JUDGMENT
R.R. Misra, J.
1. These 28 revisions have been filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against the exemption granted by the Sales Tax Tribunal to the various assessees prior to the Notification No. ST-II-7994/X–6(31)/1975–U. P. Act XV/48, Order-80, dated 30th September, 1980. Learned counsel for the parties agree that before the Sales Tax Tribunal, the leading case was the case of Orkey Metal Industries, Moradabad. A revision filed against the same has been numbered as Sales Tax Revision No. 939 of 1986. The controversy involved in all these revisions is the same and the parties agree that all of them may be taken up together for disposal. Accordingly I propose to dispose of them by a common judgment.
2. In these cases, the assessees have been dealing in some cases in gulli, in some cases in silli and in some cases in gulli and silli both. The assessment years involved are up to the assessment year 1978-79. The various assessees had claimed exemption and had moved for the issue of exemption certificates under Section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. These applications were rejected by the Sales Tax Officer. The Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), however, held that the assessees were entitled to exemption as “karkhanedars” under Notification No. ST-5263/X–902 (16)-52, dated 13th September, 1971 as amended by Notification No. ST-II-8446/X–1(2)-75 dated 1st October, 1975 and Notification No. ST-II-8453/ X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975. Aggrieved against the orders passed by the first appellate authority, the Commissioner of Sales Tax preferred appeals before the Sales Tax Tribunal but all the said appeals have been dismissed by the Sales Tax Tribunal. Aggrieved against the view taken by the Sales Tax Tribunal, the Commissioner of Sales Tax is in revisions before this Court.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. The contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel is that the Notification No. ST-II-7994/X–6(31)-1975–U. P. Act XV/48, Order-80, dated 30th September, 1980 which came into force on 1st October, 1980 will not apply in all these cases and the Tribunal is in error in referring to the same while deciding the controversy involved for the assessment years in question. Be that as it may, it is the admitted case of the parties that the interpretation of the Notification No. ST-II-8446/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October 1975, Notification No. ST-II-8449/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October 1975 and Notification No. ST-II-8453/X–1(2)-76, dated 1st October 1975 is involved in the present revisions. The submission made by the learned Standing Counsel is that gulli and silli are not “utensils” within the meaning of the aforesaid two notifications and, therefore, whenever the assessees make a sale of the items known as gullis and sillis themselves, they are not “karkhanedars” within the meaning of those notifications vis-a-vis the said goods. The said notifications are reproduced below:
5. Notification No. ST-II-8446/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 1st October, 1975):
In exercise of the powers under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 3-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948), read with Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1904), the Governor is pleased to make with effect from October 2,1975, the following amendment in Government Notification No. ST-II-4949/X–10(2)-74, dated May 30, 1975 (S. No. 127):
Amendment.–In the Schedule to the aforesaid notification, after serial No. 23 the following shall be inserted, namely:
Serial Description of goods Point at which Rate of tax
No. tax shall be levied
24. Sports shoes having spikes, nails, M or I 5 per cent
or studs embedded in their soles.
25. Linseed oil M or I 2 per cent
26. Jute and hemp goods M or I 4 per cent
27. Oils of all kinds other than M or I 3 per cent
those covered by any other
notification issued under the
Act.
28. Art brasswares and utensils First sale by the 7 per cent
made of brass, bronze (kansa), dealer other than
bell-metal (phool) or German karkhanedar as
silver and parts thereof. defined in Notification
No. ST-II-8453/X--1(2)-75,
dated October 1, 1975 or
by the importer.
Notification No. ST-II-8449/X--1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 1st October, 1975):
In exercise of the powers under Section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948), the Governor is pleased to order that no tax under Section 3-E of the said Act shall be payable with effect from May 21, 1974, by--
(1) a dealer known as ‘karkhanedar’, who manufactures and sells art brasswares, brass utensils or parts thereof, in his own gulli, darja or para bhattis on the purchase of brass, copper, zinc or scrap thereof for use by him in the manufacture of such art brasswares, brass utensils or parts thereof, provided that such art brasswares and brass utensils or parts thereof are sold in an unfinished condition (as ‘kora maal’), that is to say, without polishing, buffing, engraving or colouring (siyah kalam);
(2) a dealer other than ‘karkhanedar’ on the purchase of the aforesaid unfinished goods (kora maal) provided that such art brasswares or brass utensils or parts thereof are sold, whether as such or after polishing, buffing, engraving or colouring (siyah kalam), within the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
6. Notification No. ST-II-8453/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1976 (published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 1st October, 1975).
