JUDGMENT
S.L. Kochar, J.
1. The appellant Raju @ Rajendra Prasad has preferred this appeal against his conviction and sentence passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Agar in S.T. No. 60/1992 convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the I.P.C. R.I. for 4 years with fine of Rs. 100/-, in default S.I. for 15 days.
2. The police of Police Station Agar, Distt. Shajapur filed a charge-sheet against the appellant and one another co-accused Shri Ram (who expired during the course of trial) for offences under Sections 498A, 506, 306 and 304B of I.P.C.
3. The prosecution case in short was that deceased Manjula Bai was married before six to seven months from the date of incident i.e. 19.7.1990 at 4.00 p.m. After marriage, she was ill-treated by appellant oftenly, after consuming liquor without any reason. The appellant also used to beat her. On 19.7.1990 she was beaten by the appellant and also instigated her for commission of suicide.
4. The deceased was taken to the hospital where her report Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 was recorded by Investigating Officer and Naib Tehsildar P.W. 9 respectively. The deceased was initially medically examined by P.W. 2 Dr. G.L. Gupta. Her medical report is Ex. P/2 and after death autopsy was performed by P.W. 10 Dr. S.D. Garg. Deceased suffered 99% burn injury.
5. It is also alleged by the prosecution that first wife of appellant named Krishna Bai had also committed suicide for which Crime No. 223/1989 was registered against the appellant. The deceased Manjulabai was the second wife of appellant.
6. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that Dehatinalishi Ex. P7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 could not have been relied upon by the Trial Court because there is no evidence on record to establish that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give statement. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant there are material contradictions between the contents of both these documents and dying declaration Ex. P/13 recorded by Naib Tehsildar P.W. 9 has not proved the contents of dying declaration because of this infirmity, contents of dying declaration Ex. P/13 could not have been relied upon. It has also been argued on behalf of appellant that independent witnesses P.W. 1 Chunnilal, P.W. 3 Durga Prasad father of deceased, P.W. 4 Govind Kumar brother of deceased, and P.W. 5 Arun Mathur, Advocate have not supported the prosecution case, hence without corroboration by independent material particulars to the dying declarations, same should not have been relied upon by learned Trial Court. In opposition, learned Panel Lawyer has contended that the deceased herself has lodged the report vide Ex. P/7 in the hospital duly recorded by P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla, Town Inspector in presence of Block Medical Officer who has given certificate about burn condition of both the fingers and thumb because of which signature or thumb impression of deceased could not have been taken. It has also been contended that Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 could be considered as dying declaration after the death of its lodger. Dying declaration P/ 13 and Dehatinalishi P/7 are on the same line. Both have been duly corroborated by the medical evidence and other substantial evidence. In view of positive clunching evidence, appellant has no way to escape from conviction.
7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and after careful perusal of entire record and minute visualisation of evidence oral and documentary, this Court is of the opinion that because of serious illegality, irregularity, fault and lapse committed by investigating agency, non-discharge of onerous duty by the A.G.P. Shri Yadavrao Dhadge and improper and careless conduction of trial by Trial Court this Court has left with no option but to acquit the appellant.
8. Admittedly deceased Manjulabai was married with the appellant before 6 to 7 months from the date of incident. She was the second wife of the appellant. First wife of appellant Smt. Krishnabai met the same fate which is clear from document Ex. P/11 showing the registration of offence under Sections 306, 498A of I.P.C. vide Crime No. 223/89. This document has been proved by Investigating Officer P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla, Town Inspector. But there is no evidence on record to show the fate of the case,
9. The prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses for proving its case, out of which P.W. 1 Chunilal independent witness, P.W. 3 father-Durga Prasad, P.W. 4 brother Govind Kumar of deceased and P.W. 5 Arun Mathur, Advocate independent witness have not supported the prosecution case. The father and brother of deceased have stated that deceased was living with the accused happily and he visited Ujjain Hospital where he found his daughter in dead conditionrHe has contradicted his case diary statement Ex. P/3 about the allegations of ill-treatment by appellant with the deceased. P.W. 4 brother Govind Kumar has also asserted that his sister was happy with the appellant and she never made any complaint against her husband. Other two independent witnesses P.W. 1 Chunnilal and P.W. 5 Arun Mathur have also not supported the prosecution case so there is no oral evidence present in the case about ill-treatment by appellant which led to the commission of suicide by the deceased.
10. Learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant on the basis of Dehatinalishi treated as dying declaration Ex. P/7 recorded by P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla, Town Inspector in the hospital who reached after receiving information from the hospital. The second document relied upon by the Trial Court is dying declaration Ex. P/13 recorded by Naib Tehsildar (Executive Magistrate) P.W. 9 K.L. Shalvi. Learned Trial Court further relied on Ex. P/11 proved by P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla Investigating Officer about registration of Criminal Case 223/89 for the offences under Sections 306, 498A of I.P.C. against the appellant for the death of his first wife named Krishnabai because of burn injury for his previous conduct.
11. Dr. G.L. Gupta, P.W. 2 has stated that on 19.7.1990 in Primary Health Centre, Agar the deceased was brought for treatment. Her condition was serious, she was in shock, her pulse were feeble and she suffered 100% burn injury. She was not in a position to speak because of shock. She was not in a condition to speak but after some time she was speaking, but he did not question her. After admitting her in the ward, intimation to this effect was sent to concerned police station for recording her dying declaration. P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla, Town Inspector, Agar after receiving information to this effect reached in the hospital and recorded Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 at 17.35 (5.35 p.m.). This Dehatinalishi is not bearing the signature or thumb impression of deceased because her hands, fingers and thumb were fully burnt. This fact is mentioned by scribe of this document and duly certified by Dr. Gupta. The certificate given by Dr. Gupta has not been got proved in Court. I have also perused carefully the statement given by Dr. Gupta, he has nowhere stated in his complete statement about recording of Dehatinalishi (Ex. P/7) in his presence and certification given by him. This document Ex. P/7 is also clearly showing that certification though mentioned, has not been marked. Though the investigating Officer P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla has stated the fact of certificate given by Dr. Gupta but the same has no evidentiary value in absence of proving the same by author of this certificate by P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta who has been examined by prosecution in the Court, no questions were put to Dr. Gupta in examination-in-chief about recording Dehatinalishi in his presence as well as about certificate given by him regarding burn condition of fingers and thumb. After the death of deceased this document could be used as dying declaration under Section 32 of Evidence Act but because of such a glaring defect committed by the Prosecutor and Trial Court was also not vigilant. The same looses its genuineness.
12. Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 was recorded by P.W. 7, S.K. Shukla in the hospital on 19.7.1990 at 17.35 (5.35 p.m.). This document is not bearing any certification of mental fitness of deceased though the same ought to have been obtained from the doctor. So whether she was in a fit state of mind or mentally conscious to give statement is not reflecting from this document even the Investigating Officer has not mentioned in this document Ex P/7 that the deceased was fully conscious and in a fit state of mind and was able to understand questions to give answers. Looking to the medical report Ex. P/2 showing poor condition of deceased, it creates doubt that at the time of recording Dehatinalishi, deceased was in a fit state of mind to give statement.
13. Apart from this, after perusal of Dehatinalishi Ex. P / 7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 recorded by Naib Tehsildar P.W. 9 the following important facts are emerging which are creating doubt on the veracity and truthfulness of both these documents.
1. Ex. P/7 Dehatinalishi is shown to be recorded on 19.7.1990 at 5.35 p.m. in the hospital whereas the dying declaration Ex. P/13 is shown to be recorded from 5.15 p.m. to 5.40 p.m. At the top of dying declaration Ex. P/13, P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta has given certification that “she is fit to give statement on 9.7.1990 at 5.15 p.m.”. Thereafter Naib Tehsildar started taking dying declaration and this dying declaration was completed on 19.7.1990 at 5.40 p.m. at the bottom of this dying declaration, again Dr. Gupta has given certification i.e. she had 100% burn. Statement recorded in my presence signed dated 19.7.1990 at 5.40 p.m. Similarly scribe of dying declaration Ex. P/13, P.W. 9 Naib Tehsildar K.L. Shalvi has also signed at the bottom and mentioned date 19.7.1990 at 5.40. This state of affair is clearly indicating that writing of declaration was commenced from 19.7.1990 at 5.15 p.m. and was completed at 5.40 p.m. then how in between this period Dehatinalishi was recorded by Investigating Officer on 19.7.1990 at 5.35 p.m. It is unbelievable that at that point of time deceased was questioned for recording Dehatinalishi by P.W. 7 and for recording dying declaration by Naib Tehsildar P.W. 9, timings of both these documents are clearly establishing falsity and fabrication by concerned persons. There is also serious lapses while proving both these documents i.e. P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta was not put any question by prosecution about certification given by him on Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13. It is also pertinent to note here that P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta in para 3 of his statement has stated for the first time that patient was brought to him at 6 p.m., if this was so, how in his presence Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/13 could be recorded at 5.35 p.m. and between 5.15 to 5.40 p.m. respectively.
