JUDGMENT
S.L. Jain, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Schore, the State of Madhya Pradesh, has filed this appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the same. By the impugned judgment and order dated 24-7-91 the accused/respondents were acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 26 of Indian Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and Section 379 of Indian Penal Code.
2. Leave to appeal was granted to the appellant/State on 8-2-93.
3. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that complainant Ram Sukh Tiwari (P.W. 5) was a Forest Guard posted at Saliwara Beat. On 9-7-87, after the plantation work, while returning back from forest to his home Golchand (P.W. 3) and Saligram (P.W. 4) met him. Golchand informed him that in Saliwara Beat 5-6 persons are illegally felling the trees. He alongwith Golchand and Saligram proceeded to the place of occurrence and found that the respondents were felling Sagaun trees. When the respondents saw the Forest Guard, they took to their heels. The Forest Guard followed them to catch hold of them but was unsuccessful. He alongwith Saligram and Golchand remained at the spot throughout the night to guard the logs left by the accused persons.
4. Next morning he seized the logs and prepared POR No. 664/12 and reported the matter to the Ranger, Range Office, Bichhua, vide Ex. P-17, who forwarded the same to Police Station, Bichhua, where an offence was registered. The investigating officer seized the logs as per Ex. P-18. The list of logs prepared by the Forest Guard and POR were also seized. After investigation a charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Section 26 of the Act and Section 379 of Indian Penal code was filed.
5. A charge for offence punishable under Section 26 of the Act and Section 379 of Indian Penal Code was framed by the Trial Court against the respondents. The respondents abjured the guilt. After concluding the trial, the learned Magistrate did not find the respondents guilty for the aforesaid offences and as such by the impugned judgment and order acquitted them of the charge levelled against them.
6. I have heard Shri Sanjeev Shukla, learned Panel Lawyer for the appellant/State and Shri S.K. Nema, learned Counsel for respondents, and perused the record of the Trial Court including the impugned judgment and order.
7. Learned Panel Lawyer assailed the acquittal of the respondents on the ground that from the evidence of Forest Guard Ram Sukh Tiwari the alleged offences against the respondents were proved beyond reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Magistrate was not justified in acquitting the respondents. As against this, learned Counsel for respondents, Shri Nema, supported the impugned judgment and order.
8. Ram Sukh Tiwari (P.W. 5) in his statement before the Trial Court, has stated that he was posted as Forest Guard in Saliwara Beat. On the date of occurrence, i.e., 9-7-87, when after completing his work he was returning to his home, Golchand (P.W. 3) alongwith Saligram (P.W. 4) came across him. Golchand (P.W. 3) informed him that 5-6 persons are felling the timber in Saliwara Beat. He then went to the place of occurrence alongwith Golchand and Saligram, where he saw the respondents cutting the trees. On seeing him the respondents ran away from the spot. He tried to catch hold of them but could not succeed. He remained at the site in the night alongwith Golchand and Saligram for the security of the logs. Next day, he seized the timber as per Ex. P-3. He also prepared a POR and submitted report (Ex. P-17) to the Range Officer.
9. Golchand (P. W. 3) and Saligram (P. W. 4) in their statements did not support Ram Sukh Tiwari (P.W. 5). Golchand (P.W. 3) has stated that when he reached at the place of occurrence alongwith Ram Sukh Tiwari, he did not see any of the respondents cutting the tree. He saw 3-4 persons running away from the spot whom he could not recognize. Saligram (P.W. 4) has stated that when they reached near the place of occurrence, the persons who were cutting the trees, fled away. He could not recognise those persons due to distance. When these witnesses Golchand and Saligram could not recognize the persons who were cutting the trees due to the distance, it was not possible for Ram Sukh Tiwari also to recognize them. Saligram (P.W. 4) has clearly admitted that on the next day, he tried to enquire about the persons involved in cutting of trees and on enquiry he learnt that certain persons of Village Arnbadi were responsible for the offence.
10. It is also on record that the Forest Guard obtained a list of those criminals of the area who were previously found involved in illicit felling of trees. This suggests that the Forest Guard could not recognize the persons who were felling the trees. On the next day he could learn that residents of Village Ambadi arc responsible for the said felling. Only thereafter, he prepared the POR in which also the date of occurrence has been recorded as 10-7-87. This further suggests that on 9-7-87 the names of respondents could not be known to the Forest Guard otherwise he would have prepared the POR on 9-7-87 itself. The POR was prepared on 10-7-87 and the date of occurrence has also been shown as 10-7-87 in POR.
11. POR is the first document prepared by the complainant. Such a document is vital and valuable. Delay in preparing such document often results in embellishment which is a creature of after thought. On account of delay in preparing the POR it not only gels bereft of the advantage of spontaneity but also danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. Because POR was prepared next day, therefore, in the facts and circumstances, it is unsafe to base conviction upon the evidence. In this background, the testimony of Forest Guard Ram Sukh Tiwari that he could recognize the respondents when they were felling (he trees cannot be accepted.
12. For the reasons stated above, I do not find it proper to take a different view in this appeal against acquittal. High Court would not ordinarily interfere with the Trial Court’s conclusion unless there arc compelling reasons to do so, even if the assessment of evidence for the first time by the High Court could prompt it to reach a different conclusion. If the conclusion reached by the Lower Court was also permissible, the High Court will not interfere in the order of acquittal. Where the approach of the Trial Court as to the evidence adduced in the case was legal, proper and reasonable, the order of acquittal cannot be interfered with. A Court of appeal is not to interfere merely because it thinks that the view taken by the Trial Court is not correct. It can interfere only if it thinks that the view taken is wrong. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the High Court would not interfere in an appeal against acquittal. The High Court should not interfere merely because it feels that it would, sitting as a Trial Court, have taken the other view.[Sec Labh Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1976 SC 83), Ediga Sanjanna and Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1977 SC 785), Harijan Megha Jesha v. State of Gujrat (AIR 1979 SC 1566), and Dinanath Singh and Ors. v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1980 SC 1199)].
13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal must be dismissed and is accordingly, dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is hereby affirmed.