JUDGMENT
Sobhagmal Jain, J.
1. This appeal and the cross-objections are directed against the award dated January 5, 1985 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Banswara, awarding a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- as compensation to the claimants.
2. The accident, out of which the present case arises, took place on June 13, 1981, on Banswara-Udaipur Road in between the villages Barlia and Mordi, resulting in the death of Niranjan Kumar Nagar, who was 25 years of age at the time of the accident. A claim petition was filed by Kanti Nagar and Usha Nagar, mother and wife respectively of the deceased. It was alleged that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving by Poonjalal, driver of the bus No. GRT 7583 of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. According to the claimants, Niranjan Kumar Nagar, who was a tempo driver, was carrying two passengers, namely, Kishore Singh and Madan Singh in his tempo and was going from Banswara to Chirawala. The tempo developed some trouble and, therefore, he stopped it on the left side of the road and was attempting repairs when the bus No. GRT 7583 came from the opposite side and caused the accident. The bus, according to the claimants, was coming at a fast speed. The bus hit the deceased, as a result of which he died at the spot itself. The bus could stop after covering a distance of 300 yards. It was alleged that the accident took place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the bus. A sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- was claimed as compensation.
3. The claim was contested by the Corporation and the driver. They denied that the bus was being driven at a fast speed. They also disputed the averments that the accident was the result of rash and negligent act on the part of the driver.
4. The Tribunal, by the award dated January 5, 1985, allowed a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- as compensation to the claimants. The Tribunal found that the deceased was 25 years of age on the date of the accident. The accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of Poonjalal, driver of the bus, which belonged to the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. The Tribunal also found that the deceased was earning Rs. 800/- per month, out of which he was contributing a sum of Rs. 400/- per month towards the family. The Tribunal, on these facts, arrived at a figure of Rs. 2,16,000/-, and added to it a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, on account of the expected increase in future in the income of the deceased and a further sum of Rs. 20,000/-, on account of mental shock caused to the claimants, who were deprived of the company of the deceased. The Tribunal held that the claimants were entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,56,000/-, but then said that it would be just and proper to award Rs. 1,50,000/-, as compensation to them. The Tribunal allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, if payment was made within three months, otherwise the rate of interest was to be 12 per cent per annum.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award of the Tribunal, the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation has filed the present appeal. The claimants also feeling dissatisfied with the award, have preferred cross-objections.
6. Mr. M.C. Bhandari, counsel for the Corporation, has urged that the age of the deceased on the date of accident should have been taken as 30 years and the multiplier which the Tribunal should have applied would be 35 and not 45. He has further urged that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing a sum of Rs. 20,000/-, on account of mental shock or for deprivation of the company of the deceased.
7. Mr. D.S. Shishodia, counsel for the appellants, has, on the other hand, contended that having come to the conclusion that the amount to which the claimants were entitled was Rs. 2,56,000/-, the Tribunal was not justified in bringing down the figure to Rs. 1,50,000/-only. He has further submitted that the Tribunal should not have held that the dependency of the family was only Rs. 400/- per month. Learned counsel has also urged that the interest allowed to the claimants should have been at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application.
8. I have given my earnest consideration to the arguments urged by the counsel for the parties. I have also gone through the award given by the Tribunal. It is not in dispute now that Niranjan Kumar died as a result of the accident which took place on June 13, 1981, and was caused by the bus No. GRT 7583, belonging to the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. The fact that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of Poonjalal, driver of the aforesaid bus, is also no more in dispute. The Tribunal has recorded a categorical finding in this respect and I do not find any valid reason to disturb the same. The question of quantum of compensation to be awarded to the claimants is the crucial question which needs to be decided in this appeal. What should be the multiplier to be applied for determining the compensation depends primarily on the age of the deceased and his life. The Tribunal was not justified in allowing compensation on account of mental shock. In the claim petition the claimants had claimed that the deceased was married only 6 months before the accident and his wife lost the husband within a short period of 6 months. She was deprived of the love and affection of her husband and his consortium forever, on account of his untimely death in the accident. The question whether the claimants are entitled to compensation for loss of life, love and affection and consortium is no more res Integra. It is concluded by a Full Bench decision of this court inR.S.R.T.C. v. Kistoori Devi 1986 ACJ 960 (Rajasthan), wherein it was held:
54. We are neither concerned nor called upon in this reference as to what would be the quantum of such compensation and it would be for the concerned court to decide as to what would be the just compensation in the facts and circumstances of each individual case. We would now consider the question of admissibility of compensation in respect of the following heads for which the learned single Judge has made this reference:
(1) Loss of love and affection of spouse/ children/parents:
55. In determining the just compensation, the court is entitled to grant compensation on the above head.
(2) Consortium:
56. We have already cited number of cases where compensation has been allowed for loss of consortium but in case the amount of compensation is allowed to a spouse under the first head, then the question of further allowing compensation under the head of loss of consortium will not arise.