14. Statement of P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta that patient Manjula was brought in the hospital on 19.7.1990 by one Shri Ram (grand father-in-law of deceased who was also accused and died during the course of trial) at 6.00 p.m. He examined her and thereafter sent the intimation to the concerned police so, this must have taken sometime and intimation sent by him to the concerned police would have been certainly sent after 6.00 p.m. P.W. 7 T.I.S.K. Shukla has stated that he received information from hospital, about admission of deceased Manjula as burn case, thereafter he reached hospital and recorded Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 so this witness must have reached at the hospital after some reasonable time of 6 p.m., in that event how could he record the Dehatinalishi at 5.35 p.m. in the hospital and how he could arrange for recording of dying declaration after sending intimation to the Naib Tehsildar and after securing his presence in the hospital between 5.15 p.m. to 5.40 p.m. The statement of Dr. Gupta as well as the statement of Investigating Officer P.W. 7 Shukla vis-a-vis the statement of P.W. 9 K.L. Malveeya are clearly falsifying the truthfulness, genuineness of Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 and dying declaration Ex. P/ 13. The dying declaration Ex. P/13 has not been recorded in question-answer form which ought to have been recorded in question-answer form as per provision of M.P. Police Regulation No. 742(o)(iv). Non-recording of dying declaration in question-answer form simplicitor would not make dying declaration inadmissible but when there is a provision, learned Executive Magistrate should have taken care of it.
Dr. G.L. Gupta (P.W. 2) has proved his medical report Exh. P/2 which is available at overleaf of Ex. P/8, the medical requisition form sent by police, Agar. The contents of this report show that it was copied from the register. The date and time of receiving patient Manjula is mentioned 19.7.1990 at 4.45 p.m. in the same report, it is mentioned that the body was brought by Shriram, grand-father of the deceased. If this report was copied from the register on 19.7.1990 and also handed over to Constable Mangilal Batch No. 259 of Police Station Agar on 19.7.1990, how could it be described by Dr. Garg to patient Manjula as “deceased” because on 19.7.1990 itself, she was very much alive and referred for further treatment to Ujjain Hospital by Dr. G.L. Gupta (P.W. 2). He has mentioned this fact in his deposition at paragraph 3. Dr. G.L. Gupta in para 3 has also stated that for the first time, patient was brought to him at 6.00 p.m. which is just contrary to his medical report, Ex. P/ 2, in which he has mentioned the time of her arrival and examination at 4.45 p.m., but the fact mentioned in this report cannot be considered as evidence because the prosecution has not confronted Dr. G.L. Gupta seeking his explanation of attending the patient at Primary Health Centre, Agar. The law on this point is very clear that the medical report can be used by its scribe for refreshing his memory under Section 159 of the Evidence Act. The report itself is not the evidence. The same can also be used for contradiction and corroboration.
15. Sub-Inspector P. W. 7 S.K. Shukla has stated in his deposition in para 3 that on 19.7.1990, he recorded the statement of deceased Manjulabai under Section 161, Cr. P.C. but the same has not been got proved by prosecution through this witness, otherwise that statement could also be used as dying declaration. Such unproved statement is available in B-file of L.C. record, containing order sheets of Committal Court as well as unproved and unexhibited documents.
16. In the present case, following important documents which are present in B Part of file as unproved documents have not been got proved though the same ought to have been got proved by the prosecution and due care should have been taken by the Presiding Judge during the course of trial i.e. letter dated 19.7.1990 sent by P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta informing the fact of admission of deceased Manjula in burn condition and requesting for arranging for recording her dying declaration. Proof of this document was very essential because this could have given time of arrival of deceased in hospital and time of writing of this document. After receiving this information by police same must have been recorded in Rojnamchasana and thereafter P.W, 7 Shri Shukla would have proceeded for the hospital.
17. Merg intimation report which was recorded after receiving information from Ujjain Hospital about death of deceased was also not got proved. No documentary or oral evidence have been laid by prosecution in the present case as to when the deceased was sent to Ujjain Hospital and what treatment was given to her therein. What information was received by Ujjain Hospital by concerned police station about physical, mental condition and death of deceased.
