JUDGMENT
Shambhoo Singh, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 2nd June, 1990 passed by Sessions Judge, Ujjain in Sessions Trial No. 141/87 whereby the accused was acquitted of the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. in alternative 306, 201 and 498A of the I.P.C.
2. It is not in dispute that at the relevant time the deceased Rekhabai was living with her in laws in Badnagar. Her husband Satish Raghuwanshi was undergoing Training in Police Training School Indore. On the date of incident i.e. 28-6-86 at about 7.30 a.m. Rekhabai was burnt in the house of her in laws. She was taken to Civil Hospital Badnagar in a Handcart (Hath-Thela). She succumbed to injuries on that day at about 11.00 a.m.
3. The prosecution story in brief is that Rekhabai was married to Satish, the son of respondent in the year 1983. A daughter was born to deceased Rekhabai in February, 1986. The respondent Geetabai used to torture Rekhabai. She demanded that Rekhabai should bring 10,000/-from her father for flooring of her house and a gas connection. On 28-6-86 the deceased Rekhabai was present in the house with her mother-in-law, respondent Geetabai and her grandmother-in-law. At about 7.30 a.m. Rekhabai’s grandmother-in-law shouted that Rekhabai was burning, hearing which neighbours Govind Kumar (P.W. 5), Ramvilas(P.W. 17),Milkvendor Gagendra Singh (P.W. 18), S.K. Harne (P.W. 11), Kakim Khan (P.W. 4) went into the house of the respondent. They saw that Rekhabai was almost burnt. The grandmother of the deceased told them that the respondent had set her to fire. Deceased Rekhabai was taken to hospital where Dr. Yashwant Shinde (P.W. 1) examined her and found almost 100% burns on her body. Deceased Rekhabai succumbed to injuries at. 10.55 a.m. On the same day, the information of which was given to S.H.O. Badnagar, Govindrao Bhawar (P.W. 23) who registered merg No. 21/86. He came to hospital and prepared inquest Ex. P. 7. The body of Rekhabai was emitting smell of kerosene oil. On the letter of request by Station House Officer, Badnagar, Dr. Yashwant Shinde, Dr. T. A. Kapadiya, Dr. S. L. Mittal and Dr. S.K. Shrivastava conducted autopsy on the dead body of Rekhabai and found almost 100% burns on the dead body. They opined in post-mortem report (Ex. P. 5) that the cause of death was 100% burns leading to shock. On 29-6-86 Sub-inspector O.P. Chaturvedi (P.W. 19) visited the spot. He sealed the room of deceased in which allegedly Rekhabai was set to fire. After inspection of Forensic Science Expert, Shri Chaturvedi prepared map (Ex P. 11) of the place of incident. He seized pieces of clothes, brown paper and one electric heater vide seizure memo (Ex. P. 12). On 1-7-86 Shri Bharat Singh (P W 22), S.D.O. (P) registered offence under Section 302 & 201 of the I.P.C. vide crime No. 173/86. On application made by Ramchandra, father of the deceased, an offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and 306 in alternate was registered against the respondent. The pieces of clothes, brown paper and heater etc. were sent to F.S.I. Sagar for chemical examination, in the report (Ex P. 24) it was opined that the pieces of clothes had kerosene oil and the electric heater was in working condition. A letter (Ex. P. 8) written by the deceased to her parents was seized vide Ex. P. 9. After completion of the investigation the respondent was challaned. The respondent pleaded not guilty and false implication. The sessions Judge held that the prosecution could not prove the offence under Section 302, 306, 201 and 498A of the I.P.C. against the respondent and acquitted him, hence, this appeal by the prosecution.
4. Shri G. Desai, learned Government Advocate, contended that the learned Sessions Judge committed error in not relying on prosecution evidence. From the statement of the prosecution witnesses and circumstantial evidence on record, it has been proved that the respondent set fire to Rekhabai due to which she died. It has also been proved that the respondent demanded dowry from Rekhabai and subjected her to cruelty. Repelling this, Shri N. P. Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and contended that the prosecution had failed to produce reliable evidence. He submitted that the judgment of the trial Court is not perverse. Therefore, no interference can be made.
