JUDGMENT
M. Srinivasan, J.
1. The contention of the appellant is that the evidence of Kumaresan, P.W. 2, who is the eyewitness has been believed by the Tribunal wrongly inasmuch as the evidence of the very same person has been disbelieved by the Magistrate in the criminal proceedings against the driver. But the judgment in the criminal proceeding was not even produced before the Tribunal. An application is filed here in C.M.P. No. 17872 of 1994 for admitting the judgment of the Magistrate as additional evidence in this appeal. We dismiss the said application for two reasons: (1) There is no explanation in the affidavit filed in support of the petition to meet the requirements of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. The judgment of the criminal court was delivered on 11.6.1993 and the certified copy of the said order was obtained on 22.6.1993. The claim petition was disposed of by the Tribunal on 2.8.1994-one year and two months later. In spite of availability of such a long time, the appellant did not choose to produce the judgment before the Tribunal. It is stated in the affidavit that it was omitted to be filed. This is hardly a reason for admitting additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code. (2) The judgment is not evidence in the civil court for the purpose of disbelieving a witness. The limited purpose for which the judgment in the criminal proceeding can be admitted in evidence is to prove the fact that there was a criminal proceeding and that ended in a particular manner. Apart from that, the judgment of the Magistrate is of no use to the appellant. Hence, we dismiss the petition in C.M.P. No. 17872 of 1994.
2. Just because the Magistrate had disbelieved the eyewitness, Kumaresan, P.W. 2, for reasons of his own it is not necessary that the Tribunal should disbelieve him. We find that he has given cogent evidence in chief examination that the appellant’s bus was driven at a very high speed in a reckless manner and it dashed against the deceased. In cross-examination, not even one relevant question has been put to him to discredit his evidence. The only suggestion put to him is that he did not see the occurrence and is giving false evidence. The witness has promptly denied it. In such circumstances there is no merit in the contention that P.W. 2’s evidence shall not be accepted. The Tribunal is, therefore, right in accepting the evidence of P.W. 2 and holding that the accident occurred only because of the negligence on the part of the bus driver.
3. As regards the quantum of compensation it is in evidence that the deceased was getting a sum of Rs. 1,800/- p.m. He was employed as iron master in Tiruppur Banian Company. His employer has given evidence as P.W. 3. He has produced the salary certificate which is marked as Exh. A-3. His evidence has not been in any way discredited in cross-examination. It is argued now that P.W. 3 has admitted that there is an agreement between the Banian Manufacturers’ Association and labourers with regard to wages, and as per that agreement, the salary for an iron master is between Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 1,100/- per month. Learned counsel contends that the evidence of P.W. 3 that he was paying a sum of Rs. 1,800/- to the deceased should be disbelieved in view of the aforesaid fact. We do not agree. The agreement that is referred to is not an agreement between P.W. 3 and the deceased. That is a general agreement between the workers on the one hand and the Manufacturers’ Association on the other. That will not prevent any employer from giving more salary to any particular worker. Further, it is not clear whether the said amount represents basic salary or the total emoluments of the worker. Hence, we accept the positive evidence of P.W. 3 that he was paying Rs. 1,800/- per month to the deceased. No motive has been suggested to P.W. 3 as to why he should take the trouble of giving evidence on behalf of the claimants and that too false evidence.
4. It is then contended that both the claimants are not dependants of the deceased and they are not entitled to get compensation for loss of income. There is no merit in this contention. P.W. 1, the first claimant, has stated that he has been from his childhood suffering from fits and, therefore, he is not working anywhere. He has denied the suggestion that he was also earning by working in some place. Apart from that suggestion, nothing has been made out to show that P.W. 1 was having an independent income. As regards the second claimant, it no doubt appeared from the cause title that she was married to one Natesan. But nothing has been suggested in cross-examination that she was not dependent on her father, the deceased. Unless a specific question has been put to the witness in the cross-examination, no inference can be drawn from the factum of marriage between the second claimant and one Natesan that she was not dependent on her father at the time of his death.
5. Apart from that, the total compensation is worked out by the Tribunal by taking into account the income of the deceased and the contribution which he would have made to the family. That amount has been apportioned into equal halves between the claimant Nos. 1 and 2. It is for the claimants to contest the apportionment. If the first claimant so desires, he may contend that no amount should have been given to the second claimant. But as far as the appellant is concerned, the liability is wholly on the appellant to pay the compensation amount which has been fixed at Rs. 2,26,000/- by the Tribunal. Having regard to the materials available on record, we are of the view that the said amount is a proper compensation and does not warrant any interference. Hence the appeal is dismissed.