JUDGMENT
Anil Dev Singh, J.
(1) It frequently happens that an employee is required to do more than one type of work. What is to be seen is primary and substantial nature of the work performed by him. It is the predominant nature of his work which determines whether he would be a workman or otherwise. In the instant case, the primary and predominant nature of duties of the petitioners are not of manual nature. Duties are rather supervisory and administrative in nature. The petitioners in the process of supervising the work of Safai Karamcharis and other employees may be utilising their technical knowledge but this would be for the purposes of supervision only. Again while supervising they may be giving instructions/ directions and guidance to the latter category of employees. The main feature and pith and substance of the employment of the petitioners is not performance of manual work and, therefore, they do not fall in the category of `workmen’ as defined by F.R.56(b).
(2) In the present case, since the services of the petitioners are primarily being utilised for supervising the work of others, the fact that for the purpose of proper supervision they are required to utilise their technical knowledge, if any, will not convert the supervisory work into technical work. Even otherwise persons performing technical work are not included in the definition of the word ` workman’ under F.R. 56(b).
(3) From the reading of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and F.R.56(b) it is apparent that there is a material difference between language of the two provisions. While persons performing technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work are not included in the definition of the word “workman” in F.R. 56(b), they are included in definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the Full Bench decision in Hetram’s case (Supra), “Workman” as contemplated by note to F.R.56(b) is an artisan who essentially performs manual work in an industrial or work charged establishment on a monthly rate of pay and the same is not to be construed by reference to any other provision including Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. As already pointed out the petitioners are not manual workers and therefore fall outside the ambit of F.R. 56(b). It is not disputed that if F.R.56(b) is not attracted petitioners superannuate at 58 years in accordance with F.R. 56(a).
(4) Disparity between the age of retirement of different classes of employees under one employer does not per-se amount to discrimination. If the discrimination between two groups of employees is based upon reasonable differentia, Article 14 is not violated.
(5) Therefore, in an organisation there could be different ages of retirement for different sets of employees and lack of uniformity in the age of retirement does not fall foul of article 14 of the Constitution, unless it is shown that the classification is not based upon reasonable differentia or is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and unfair. The petitioners in the present case cannot claim violation of article 14 as they have not been able to establish that the disparity between the ages of superannuation of “workmen” and Safai Karamcharis on the one hand and other employees on the other, is not grounded on intelligible differentia, or the same suffers from the vice of unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness. Therefore, their claim of violation of Article 14 because of lack of uniformity in the ages of retirement of employees of the corporation is not tenable.