5. We were taken through the evidence on record.
6. The first question that arises for determination is whether the death of deceased Rekhabai was homicidal. Before dealing with this, it is better to discuss the law regarding appeal against acquittal. The supreme Court has laid down following principles while dealing with the case against acquittal, in the case reported in AIR 1988 SC 1158: (1988 Cri LJ 1154) (Awadhesh v. State of M. P.) (Para 3):
Although the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusion are as extensive as in an appeal against the order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence, the High Court should always give proper weight and consideratio to matters e.g.(i) the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial, (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (iv) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. If on appraisal of the evidence and on considering relevant attending circumstances it is found that two views are possible, one as held by the trial Court for acquitting the accused, and the other for convicting the accused in, such a situation the rule of prudence should guide the High Court not to disturb the order of acquittal made by the trial Court. Unless the conclusions of the trial Court drawn on the evidence on record are found to be unreasonable, perverse or unsustainable, the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal.
No doubt, it is also true that the Appellate Court in the matter of appreciation of evidence, has got the same powers which are enjoyed by the trial Court. If on appreciation of evidence, trial Court feels satisfied that the accused has been legally acquitted in that case, it is bound duty of the Appellate Court to pass necessary legal order of conviction even after the lapse of many years. Reference may be made to (Govardhan Rao v. State of Maharashtra) (1993) 2 UJ (SC) 645 : (1993 Cri LJ 3414).
7. Now we would examine the evidence on record in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court.
8. The learned Trial Judge in paras 11 to 28 of the judgment discussed the evidence and came to the conclusion that it has been clearly established that the respondent was not present at her house when the deceased Rekhabai caught fire, therefore, the prosecution story that the respondent deliberately or intentionally burnt Rekhabai and thus committed her murder stands not proved. In para 29 the learned trial Judge concluded that there being no sufficient material on record, it cannot be held that the death of Rekhabai was homicidal. We see no reason not to agree with the conclusion of the trial Court. It has come in the evidence of Govind Kumar, P.W. 5, whose house is situated in front of the respondent, Ramvilas, P.W. 17, who resides in the house just adjoining the house of the respondent, Gajendra Singh, P.W. 1, a milk vendor and S.K. Harne, P.W. 11 that they hearing shouts of Mainabia, the sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of Govind Kumar, that fire had taken place in the house of Geetabai, entered into the house, they had found that Rekhabai was burning and an old lady (grandmother-in-law of the deceased) and child of Rekhabai were lying on a cot. At that time the respondent Geetabai and her husband Hanumant Singh were not present there. The grandmother-in-law of Rekhabai was saying that her daughter was burning, she be saved. Gajendra Singh tried to extinguish the fire. He put a quilt on Rekhabai. It has come in the evidence of Govind Kumar that he went to the Civil Hospital Badnagar and narrated the incident to the respondent and Hanumant Singh who immediately came on the spot and put Rekhabai in a hand-cart (Hath-Thela) and brought her to Hospital. These witnesses clearly slated that Rekhabai was not speaking. She was in great agony and was uttering the words “Ah, Ah”. Dr. Yeshwant Shinde (P.W. 1), who examined Rekhabai at 7.45 a.m. at Civil Hospital Badnagar, stated that Rekhabai had almost 100% burn injuries on her body except the private part which was covered by a underwear. She was in a serious condition. She was unconscious and was in agony. Her blood pressure was not recordable and pulse was not traceable. He also stated that she was not in a position to speak and give dying declaration. Against this Ambalal (P.W. 15) stated that hearing that Rekhabai was burning, he went to the house of the respondent. He heard the mother-in-law of the deceased saying that the respondent had burnt Rekhabai. But he admitted in cross-examination that he did not enter the house, he heard the voice of mother-in-law of the deceased from outside. This statement appears to be unreliable. It is not possible for a man standing outside the house to have identified the voice of the mother-in-law of the deceased when there was significant crowd, several people of the locality had collected and there was great commotion, hue & cry. Rajabai (P.W. 20), who is employed in the Civil Hospital, Badnagar also stated that when Rekhabai was brought to the Civil Hospital in a burnt state, she told her that she was burnt by her mother i.e. the respondent Geetabai but she did not state this fact in her Police Statement (Ex. D. 6) which was recorded on 1 -7-86, about 4 days after the incident. Same is the statement of Motiram (P.W. 16), the chowkidar of the hospital. Dr. Sudamalal Mittal, P.W. 10, incharge hospital stated that Ambalal, Motiram and Rajabai after consuming liquor used to quarrel with Geetabai. Rajabai, P.W. 20 admitted in cross-examination that her husband Ranchhod was prosecuted on the report of Geetabai and was convicted and sentenced to 4 months rigorous imprisonment by Magistrate First Class. Therefore, these witnesses cannot be relied on.
