JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. By my this common judgment I would dispose of these two revision petitions bearing C.R. No. 2917 of 1998 titled as Harbhajan Singh and Ors. v. Malook Singh and Anr. and C.R. No. 1612 of 1999 titled as Tarlok Singh and Ors. v. Malook Singh and Ors.. Suit No. 272 of 199 was instituted by Harbhajan Singh and Ors. against Malook Singh and State of Punjab for declaration that the plaintiffs are owners in possession and the land measuring about 10 Kanals in Khasra No. 2616 min as head note of the plaint. They had also prayed for the relief of injunction. While Suit No. 151 of 1998 was instituted by Tarlok Singh and Ors. against Malook Singh and Ors. and State of Punjab for joint possession of the land measuring about 35 Kanals 2 Marlas and had also prayed for relief of injunction that the State of Punjab be restrained from alienating or transferring the property in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2. Both these suits are pending before the respective learned trial Courts.
2. Punjab Wakf Board filed an application for being impleaded as a party in both the above suits under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Punjab Wakf Board (hereinafter referred to as the applicant) claimed that they were owners of the property and the plaintiffs and defendants had not intentionally impleaded the Punjab Wakf Board as a party. They claimed to be necessary party to the suit, as they had interest in the subject matter of the suit. According to the applicant the property in question is a wakf property. As per the Central Gazette Notification, it is a grave yard and falls in the wakf property as per jamabandi for the year 1946-47. Thus, their presence before the Court was necessary to finally adjudicate the matter. This application was opposed by the other parties on the grounds that the applicant had no locus standi to file the present application and they have no interest in the property in question. It was further stated that the entry in relation to the suit property was wrongly recorded in the name of the custodian department and, therefore, State of Punjab has been impleaded as a party and the applicant has no concern whatsoever with the suit property.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court vide their order dated 14.5.1998 (Suit No. 272 of 1997) and 5.2.1999 (Suit No. 151 of 1998), giving rise to the aforestated civil revision petitions being CR No. 2917 of 1998 and CR No. 1612 of 1999, allowed the said application and ordered the Punjab Wakf Board be impleaded as a party.
4. In order to appreciate the controversy in issue, it will be relevant to point out that during the course of arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the wakf Board produced a copy of judgment of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amritsar, dated 26.11.1997, which has also been relied upon by the learned trial Court saying that the Court had already concluded that the Punjab Wakf Board is the owner of these properties and the plaintiff in that suit was the tenant in the land in question. The relevant extract of the judgment dated 26.11.1997 read as under:-
“The entire record produced by the plaintiff i.e. jamabandi of the land in dispute for the year 1995-96 Ex.P.24, Khasra girdwari from 1981-82 to 1983-84 Ex.P.23, latest Khasra girdawari for the year 1996-97 Ex.P.25 and the copy of the order of ACIIC, Amritsar regarding correction of Khasra girdawari Ex.P.26 and Nishan dahi taken by the plaintiff of this Khasra No. 2616 is Ex.P.22. The copy of the allotment of the land in dispute in favour of the plaintiff are Ex.Pl and Ex.P.2 and rent receipts Ex.P.3 to Ex.P.21. All this shows that Punjab Wakf Board is owner of the property in dispute and the plaintiff is tenant under it in the land in dispute.”
5. This suit was related to the same property, part of which is subject matter of the present suit. Furthermore, it was also pointed out that some of the plaintiffs or defendants themselves had moved the applications to the Wakf Board for allotment of the land in question. All the parties have not even been reflected in the revenue records, as having interest in the suit property. The applicant has claimed interest in the suit property on the basis of certain documents including revenue records and the judgment of the Court.
6. It was contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the plaintiffs are dominus litus of a suit and no party can be imposed upon the plaintiffs without their consent. He also stated that entry in R-1 was illegal and some of the applicants had been shown to be owners of the property even in revenue record. Thus, the Wakf Board was neither a proper nor necessary party. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant contends that after partition, the property was entered into the name of the custodian department and then upon creation of the Wakf Board, the property vested in them, as already confirmed by the decree of the Court dated 26.11.1997. Dara Singh and Dharam Singh had moved applications on 25.2.1981 and 31.3.1987 for allotment of land to them to the Punjab Wakf Board.
