been found proved and award in that regard is made for payment by respondent of a sum of Rs. 27,982.50. Claimant- appellants are also entitled to interest which must be allowed in terms of Section 4-A(3), namely at the rate of 6% per annum, from the date of application till realisation.
11. The appeal succeeds to the extent hereinabove indicated. The award is modified accordingly.