9. As stated earlier, Govind Kumar, Ramvilas, Gajendra Singh and S.K. Harne deposed that the respondent Geetabai was not present in her house at the time of incident. It has come in the evidence of Dr. Sudamalal Mittal (P.W. 10), that on the date of incident at about 7.00 a.m. Geetabai and her husband Hanumant Singh had come to his bungalow and collected key and opened the hospital. No other injuries were found on the dead body.
10. Under these circumstances, the learned trial Judge rightly held that the respondent did not cause the death of Rekhabai by setting fire to her as she was not present in her house when Rekhabai got burnt. As observed earlier, Rekhabai had 100% burns and she succumbed to these injuries. There was no injury on the body of the deceased, no marks of strangulation or throttling were found on the neck. Therefore, the death of Rekhabai was not homicidal.
11. Now the question is whether Rekhabai committed suicide or died accidental death? Alternative case of the prosecution is that the respondent demanded Rs. 10,000/- for flooring her house and a gas-connection from Rekhabai and subjected her to cruelty and thereby abetted her to commit suicide and in consequence of abetment given by Geetabai, Rekhabai committed suicide, while the case of the defence is that the deceased, while preparing tea on stove caught fire and got burn injuries. P.W. 23, Govind Rao Bhanwar, T. 1. Police Station Badnagar, after receiving information of (he death of Rekhabai at 11.30 a.m., visited the spot and prepared inquest report, Ex. P. 7 wherein it was mentioned that the smell of kerosene oil was coming from the dead-body. Dr. Yeshwant Shinde (P.W. 1), Dr. Kapadiya (P.W. 2) and one other Doctor conducted autopsy on the dead body. Dr. Shinde deposed that the dead body was giving smell of Kerosene oil. Ramvilas (P.W. 17) also stated that kerosene oil was spilt on the floor. There was one stove and some prepared tea was also in a kettli. From this statement, it is clear that deceased Rekhabai came in contact with kerosene oil. On the next day i.e. on 29-6-86, P.W. 19, O.P. Chaturvedi, A.S.I. visited the house of the respondent. He seized half burnt piece of rosy cloth, printed cloth, one brown paper and one electric heater from the spot. This electric heater, rosy and printed pieces of clothes and brown paper were sent for chemical analysis to F.S.I. Sagar. In the report, Ex. P. 24, it was opined that rosy and printed pieces of clothes had kerosene oil. It was also opined that the electric heater was in a working order. No stove was found on the spot. There was only one electric heater. If Rekhabai prepared tea on electric heater and caught fire, in our opinion, she could not have kerosene oil smell on her body or clothes. If we accept the defence story that Rekhabai was preparing tea on kerosene oil stove and she caught fire even then it was not possible that the kerosene oil could come on her clothes or body. It is not the case of the defence that stove got burst on account of which kerosene oil sprinkled on the clothes and body of Rekhabai. As stated above, P. W. 11 Ramvilas deposed that kerosene oil was spilt on the floor of the room where Rekhabai was lying in burnt condition.
12. The view of the learned trial Judge that there is a possibility that the death was accident in nature, does not appear to be correct. He failed to take into consideration the important fact that the dead body was giving kerosene oil smell and kerosene oil was found on the half burnt pieces of printed and rosy clothes and brown paper. As observed above, at the time of incident respondent Geetabai and her husband were not present in their house. It leads to the conclusion that Rekhabai committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on her body and setting fire to her.
13. Now the question that arises for determination is as to whether the appellant Geetabai abetted Rekhabai to commit suicide? Before assessing the evidence in this regard it will be convenient to notice the relevant statutory provisions and discuss the legal position. The legislature looking to the rising number of bride burning and dowry death cases in order to combat this menace introduced Sections 304B and 498A in the Indian Penal Code and Section 113A and 114B in the Evidence Act. There is no charge Under Section. 304B of the I.P.C. against the appellant. Therefore, we refer Section 113A Of the Evidence Act which is as follows:-
Section 113A :
Whe the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of the husband.