(3) Loss of future happy life of deceased:
57. Any compensation under this head appears to be overlapping the compensation already considered under the first head of loss of love and affection of spouse/children/parents. Thus, no separate compensation need to be considered when the same has already been considered under the first head.
9. The Full Bench also dealt with the question of compensation on account of mental shock and mental agony, pain, suffering and observed as under:
58. The question came up for consideration recently before the House of Lords in McLoughlin v. O’Brian 1984 ACJ 410 (HL, England). In this case, the facts were that the husband and three children of the plaintiff met with an accident caused by the negligence of the defendants. At the time of accident, the plaintiff was at home two miles away from the place of accident. The plaintiff was told of the accident by a person who had been at the scene of accident and was taken to the hospital where she saw the injured members of her family and heard that her daughter had been killed. As a result of hearing and seeing the result of the accident, the plaintiff suffered severe nervous shock. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants for the nervous shock, distress and injury to her health caused by the defendant’s negligence. Both the trial Judge and the court of appeal dismissed her claim; the plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords, the appeal was allowed. Lord Wilberforce made the following speech:
‘But, these discounts accepted, there remains, in my opinion, just because, ‘shock’ in its nature is capable of affecting so wide a range of people, a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible claims. It is necessary to consider three elements inherent in any claim; the class of persons whose claims should be recognised; the proximity of such persons to the accident; and the means by which the shock is caused. As regards the class of persons, the possible range is between the closest of family ties, of parent and child, or husband and wife, and the ordinary bystander. Existing law recognises the claims of the first; it denies that of the second, either on the basis that such persons must be assumed to be possessed of fortitude sufficient to enable them to endure the calamities of modern life or that defendants cannot be expected to compensate the world at large. In my opinion, these positions are justifiable, and since the present case falls within the first class it is strictly unnecessary to say more. I think, however, that it should follow that other cases involving less close relationships must be very carefully scrutinised. I cannot say that they should never be admitted. The closer the tie (not merely in relationship, but in care) the greater the claim for consideration. The claim, in any case, has to be judged in the light of the other factors, such as proximity to the scene in time and place, and the nature of the accident.’
59. All the Law Lords in the above case found that where the result of the negligence is considered to have been reasonably foreseeable, the defendants are liable in damages. Thus, in order to decide the question of compensation under the above head of mental or nervous shock, it would depend on the facts of the each individual case. We would quote the apt observations in the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich in the above case:
‘My Lords, I have no doubt that this is an area of the law of negligence where we should resist the temptation to try yet once more to freeze the law in a rigid posture which would deny justice to some who, in the application of the classic principles of negligence derived from Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562, ought to succeed in the interests of certainty, where the very subject-matter is uncertain and continuously developing, or in the interests of saving defendants and their insurers from the burden of having sometimes to resist doubtful claims. I find myself in complete agreement with Tobriner, J. in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 29 ALR 3d 1316, that the defendant’s duty must depend on reasonable foreseeability and must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis. We cannot now predetermine defendant’s obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future.’
60. Thus, it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but in case the claimants may bring their case within the principles enunciated in the above case of House of Lords, they would be entitled to claim compensation under this Act.
(5) Mental and physical agony, pain and sufferings:
61. The claimants under the above head cannot claim any compensation for their own mental and physical agony or pain and sufferings on account of the death of a person in an accident. However, it would be a different case where the claimant himself suffers an injury in an accident and on that count, he claims compensation for his own injuries, in that case, the claimant would be entitled to compensation for the expenses incurred by him in connection with the medical treatment or any disability of temporary or permanent nature incurred by him. Similarly, if any amount is spent on the treatment of a person during the period he remained alive from the time of his accident till his death, compensation can also be awarded to the claimants on that count.
10. In view of the aforesaid Full Bench decision of this court, it is not open to the counsel for the appellants to urge that the claimants were not entitled to compensation on account of loss of life, love and affection of the spouse/children/parents and for loss of consortium.
