ORDER
A.K. Mishra, J.
1. By this order, 7 Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 427/2000, 429/2000, 430/2000, 431/2000, 432/2000, 446/2000 and 447/2000 are being decided, as the question raised in these appeals is common and they have been filed against a common order passed in 7 Misc. Appeals dated 19-8-99 by the Single Bench of this Court.
2. Seven Review Applications were filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) being Review Application Nos. 22/98, 23/98, 24/98, 25/98, 26/98, 27/98 and 29/98. It appears that before the Tribunal, the review was sought of the orders passed in the aforesaid matters which arose respectively out of O.A. Nos. 398/94, 42/95, 44/95, 45/95, 49/95, 50/95 and 47/95. All those O. As. were decided by the Division Bench of the Tribunal consisting of Shri V. Padmanabha Kedilaya, Member (Judicial) and Shri Brijendra Prasad, Member (Technical). On the basis of compromise entered into between the parties, order was passed on 9-12-97 deciding all the O.As. in terms of compromise. The Review Applications were filed under Section 18(3)(f) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1987 Act’) read with Rule 32 of the Railway Claims Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1989. The Tribunal has dismissed the Review Applications holding that no substantial ground to maintain the review applications arises.
3. There was difference of opinion between the two Members as to the dismissal of the review applications on the ground of delay. However, on merits, both the Members of the Tribunal had agreed for the dismissal of the review applications.
4. Jointly against the dismissal of the review applications, and against the original order dated 9-12-97, these seven Misc. Appeals were preferred before the Single Bench of this Court, all of which have been decided by the learned Single Judge by a common order dated 19-8-99. Learned Single Judge has dismissed the appeals on the ground that in view of Section 23(2) of the 1987 Act, no appeal lie against the consent order.
5. Aggrieved by the common order dated 19-8-99 passed by the learned Single Judge, the present seven Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred by the Union of India through General Manager, Western Railway, Bombay and General Manager, Central Railway, Mumbai. All these seven appeals have been preferred on3rd July, 2000 i.e., after lapse of approximately one year from the date of the passing of the order dated 19-8-99 by the Single Bench. Initially the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act did not accompany the appeals. The same was subsequently filed on 31-10-2000, though it appears, that the date of its typing and verification of the affidavit in support of the application is 29-8-2000. In the application, the reason for the delay mentioned is that the order was received in the office of the Chief Claim Officer on 14-2-2000. It was discussed at various stages in the office of the Chief Claims Officer between the period from 14-2-2000 to 26-8-2000. The Single Bench passed the order on 19-8-99. Certified copy was applied for on 18-1-2000 and was obtained on 4-2-2000. There is no satisfactory explanation of delay of the period from 19-8-99 to 17-1-2000 as to why the copy could not be applied for earlier. Limitation for filing the Letters Patent Appeal is 30 days against the order of the Single Bench. But, in the instant case appeals have been filed after about a year. Thus, it is apparent that the appellants have taken the matter very lightly.
6. Not only the appeals but Review Applications filed before Tribunal were also barred by limitation. They had been filed after about five months. The Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred after about one year. The appellants, therefore, have not been vigilant in the matter. Their conduct throughout has been negligent. They ought to know the limitation for filing the L.P.As. is 30 days. The delay culpable and enormous cannot be condoned. Strictly speaking, the application seeking condonation of delay did not initially accompapy the memorandum of appeal hence they are not maintainable and these applications for condonation of delay were filed on 31-10-2000 i.e., after about 1 month 23 days; belated appeals were filed after about one year. It is clear that the appellants have not been vigilant in pursuing the matter.
In P.K. Ramchandran Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276, it has been
held the Apex Court that the delay has to be explained reasonably and satisfactorily which is an essential pre-requisite for condonation of delay. The explanation that Advocate General’s Office at that time was fed up with so many arbitration matters was held not to be sufficient cause so as to condone the delay. Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statutes so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
7. We have examined the applications for condonation of delay on merits and we are not satisfied that any sufficient cause has been made out by the appellants for condonation of delay.
8. Learned counsel has also urged that compromise was reached and recorded without any authority and pressure was exercised by the learned Members constituting the Tribunal, hence order is vitiated.
9. There is a categorical finding recorded by the Tribunal that no pressure was exerted on the parties or their counsel by the Tribunal while recording the compromise on 9-12-97. In Paragraph 20, the Tribunal has observed:
“20. In all the files I find written documents reporting compromise signed by lawyers and parties. When compromise is recorded on the written statement or submission, there cannot be any mistake committed by the Bench in recording such a compromise in order-sheet.”
10. We find ourselves in agreement with finding that the compromise order was passed by the Tribunal on the basis of the consent of the parties and their counsel.
11. Section 23 of the 1987 Act, which provides for filing of appeal, runs as under:–
“23. Appeals.– (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located.
(2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the order appealed against.”
12. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the 1987 Act clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the bar of filing the appeal against a consent order cannot be treated as against the order, refusing to review the consent order. His further submission is that since there was no consent, the appeal before the Single Bench was maintainable. No consent
was give to compromise the case and therefore, there was no consent to pass the order in terms of compromise. Hence the bar of maintainability of appeal as prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 23 is not attracted.
14. We find ourselves unable to accept the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant as to the maintainability of the appeal in view of the clear finding of the Tribunal recorded while dismissing review that order passed was based on consent of parties and counsel. While dismissing the review applications, it has been categorically found by the Tribunal that there was a compromise arrived at between the parties. Thus, there was a clear consent to the compromise recorded on 9-12-97. Hence, the bar in regard to maintainability of an appeal as per Section 23(2) is clearly attracted to the instant case.
15. Simply by the fact that review applications have been dismissed and an appeal is provided against every order under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the 1987 Act would not lift the bar on maintainability of appeal as on facts it is found order was based on consent particularly when review applications pertaining to the main orders which were passed on the consent of the parties. Thus, we find ourselves in agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the order passed dismissing the review applications to review the consent order is not appealable, as no appeal lies against the main order passed on consent of the parties being barred by sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the 1987 Act, the bar is clearly attracted to an order passed dismissing the application for reviewing the order which on facts found was passed in terms of the consent of the parties. We arc also not satisfied that any pressure was exercised by the Members of the Tribunal to record the compromise. The Tribunal has recorded the finding that no pressure was exercised and this concludes the matter. It does not sound to reason why such an imputation was advanced which has absolutely no legs to stand.
16. Accordingly, we dismiss all these Letters Patent Appeals as hopelessly barred by limitation as well as on merits.
17. Letters Patent Appeals dismissed.