7. It is true that the submission of such application would not bind all the parties but to form a prima facie view these are relevant facts emerging from the documents. Having moved to the Punjab Wakf Board for allotment of property it will not lie in the mouth of the plaintiffs to argue that the Wakf Board was not even a proper or necessary party to the present suit. The doctrine of the plaintiffs is dominus litus of the suit is always subject to the basic exception. The said exception is whether the Court comes to a conclusion that the presence of a party is necessary before the Court for proper and final determination of the matters in controversy and to grant complete relief to the parties, such discretion of the Court is not dependent upon the consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff can regulate his suit but in accordance with law. The plaintiff can only be permitted to have his wish about the judicial discretion of the Court of competent jurisdiction. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that sqme of the parties came into possession of the property through the Punjab Wakf Board and as such it cannot be permitted to question even the ownership of Gram Panchayat much less they can seek relief in absence of the applicant before the Court. He relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kartar Singh v. Collector, Patiala, (1996-1)112 P.L.R. 154, Mohan Singh and Ors. v. Angrej Singh and Ors., (1997-2)116 P.L.R. 166, Krishan Lal and Anr. v. Sudesh Kumari and Ors., (1998-1)118 P.LR. 514 and Gram Panchayat Garhi v. Dharamvir and Ors., (1998-1)118 P.L.R. 809 to contend that the applicant has rightly impleaded as a party by the learned Courts below. The Court in Dharamvir’s case (supra held as under:-
“In order to have a pervasive and baroque approach to the provisions of the code which would be also in consonance with the scheme of the Code, would be to read the provisions of Order 1 and other effective provisions of the Code collectively rather than to read and construe Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code in abstract or isolation. Interpretation of construction of procedural laws or provisions related thereto must be read to achieve the ends of justice which is an indispensable object of basic rule of law. With the modern development in all sphere of life the Courts must mould the procedural laws to further because of expeditious disposal and determination of all questions in one proceedings, if permissible in law, rather than to direct the parties to create multiplicity of litigation.
Without being innovative and primarily on re-iteration of the settled principles and in a derivative manner, it is possible to indicate certain factors which may be considered by the Court while determining such a question:-
a) Whether the applicant is a necessary and proper party keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case?
b) Whether presence of such a party before the court is necessary for effectively and completely adjudicating the matter and granting a complete and effective decree to the party entitled to?
c) Whether such a party interested would be directly effective as a result of culmination of such persons into decree or it would only be effected remotely, indirectly and distantly?
In addition to above, where the court considers the presence of a party necessary for proper and complete adjudication, then it may be considered relevant whether non impleadment of such a party would result in avoidable multiplicity of litigation, then effect should be to implead a party rather than to force the party to go to a fresh litigation.
The above principles are not exhaustive but are merely indicating what may be considered by the Court in addition to such consideration, which may be appropriately considered, relevant by the Court, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a given case. The Legislative intent to provide an effective protection to a party who may be affected by the questions to be determined by a Court in a suit or proceedings and to have complete adjudication, is clear from the introduction of Rule 10-A in Order 1 of the Code vide Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1976.
In view of the above discussion, it is clear that the plaintiff is dominus litus of the suit is not an absolute rule. The law intends and has actually provided for exceptions. In the present case, if the applicants are not impleaded as parties, especially when they satisfied the conditions aforestated would only lead to multiplicity of litigation which is neither the object nor Legislature intent of any procedural or substantive law.”
8. By applying the said principle, the learned trial Court exercised its judicial discretion and came to the conclusion that the applicant’s presence before the Court was necessary for fully and finally determination of the matter in issue. I am unable to see any error of jurisdiction or otherwise in the discretion exercised by the learned trial Court. Whatever may be rival claims of the parties in the suit, a party should claim the ownership in relation to the subject matter of the suit and prima facie shows documents in support thereof could normally be treated to be a party whose presence before the Court would be proper for settling the controversy in the suit. The merits of the claims are of no consequence and the Court at this stage is not concerned with the validity or otherwise of the suit but the presence of that party if necessary before the Court, the Court would permit impieadment of such a party to avoid prejudice to any of the parties to the suit and to give a judgment which would fully and finally decide on the rights of the parties and would help in avoidable multiplicity of the litigation.
9. For the reasons aforestated, I find no merit in these revision petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.