Explanation : For the purpose of this Section ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 598A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
It has been provided in this Section (113A) that if a woman commits suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or relatives of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume that such suicide has been abetted by her husband or by relative of her husband. It has been explained that ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as has been given in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which is quoted below :-
Section 498A :
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation : For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ means :
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
For proving cruelty it has to be established that the conduct or acts of the accused were of such nature that it was likely that they drive the woman to commit suicide and that those conducts or acts were wilful or the accused harassed the woman with a view to coercing her to meet an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. If such wilful conduct, acts or such behaviour as mentioned above are proved, then it will constitute cruelty and if suicide is committed within seven years of marriage, it will raise presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act that the accused abetted the deceased to commit suicide.
14. The ‘presumptions’ are of two kinds one non-rebuttable and other rebuttable. In every criminal prosecution when the Court has to deal with ‘presumption ‘indicated by statute, the Court has to keep in mind that the ‘presumption’ indicated by statute is always a “rebuttable presumption.
15. The accused can rebut the presumption by adducing defence evidence or by relying on the circumstances revealed by the prosecution evidence itself. The present case is one in which the accused (present respondent) can rebut the presumption indicated by Section 113-A by relying on the circumstances revealed by the prosecution evidence itself as discussed above.
16. Admittedly, Rekhabai committed suicide within seven years of her marriage. Now, therefore, it needs to be seen whether the conducts or actions of the respondent were of such a nature that they drove Rekhabai to commit suicide?
17. It has come in the evidence of Ramchandra (P.W. 12) and Nandkunwarbai (P.W. 13) the father and mother of the deceased Rekhabai that respondent harassed and tortured her. Respondent Geetabai subjected her to starvation. Rekhabai used to weep and say that there was danger to her life at her-in-law’s house so she should not be sent there. The respondent Geetabai remarked that she (Rekhabai) did not know how to smear ‘Kachha’ floor and burn ‘Chulha’ (hearth). So she should bring Rs. 10,000/- for making floor ‘Pakka’ and bring gas connection from her parents. P.W. 13, Subhadrabai also deposed that she had gone to Rekhabai’s matrimonial home six months before the incident. She saw that the respondent was quarrelling with Rekhabai and was telling that she had married her son to her (Rekhabai) looking her fair colour and her (father’s) big house, if she died she would bring fifty wives for her son. She also stated that Rekhabai told her that one month ago she was administered poison by the respondent. She had narrated these facts to the parents of Rekhabai. P.W. 14, Pratap Singh also stated that Rekhabai had told that the respondent had asked her to bring gas connection from her parents. She was also given threats.
18. But the evidence of these witnesses do not appear to be reliable. Subhadrabai is a family friend of Ramchandra. Ramchandra and Nandkunwar did not state that Subhadrabai had narrated these facts to them. Had Subhadrabai told Ramchandra and Nandkunwar that Rekhabai was tortured and was poisoned, they would have stated these facts in their statements in Court. She appears to be an interested witness. Same is the case with Pratap Singh. He is maternal uncle of Rekhabai. He is a Police Officer. If Rekhabai would have told him that the respondent was demanding dowry and she was being threatened, he would have reported the matter to Police or would have at least talked with the respondent. The statements of Ramchandra and Nandkunwar are also not trustworthy, they have not narrated the fact that Rekhabai had told them that she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and starvation in their police statement Ex. D-2 and Ex. D-3 which were recorded on 9-7-86 and 20-8-86 respectively. Ramchandra admitted in cross-examination that he had reached the house of the appellant on the date of incident at about 12:30 p.m. but he did not lodge report against the respondent on 28th and 29th June. He stated that he lodged report on 30th June, 1986 and gave statement on 1-7-86 at the police station Mahakal which were recorded by S.H.O. Govindrao Bhanwar(P.W. 23). He further stated that after 15 days he submitted a written report also to the S.D.O. (P) Shri Bharat Singh. But the so called reports made by this witness on 30-6-86 and after 15 days of the incident and the statement recorded on 1-7-86 have been suppressed by the prosecution. Therefore, the inference is that the reports and statement made by this witness do not support prosecution case. Had Rekhabai been subjected to cruelty or harassment, Ramchandra, who himself is a police officer, would not have missed to make report at police station Badnagar on 28-6-86. This is totally an unnatural conduct. Non-making of report by him leads to the conclusion that the story of Cruelty and demand of dowry is after thought and cooked up. Admittedly at the time of marriage no dowry was demanded. It does not appear probable that the respondent would make demand for dowry after 3 years of the marriage. The offence was registered against the respondent on 1-7-86 vide F.I.R. Ex. P-21. No explanation for long delay has been given. In this delayed F.I.R. there is no mention that the respondent subjected Rekhabai to physical torture, starvation or she demanded Rs. 10,000/- for flooring and gas connection. In F.I.R. it was alleged that the respondent used to take all house hold work from Rekhabai. She used to quarrel with her. She used to give kerosene oil and match box to her and asked her to set her fire and die. But none of the prosecution witnesses stated these facts in their evidence. Letter Ex. P-8 reveals that Rekhabai was in habit of writing letters. Had the respondent made illegal demand for Rs. 10,000/- and gas connection, she would have definitely mentioned this fact in her letters including Ex. P-3.
