JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. By this common judgment I propose to dispose of CM No. 3171-CI/1997 in RFA No. 1883 of 1997, CM No. 3172-CI/1997 in RFA No. 1884 of 1997, CM No. 3173-CI/1997 in RFA No. 1885 of 1997 and CM No, 3174-CI/1997 in RFA No. 1886 of 1997 as the same raise common question of law. However, the judgment is being written in CM No. 3173-CI/1997 in RFA No. 1885 of 1997.
2. This regular first appeal is directed against the judgment and award of the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala dated 30.11.1993. The learned Additional District Judge enhanced the compensation payable to the claimants on the basis of earlier judgment of the Court in relation to same acquisition dated 24.12.1992.
3. The present appeal was instituted on 21.8.1997. As the appeal was patently barred by time it was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay of 3.5 years in filing the present appeal (C.M.NO.3173-C1 of 1997). Notice of this application was issued to the respondents who appeared, filed reply and seriously opposed the condonation of this delay. In this view of the matter the Court is obliged to consider the merits of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and to determine whether the applicants are entitled to relief of condonation of delay or not.
4. The application in its content and substance is a very formal one and runs into six paragraphs. The only relevant paragraphs which require consideration are paragraphs No. 2 to 4 and they read as under:-
“2. That the applicants are poor marginal farmers whose land was acquired by the State under the Land Acquisition Act vide award dated 4.5.1989. It is submitted that the whole amount of compensation as awarded by the learned Lower Court was only disbursed to the claimants in January this year. Since the appellants did not have the requisite finances of Court fee etc. they could not approach this Hon’ble Court within limitation.
3. That the collector passed two awards, firstly for the value/cost of the land secondly as a supplementary award for severance as envisaged under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. This further led to delay in compensating the applicants and consequently hindered the applicants in approaching this Hon’ble Court within limitation.
4. That the State Regular First Appeal Nos. 1472 of 1993 to 1478 of 1993 are pending in this Hon’ble Court as admitted and are against the first award. The present appeal would also be disposed off alongwith the above mentioned appeals.”
5. These paragraphs have been specifically disputed and denied by the respondents in their reply. It has been stated that appellants are not poor men and they had received the awarded amount by the Collector on 2414.1991 and enhanced amount had been deposited in Court on 8.11.1996. It is also stated that pendency of other regular first appeals* would be per se no consideration for condoning the delay as a substantive right has accrued to the State.
6. As is clear from the above narrated pleadings the only ground given for condonation of delay is that the applicants are poor marginal farmers and they had no adequate funds to pay the Court fee and claim the compensation in these appeals. Firstly, this reason itself has been denied by the respondents in their reply and it is specifically stated that the applicants had been paid the awarded amount of compensation. As such they could easily pay the requisite court fee. Even if for the sake of arguments this reason is to be attached any weightage even then no one prevented the applicant-claimants from filing the appeals with a limited amount of court fee while praying for extension of time for making up the deficiency for the payment of court-fees in consonance with the provisions of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No reason, whatsoever, has been stated in the application as to why this prescribed course of action as per law, was not adopted by the applicants.
7. This court has the occasion to consider such a plea in RFA No. 739 of 1999 and where the Court held as under:-
“Once the copy was ready on 8.12.1994, one can hardly see any reason much less a good or plausible reason for filing the present appeal after a period of nearly four years i.e. in December, 1998. The excuse for not getting the funds is a very flimsy and unsatisfactory one. The State could have filed the appeal by affixing a small court fee and prayed for extension of time for making up deficiency in paying the court fee under Section 149 of the Code of Civil procedure. Why this was not done, no explanation has been put forward. Whatever may be internal arrangement of various departments of the State, the cause for……….condonation of delay has to be a good and sufficient one, failing which application for such a relief would be liable to be rejected. I have already noticed that no reason whatsoever has been stated in the application except the excuse for non-availability of funds for purchase of the court fee. The court fee to be filed in the present case was only to the tune of Rs. 4,100/- and was not such a huge court fee, for which the State or its various departments need to take more than three years for arranging the funds.”
8. It is also a settled principle of law that a substantive right accrues to the other party when the appeal against the judgment becomes barred by time. This right must not be taken away in a casual manner and there should be really a sufficient and good reason for condonation of delay. The learned counsel for the claimants relies upon N. Balakrishan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1999-1)121 P.L.R. 462 to argue that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be liberally construed and delay should be condoned. No doubt the Hon’ble Apex Court has so observed in this judgment but the Court has equally stated that some sufficient cause must be shown and the party may not explain each hour’s or day’s delay but it must give a plausible explanation for the period of delay involved for condonation. In the present case there is no explanation much less a reasonable or a good explanation for condoning the delay.
The yard stick of justice demands an equibalance between the applicant and non-applicant, may be with a little tilt of liberal interpretation in favour of the State. At this stage it will be appropriate to refer to the judgment of this court in case of State of Haryana v. Jit Ram being RFA No. 2129 of 1997 decided on 19.11. 1999 following the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra) as under:
“A right of finality of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge has vested in the non-applicant (respondent herein). The right, therefore, cannot be taken away in a routine manner. There has to be definite and complete averments so as to constitute a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In the present case, nothing has been stated that by whom the file was dealt with, for how long and for what purposes. Mere one line allegation without describing the duties, periods and the purpose of the concerned official in dealing with the file would not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of such serious delay. The mere procedure of office and delay resulting therefrom per-se cannot constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. May be the State is not required to explain each day’s delay like a private litigant but it must by and large explain the cause of delay with particulars and some definite averments.
A definite right has accrued to the non-applicant and that right certainly cannot be taken away so lightly because it has the affect of ignoring the statutory provisions of the Limitation Act. In this regard, a reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case titled as P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 605, wherein it has been held that:
“Law of Limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious the order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time.”
Reference can also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 605 where the Court observed as under :-
“The High Court does nto appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent state for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.
6. Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained.”
9. A Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has clearly held that pendency or admission of other connected matters per se would not be a ground for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. This court is bound by the principles settled by the Hon’ble Courts and has to follow the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mewa Ram (deceased by LRs and Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 S.C. 45 held as under:-
“… The petition of Mewa Ram is barred by 1079 days, that of Pat Ram by 1146 days and of Ram Sarup by 1098 days. We heard the matter thrice on the question whether there was any sufficient cause of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We were not satisfied that there was any cause much less sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The petitioners then took time to file further and better affidavits explaining the unexplained, inordinate delay in moving the Court.
Merely because this Court in two cases of Paltu Singh and Nand Kishore enhanced the rate of compensation to Rs. 17.50 per square yard, could not furnish a ground for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
10. Resultantly, I find that the applicants have failed to place on record any plausible, sufficient or good reason for condonation of this huge delay of 3.5 years in filing the present appeal. There was a definite burden upon the applicants which they ought to discharge by averring proper facts and, if necessary, placing some documents in support thereof to justify the condonation of delay. The process of law cannot be titled in favour of an applicant so as to cause serious prejudice to the rights of the others and that too where the applicant fails to discloses a sufficient and reasonable cause. Consequently the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed and resultantly the appeal does not survive for consideration. However, there will be no order as to costs.