18. Bedhead tickets of Agar Public Health Centre as well as Ujjain Hospital have not been seized and filed this would have given the exact time of admission of patient her mental and physical condition as well as the treatment given to her in a burn case what kind of drugs were given to the patient immediately after receiving burn injury is very important and to judge the mental condition for giving dying declaration would depend upon the effect of these medicines. Supreme Court has elaborately considered these facts in a judgment II (2001) DMC 139 (SC)=V (2001) SLT 136=AIR 2001 SC 2383, Smt. Laxmi v. Om Prakash and Ors.
19. It is a case of 100% burn and the deceased has committed suicide within the four walls of the kitchen but autopsy surgeon P.W. 10 Dr. S.D. Garg failed to mention presence or absence of carbon particles in the mucus memberance of nose, nasopharynn, trachea larynx and bronchi and also so many other things which are normally available in a burn case by kerosene because according to the prosecution case deceased having poured kerosene oil on her person lit fire, must have produced lot of carbon dioxide and other gases and the same would have been inhaled by the deceased. Dr. Garg has also not mentioned in the post mortem report whether the burn injuries were post mortem or anti mortem and no finding or data has been given in the post mortem report, on the basis of which one can assess that the burn injuries were post mortem or anti mortem. All these medico requirements are discussed in great detail in Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of Ashok Dubey (Dr.) v. State of M.P., 1980 JLJ 250.
20. It is apposite to mention here that as per police requisition form, the request was made for the performance of post mortem report by Medical Board consisting with a lady doctor. The post mortem report Exh. P/14 showing the signature of Dr. CM. Puranik, Dr. S.D. Garg (P.W. 10) and lady doctor Dr. (Miss) Nigam all posted on 21.7.1990 at District Hospital, Ujjain. Perfunctory and incomplete post mortem report was submitted by these doctors. The medical requisition form sent by Kotwali Police Station, Ujjain has also not been got proved by the prosecution. As such no police official from Kotwali Police Station, Ujjain has been examined though deceased died in the Ujjain Hospital. Thereafter, Kotwali police received information about that and stepped into investigation.
21. Inquest report prepared under the provision of Section 174 of Cr. P.C. has also not been got proved by prosecution though the same was filed with charge-sheet and available in B file. In the present case as per autopsy report Ex. P/14 the deceased died within 24 hours from the time of post mortem commenced on 21.7.1990 at 10.00 a.m. but there is no oral or documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution to show at what point of time deceased died.
22. The deceased was sent from Public Health Centre, Agar to Ujjain but no such document through which the patient was referred by P.W. 2 Dr. Gupta has been filed and proved by prosecution.
23. On the basis of Dehatinalishi Ex. P/7 which was recorded on 0 (zero) No. F.I.R. was recorded in the police station giving registration of crime No. but this F.I.R. has not been got proved by the prosecution. F.I.R. is the only document on the basis of which Court can know on what date and time offence was registered. If there is delay in registration of crime the same is required to be explained by prosecution otherwise delay goes against the prosecution. No evidence was led by the prosecution about compliance of Section 157, Cr. P.C. by sending the copy of the F.I.R. to concern Magistrate.
24. In the present case learned Trial Court has prepared questions of accused statement in a perfunctory and negligent manner. The contents of dying declaration Ex. P/7 and Ex. P/13 have not been specifically mentioned in questions so that appellant may understand and explain the same. Ex. P/7 Dehatinalishi which has been used as dying declaration the following question was framed :
"xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx" For dying declaration Ex. P/13 the following question No. 9 was framed : "xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx" Both these questions are nowhere disclosing that what were the incriminating statements given by the deceased against the appellant which was required by him to be explained. Mere giving the name and number of documents, is not sufficient in accused statement because on the basis of which accused would not be able to understand the contents and its effect. 25. In the present case for document Ex. P/7 the Court has also not framed any question showing that the same could be used as dying declaration against the appellant. Learned Trial Court has utterly failed to comply with the provision of Section 313 of Cr. P.C. which reads as under : "313. (1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court,- (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary; (b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case : Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court had dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under Clause (b). (2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under Sub-section (1). (3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.
26. The Supreme Court and High Courts in time and again pronounced series of judgments interpreting Section 313 of Cr. P.C. and its improper compliance. This Court can profitably refer AIR 1984 SC 1622, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 1978 SC 315, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Wazir Chand and Ors.; AIR 1976 SC 2140, Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Administration); 1992 SC 2100, State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh and Ors. The crux of these decisions are as follows :
Section 313 of Cr. P.C. casts duty on the Court to put each material circumstances appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctly and separately. Failure to do so, amounts a serious irregularity, vitiating the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused. The words “shall question him” clearly bring out the mandatory character of clause and cast imperative duty on the Court confer corresponding right on the accused to an opportunity to offer his explanation for such incriminating material appearing against him.