19. The argument of Shri Desai, learned Government Advocate, that the letter Ex. P-8 proves that the respondent subjected Rekhabai to cruelty, therefore, a presumption Under Section. 113A of the Evidence Act should be raised that the respondent abetted Rekhabai to commit suicide, is not acceptable. The relevant portion of the letter Ex. P-8 dated 4-10-85 is quoted below :
^^&&&&&&&&&vkxs
gky gS fd ;gka ls tkus ds ckn eEeh vkius vHkh rd ,d ysVj ugh Mkyk ysVj Mkyuk
dksbZ cgqr cMh ckr rks ugha gS A mles dksbZ iSls [kpZ ugha gksrs gS A de ls de
eq>s vkB fnu esa ,d ysVj Mky fn;k djksa A eSa ;gka ij jkst vkids ysVj
dk jkLrk ns[kk djrh gwa vki fdlh dks Hkh esjh ;kn ugh vkrh gS A vki lcus ,slk
le> fy;k gS fd eSa ej x;h gwa A D;k fdlh dks esjh ;kn ugh vkrh gS A esjs mij
ikik eEeh vkidksa dksbZ dks n;k ugha A esjs izfr vki nksuks ds eu esa fcYdqy Hkh
n;k ugh gS A eEeh vki lc ;gka ij ns[k ds xbZ tc Hkh vkidks n;k ugha vkrh gS A
eEeh eSa ;gka ij th jgh gwa ;s Hkxoku gh tkurk gS A ;gkW esjk dksbZ Hkh lkgkjk
ugha gS ;gka ij esjs fdlh dks esjs mij fcYdqwy Hkh n;k ugha vkrh gS A eEeh ikik
D;k eSa pkj ikap efgus vki nksuks dh eerk vkSj I;kj ds vkapy dh Nko esa ugh fcrk
ldrh eEeh ikik eSa ;gka ij eka dh eerk vksj ikik vkids I;kj ds fy;s rjl mBh gwa
vc vki ;gh le> yksa ds js[kk FkksMs fnu dh vkSj gS A lp esa ;gka ij ,slh cqjh
rjg ls ?kcjk x;h gwa dh vc eSa dqN fy[k ugha ldrh eEeh vkids ;gka ls tkus ds ckn
vki lc dh bruh ;kn vkrh gS fd fnu jkr cl jksuk vkrk gS A eEeh vc esjk Hkxoku gh
lgkjk gS A lp esa eka dc rd eSa vius lqgkx ls nqj jgwaxh dc rd lc lgu d:xh eka
vc rks eq>ls dqN Hkh lgk ugha tkrk A eka ,d u ,d fnu rqe lcdks viuh csVh dh
yk’k dks ns[kus rks vkuk gh iMsxk eka vc rks rsjh eerk vkSj ikik ds I;kj dh
I;klh gwa A eEeh ;s bruh gh vksj HkkHkh ls cl bruh fourh gS fd esjs ;gka vkus ls
[kwc rjl mBh gwa dh cl eEeh eSa ;gka ij cgqr cqjh rjg ls ?kcjk x;h gwa A eEeh
eSa HkkbZ&cgu ds I;kj ds fy;s Hkh cgqr rMQ pqdh gwa A eq>s ;gka u rks
HkkbZ dk izse feyk gS vksj uk cgu dk I;kj A eEeh rqe lcus feydj bruh tYnh D;ksa
dh eka vc rks vki lcdk I;kj fey tk;s rks eSa rqEgkjk vglku dHkh ugha Hkwyqaxh A
eEeh eSaus vkils dgk Fkk fd vki ukSjk=h ds ckn ikik dks Hksst gh
nsuk A eEeh vcdh nhokyh ogha ij eukmaxh ukSjk=h ckn rd eq>s NBk
iwjk yx tk;sxk A eEeh eSa vkidks vkSj ikik ds iSj vkSj gkFk tksMdj fourh djrh
gwa vki eq>s ;gka ls ys tkuk ugha rks rMQ&rMQ ds ej tkmaxh A eEeh vc eSa
ogka ij ¼vkdj½ lc dqN lgu dj ywxh ysfdu ;gka
eq>ls dqN Hkh lgu ugha gksrk ;gka ij rks fdlh dks [kq’kh Hkh ugha gS A eEeh
eq>s tYnh ls ysus ds fy;s Hkst nsuk eSa ml eklwe dh dle Mkyus ds fy;s eq>s
vxj vkius tYnh ls ysus ds fy;s ugha Hkstk rks vkidks ml eklwe dh dle gS A
eEeh vki ysus Hkstks rks ,d ysVj
t:j Mky nsuk A eSa ysVj dk bUrtkj d:axha A&&&&&&&**