11. The position that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the age of the deceased on the date of the accident should be taken as 30 years; the multiplier of 40 in place of 45 should be applied to compute the figure of compensation; the loss of dependency assessed by the Tribunal as Rs. 400/-per month is just and would stand. On these findings, the amount of compensation would come to Rs. 1,92,000/-. At this stage, I may deal with the argument of Mr. Shishodia that the Tribunal was not justified in the absence of any reasons in reducing the amount to Rs. 1,50,000/-. True, the Tribunal has not spelt any reason for this reduction. However, a deduction in consideration of the fact that compensation is being paid in lump sum and the uncertainties of life is certainly a valid and permissible deduction. To my mind deduction of 20 per cent would be a reasonable deduction on this count. I, therefore, reduce the aforesaid amount by Rs. 38,000/-. The net compensation payable to the claimants would, therefore, be:
Rs.
Amount calculated on the basis of dependency multiplied by the multiplier applied (i.e. 400 X 12 X 40) 1,92,000/- Add: Amount on account of expected increase in income in future + 20,000/- Add: Amount for loss of life, love and affection and consortium of spouse/son + 20,000/- Gross amount of compensation 2,32,000/- Less: Deduction in consideration of uncertainties of life etc. - 38,000/- Net compensation payable 1,94,000/- As between the widow and the mother of the deceased the aforesaid amount of Rs. 1,94,000/-shall be apportioned as under: Usha Nagar (widow) will be entitled to get Rs. 1,59,000/- Kanti Nagar (mother of the deceased) will be entitled to get Rs. 35,000/-
12. On the question of interest the present trend is to allow interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum payable from the date of claim petition. Therefore, the submission made by Mr. Shishodia is not devoid of substance. Accordingly, I allow interest to be paid to the appellants on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date the application for compensation was filed by claimants.
13. In the light of the aforesaid conclusions the award made by the Tribunal needs to be suitably modified.
14. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the Corporation and the cross-objections filed by the claimants are partly allowed and the award made by the Tribunal shall stand modified as under:
(1) The claimants shall be entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 1,94,000/- as compensation from the respondents, who shall be liable to pay the same to the claimant-appellants jointly and severally. This amount shall be apportioned between the claimants as follows:
Usha Nagar Rs. 1,59,000/- Kanti Nagar Rs. 35,000/- (2) The claimants shall be entitled to receive interest on their respective amounts at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application for claim filed by them, i.e., w.e.f. 11.12.1981;
(3) The respondents are allowed 3 months’ time to deposit the amount of compensation with interest with the Tribunal. If any part of the amount of compensation or interest has already been paid or deposited, the same shall be given a set-off and the respondents shall be required to deposit the balance only. If the amount of compensation is not deposited within the period so stipulated, the Tribunal shall proceed to recover the same, as per the provisions of the Act;
(4) Out of the amount of Rs. 1,59,000/- payable to Usha Nagar, a sum of Rs. 50,000/-shall be paid to her in cash and the remaining amount with interest shall be deposited in a Scheduled Bank in her account on fix term basis, not exceeding five years. During the period of deposit she will be entitled to withdraw interest accrued to her on the deposit every three months but shall not be entitled to withdraw the amount of deposit itself. At the expiry of the period of five years she will be entitled to withdraw and receive the entire amount of deposit in her name. If any part of the compensation or interest has already been paid to Usha Nagar, the same shall be deducted from the amount of Rs. 50,000/-, directed to be paid to her in cash. She will be entitled to receive in cash that much amount which falls short of Rs. 50,000/-, after taking into account the amount already received by her;
(5) Out of the amount of Rs. 35,000/- payable to Kanti Nagar, a sum of Rs. 10,000/-shall be paid to her in cash and the remaining amount with interest shall be deposited in a Scheduled Bank in her account on fix term basis, not exceeding five years. During the period of deposit, she will be entitled to withdraw interest accrued to her on the deposit every three months but shall not be entitled to withdraw the amount of deposit itself. At the expiry of the period of five years she will be entitled to withdraw and receive the entire amount of deposit in her name. If any part of the compensation or interest has already been paid to Kanti Nagar, the same shall be deducted from the amount of Rs. 35,000/- (Sic. Rs. 10,000/-), directed to be paid to her in cash. She will be entitled to receive in cash that much amount which falls short of Rs. 35,000/- (Sic. Rs. 10,000/-), after taking into account the amount already received by her;
(6) It should be open to the parties, including the claimants and the respondents, to apply to the Tribunal for further and other directions as regards the deposit and payment of money under the award and the Tribunal shall be free to decide all such questions and give such directions as may be deemed just and proper, in the circumstances, keeping in view the interest of the claimants;
(7) The parties shall bear their costs of this appeal.