In exercise of the powers under Section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948), read with Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1904), and in supersession of Government Notification No. ST-5263/X–902(16)-52, dated September 13, 1971 (S. No. 16), the Governor is pleased to order that, with effect from October 2, 1975, no tax shall be payable on the turnover of sales of art brasswares and utensils made in whole or part of brass, bronze (kansa), bell-metal (phool) or German silver by the class of manufacturers of such art brass-wares or utensils known as karkhanedars, specified in column 2 of the table below, subject to the following conditions:–
(1) The concession shall be admissible only to such karkhanedars as are registered under Section 8-A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
(2) Every karkhanedar seeding to obtain exemption shall, within three months of the commencement of the assessment year for which exemption is sought, deposit the fee calculated at the rate specified against each category of dealers in column 3 of the said table:
Provided that the proportionate fee for the unexpired portion of the assessment year 1975-76 shall be deposited not later than November 30, 1975.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this notification the term ‘karkhanedar’ means a dealer who manufactures his own utensils or art brasswares or parts thereof from his own raw materials and sells the same without buffing, engraving, colouring or siyah kalam (that is to say, who sells such utensils or art brasswares or parts thereof as are commonly known as ‘kora maal’ and as are not ordinarily sold direct to the consumer).
Table
Serial Class of dealer Rate at which fee
No. is payable
1 2 3
1. Dealers owning gulli bhattis ... Rs. 25 per year per bhatti.
2. Dealers owning para bhattis ... Rs. 100 per year per bhatti.
3. Dealers owning darja bhattis ... Rs. 100 per year per bhatti.
7. From a perusal of the above notifications I find that in the Notification No. ST-II-8453/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975 the essential conditions are that a karkhanedar who is entitled to exemption should be a dealer (a) who manufactures his own utensils or art brasswares or parts thereof, (b) from his own raw materials and (c) sells the same without buffiing, engraving, colouring or siyah kalam, etc. The assessees in these cases manufacture gullis and sillis out of the brass scrap and sell the same. The point raised on behalf of the department is that these gullis and sillis are neither utensils nor parts thereof and are not exempted by the Notification No. ST-II-8453/X–1(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975. Elaborating his argument, the learned Standing Counsel states that it may be that in certain cases out of these gullis and sillis utensils may possibly be manufactured but when the assessee sells gullis and sillis as such, the same does not come within the term of “utensils” or parts thereof as used in the said notifications. In the submission of the learned Standing Counsel when a dealer manufactures gullis and sillis and stops at that, no manufacture of “utensils” come into existence.
8. The contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel is that sillis and gullis are only raw materials and cannot be termed as “utensils” or “parts” thereof. It has, therefore, become necessary to interpret the words “utensil” and “part” as appearing in the said notifications. The meaning of the word “utensil” has been given in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at page 2525 as follows:
Utensil–an article useful or necessary in a household; esp., an implement, instrument, or vessel used in a kitchen (household).
9. The meaning of the word “part” has been given in Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, at page 1274 as follows:
Part–an integral portion, something essentially belonging to a larger whole; that which together with another or others makes up a whole.
10. In Oxford Encyclopedic Dictionary, Vol. II, at page 1212 the meaning of the word “part” has been given as follows:
Part–means some but not all of a thing or number of things; division or section;
11. Taking into consideration the aforesaid dictionary meaning of the said words as well as the fact that sillis and gullis are prepared out of brass scraps which are raw materials for the same and the fact that these sillis and gullis are in different shapes and it is out of these sillis and gullis, which is the material with which ultimately “utensils” come into existence, in my opinion, there is no force in the said contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel that sillis and gullis in question are not part of “utensils” and are not entitled to exemption. The contention raised by the Standing Counsel that these sillis and gullis are raw materials is, in my opinion, incorrect inasmuch as for manufacture of “utensils” in question admittedly it is out of the scraps that these sillis and gullis are prepared and having regard to the process involved in the manufacture of “utensils’ it cannot be said that these sillis and gullis are raw materials of “utensils” and are not parts thereof.
12. In support of his aforesaid contention learned Standing Counsel has relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. v. Manohar Glass Works 1970 UPTC 226, in which it has been held that “glass tubes and glass rods” are not covered by the term “glasswares”. The said authority cannot help us in determining the controversy involved in this case inasmuch as in the said case what was in dispute was the interpretation of the term “glasswares” within the meaning of notification dated April 1,1960 (entry No. 10) as to whether the articles in question were parts of “glasswares” or not. In support of his contention learned counsel for the Commissioner of Sales Tax has also relied upon the case of Radha Balldbh Satish Chandra v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. 1987 UPTC 748 decided by me and has submitted that since in that case “brass circles” have been held to be not exempted from tax, therefore, sillis and gullis also are not exempted from tax. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
…The contention raised is that brass circles are prepared from gullis and that when utensils prepared with gullis have been held to be exempted from tax, the brass circles prepared from gullis, i.e., a process in between the preparation of gullis and utensils stand exempted and that the circles from which the utensils are prepared should also be exempted The Tribunal had observed in the impugned order of the said case that there is a rationale in the aforesaid argument made on behalf of the assessee that brass circles are prepared from gullis and that when utensils prepared with gullis have been held to be exempted from tax, the brass circles prepared from gullis, i.e., a process in between the preparation of gullis and utensils stand exempted and that the circles from which utensils are prepared should also be exempted.