A plain reading of this letter would show that the main grievance of Rekhabai was that her parents and members of her father’s family did not write letters to her. She was badly disappointed and depressed as her husband was not living with her. He was undergoing Training at Police Training School, Indore. This fact made her more gloomy as she wrote in the letter Ex. P-8, “How long I will remain away from my husband” (Main apne suhag se kab tak dur rahungi). No doubt the sentences that God knew how she was living in her in-laws’s house, there was none to support her, she had a shortened life, she was badly confused how long she would tolerate, one day they (parents) will have to come to see her dead body, disclose that the atmosphere of her in-law’s house was not happy and congeneal. She was not satisfied there, she was disgusted and frustrated. But this letter does not state the deeds, actions and behaviour ofthe respondent. Therefore, it is not possible to examine as to whether they were of such a nature that they could drive Rekha to commit suicide. For arguments sake, if it is presumed that the atmosphere of Rekha’s matrimonial home was so gloomy and intolerable that it drove her to commit suicide, the respondent cannot be held guilty, unless it is established that it were the wilful deeds and harassment of the respondent which had made the atmosphere so, since Hanumant Singh, the husband and mother-in-law of the respondent were also living along with Rekha, therefore, the exclusive responsibility creating that atmosphere can not be fastened on the respondent without evidence. It is note-worthy that Rekha did not write even a single word against the respondent.
20. As discussed above, the prosecution could not prove that Rekha was subjected to cruelty by the respondent, therefore, no presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act that she was abetted by her husband’s mother, the respondent Geetabai to commit suicide, could be raised though she committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage. As observed earlier, it could not be established by direct evidence that the respondent abetted Rekha to commit sucide. It appears that Rekha was very sensitive and sentimental girl. She was not happy in her in-law’s house, her parents were not writing letters to her, they were not taking her to Dewas. Her husband was living away from her, these factors drove Rekha to commit suicide.
21. It is well settled that while dealing with the case of appeal against acquittal due weight has to be given to the views of the trial Judge as he has added advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and, therefore, if two views are possible from the evidence, the view adopted by the trial Court should be accepted by the appellate Court unless the judgment of the trial Court is perverse (AIR 1980 SC 1199 : (1980 Cri LJ 921); Deena Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 135 : (1979 Cri LJ 51); Ganesh Bhavan v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1976 SC 989 : (1976 Cri LJ 717);Muluwav.StateofM.P.). In our considered opinion, impugned judgment is not perverse, the learned trial Judge after considering entire evidence on record acquitted the respondent. We see no reason not to agree with the view taken by the trial Judge.
22. As such the appeal is found without substance and does not call for interference, it is therefore, dismissed.