27. In the present case the way in which questions were framed and put to the accused would have certainly caused prejudice to him because he was not made aware of allegation levelled by deceased in Dehatinalishi Ex. P7 treated as dying declaration and dying declaration Ex. P13.
28. The prosecution has come up with a specific case that when deceased ablazed herself after pouring kerosene oil according to the map Ex. P/9 proved by P.W. 7 S.K. Shukla the place of incident was kitchen which has two doors. Police has also seized kerosene container and other articles broken bangles, burnt clothes, nylon metting etc. through seizure memo Ex. P/6. Immediately she was shifted to the hospital but while examining, Dr. Gupta P.W. 2 has nowhere mentioned in his medical report Ex. P/2 about presence of kerosene oil or smell of kerosene oil. It is also a matter of great surprise that when the deceased was brought to the hospital by co-accused grand father-in-law of deceased Dr. Gupta did not enquire about the incident either from him or from deceased herself which normally a Doctor ought to have enquired being medico legal case. The Supreme Court in a decision AIR 1997 SC 1526, Rehmat v. State of Haryana, held :
“Ordinarily, in a medico legal case, the doctor is supposed to write down the history of the injured but admittedly in this case, medical papers of Padam Singh (P.W. 4) do not incidate the name of assailant.”
29. In view of the above mentioned legal and factual situation of the case, this Court is of the opinion that conviction of appellant is not sustainable, therefore, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is ordered to be acquitted. Appellant is on bail, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.
30. While parting with the judgment this Court expresses its great dissatisfaction and concern, the manner in which the Investigating Officer and trial was conducted by prosecution agency headed by learned A.G.P. Shri Yadavrao Dhadge. This Court also expresses its discontentment for the learned Trial Court which had not taken serious care during the course of recording of evidence and not made good use of provision under Section 165 of Evidence Act as well as under Section 311 of Cr. P.C. which read as under simultaneously :
Section 165 of Evidence Act.
” 165. Judge’s power to put questions or order production-The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or things; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question :
Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved :
Provided also that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under Sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the questions were asked or the documents were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under Section 148 or 149; nor shall be dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.”
Section 311 of Cr. P.C.
“Any Court may, at any stage of any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned, as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.”
31. Under these provisions the learned Trial Court had ample power and discretion to interfere and control conduction of trial properly, effectively and in manner as prescribed by law. While conducting the trial, Court is not required to sit as a silent spectator or umpire but to take active part well within the boundaries of law. In the present case so many important documents were not got proved though filed along with charge-sheet, so many important documents as pointed hereinabove were not filed which all could be important and relevant for the just decision of a trial and the same could be got proved and directed to be produced by Trial Court under Section 165 of Evidence Act and 311 of Cr. P.C. The Supreme Court has observed in Ramchandra v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1036, as follows :
“The adversary system of trial being what it is there is an unfortunate tendency for a Judge presiding over a trial to assume a role of a Referee on an Umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing from combative and competitive elements entering the trial procedure. If Criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He must become a participant in the trial by evincing intelligent motive interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth. But this he must do, without unduly trespassing upon the functions of the Public Prosecutor and the defence Counsel without any hint of partnership and without appearing to frighten or bully witnesses. Any question put by the Judge must be so as not to frighten, coerce confuse or intimidate the witnesses.”
32. In the judgment of Ashok Dubey (Dr.) v. The State of M.P. (supra), as well as in the judgment pleaded to the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Irfan Khan v. State of M.P., 1994 MPLJ 862, both the Division Benches have found lot of illegalities and irregularities in the preparation of medical report, performance of investigation and conduct of trial by the prosecutor and, therefore, directed for transmission of copies of both these judgments to the concerned authorities for taking appropriate action. Therefore, this Court also deems it fit and proper in the interests of justice to transmit copies of this judgment to the Secretary,, Law and Home Department, State of M.P., Director General of Police and Director of Health Services, for appropriate action on the basis of observations affecting investigation, preparation of medical report, evidence of medical officer and conduction of trial by the Prosecutor. This, Court is informed by the Registry that the Presiding Judge Mr. R.G. Ghatia has been voluntarily retired.
33. Registry is directed to place copy of this judgment before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for seeking orders to circulate copy of this judgment amongst all Sessions Judges.