But from a close reading of the case of Radha Ballabh Satish Chandra 1987 UPTC 748 it is clear that that case has been decided solely on the basis that the assessee could not show any notification by which “brass circles” are exempted and not on the basis whether brass circles are part of utensils or not. In this view of the matter the said decision in the case of Radha Ballabh Satish Chandra 1987 UPTC 748 is of no assistance to the learned Standing Counsel.
During the course of his arguments one of the learned counsel appearing for the assessee has placed reliance on a Circular No. Vidhi-1 (Do-4)-75-76-9938/Mukhyalay, dated 23rd February, 1977 issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax. According to the said circular it has been emphasised that process of making of billets and ingots (sillis and gullis) may not, in other words be said to be excluded from the purview of the explanation and that being so, the Notification No. ST-II-8449/X-l(2)-75, dated 1st October, 1975 would be attracted and exemption may become admissible. Here we find that the crucial relevant words used in this regard in all the above notifications are “utensils or parts thereof.
13. Therefore, relying on a decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Jagdeo Ram Dona Ram, Azamgath 1974 UPTC 273 learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the said circular has no statutory force. From a reading of the said circular, I find that the terms of the circular issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax in the case of Jagdeo Ram Dona Ram 1974 UPTC 273 were contrary to the mandatory statutory provisions. In these circumstances, the said decision cannot be of any assistance to the learned Standing Counsel. On the other hand, in a case arising under the Central Sales Tax Act, Slate of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu & Sons AIR 1976 SC 1561 the true nature of such communication fell to be considered. Question No. (2) referred to by the Tribunal in that case to the High Court was as follows:
(2) Whether the communication No. 4(8)-ST/57 dated 31st January, 1958, issued by the Government of India which is only an official communication having no statutory sanction behind it can have any legal effect to hold the goods in question as oil-seeds as understood in common parlance and whether such an official communication is binding on the State Government.
The Supreme Court after considering the rival contentions at (page 586 of STC) page 1564 held:
…It is true the High Court has rightly observed that the aforesaid notification of the Government of India has no statutory force and as such is not binding on the Sales Tax Officer. It cannot, however, be denied that the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, is intimately conversant not only with the policy of legislation for the purpose of implementation of the provisions of the Central Act but is also familiar with the nature and quality of the commodities as also their use from time to time. If, therefore, such an authority issued a notification including certain commodities under the head of ‘oil-seeds’, as defined under the Central Act, it cannot be said that the Tribunal and the High Court were not right in preferring such an opinion of the Government as good evidence for its conclusion, to the opinions relied upon by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on which great reliance has been placed by the appellant….
14. It is, however, made clear that what the Supreme Court was considering was a communication issued by the Government of India and not a notification. In any way, this decision of the Supreme Court has later on been followed by this Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Om Engineering Works 1986 UPTC 55. After relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the said case a similar contention raised by the Standing Counsel was repelled by the court. Thus in my opinion the case of the assessees that sillis and gullis are also covered by the terms “karkhanedar” inasmuch as the said commodities are part of “utensils” within the meaning of “karkhanedar” as used in the three notifications in question, has force.
15. There is yet another reason for taking the aforesaid view. In our case I find that the object of providing exemption by way of notifications in question to “karkhanedars” is to encourage and keep alive the industries of “brasswares” (utensils) specially in Moradabad Division of Uttar Pradesh. It is a well-known canon of interpretation of the statutes that while interpreting such notifications whose object is to confer benefit on a specific industry, the terms occurring in the notifications should be liberally interpreted to achieve the underlying object. While construing such words as “parts thereof” in our case the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes. In the same vein Lord Wilberforce in the case of Prenn v. Simmends, has pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but one is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set. The law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. The interpretation of such words as aforesaid be not put in procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In the case of Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (1980) 4 SCC 443, the Supreme Court had at page 447 occasion to say:
Semantic luxuries, are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.
16. In this view of the matter also and having regard to the object of the notifications as aforesaid, it has to be held that sillis and gullis manufactured by “karkhanedars” are “part” of “utensils” within the meaning of the aforesaid notifications.
17. No other point was pressed before me.
18. In the result, all the revisions filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax fail and are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.