PETITIONER: DEONARAYAN SINGH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: THE COMMISSIONER OF BHAGALPUR & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/1997 BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Majmudar, J.
This appeal on special leave is directed against the
decision rendered by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court
dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellants.
In order to appreciate the grievance of the appellants
it will be necessary to note a few relevant facts leading to
these proceedings. A Jamabandi No. 65 of mauza Billi within
police Station Madhupur, in the district of Santhal Parganas
in the State of Bihar was recorded in the names of Sitaram
Singh, Jaleshwar Singh, Yudhisthir Singh and Kastura Kumari
Devi as Mool Raiyat Ka Jote. They amongst themselves had 8
annas interest in the said jote. As occupants of lands, they
were called Raiyats with their headman as Mool Raiyat. Mool
Raiyat Ka Jote was a land tenure in Santhal parganas. It was
attached to a Mool Raiyat who as a village headman was
responsible for the collection of land revenue in times of
British rule. The proprietor landlord was called ‘Ghatwal’.
Requisite rent of the land was to be banded over by the Moll
Raiyat to the Ghatwal. Mool Raiyat had two types of land
tenures. Mool Raiyat ka Jote was alianable and personal.
Mool Raiyat Jote was inalienable and was attached to his
office. It was called official jote. it is not in dispute
between the parties that official jote admeasured 1 acre 81
decimals while Mool Raiyat of the village in place of his
farther in Revenue Miscellaneous Case No.99 of 1938-39 of
the Court of sub-Divisional officer, Deoghar. the said
appointment was duly approved by the Deputy commissioner of
Santhal parganas. It is the case of the appellants that as
the entire family of Sarju Singh @ Bhatu Singh was heavily
indebted and was in need of money, the said 8 annas interest
in Mool Raiyat comprising 38 acres 9 decimals representing
his share in Nij Jote came to be sold by said Bhatu Singh
and his brothers to one Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury on 22nd
March 1939. The further case of the appellants is that the
said vendors had been in possession of 38.09 acres of land
in lieu of their 8 annas interest in Mool Raiyat by family
arrangement with their co-sharers. The said sale was
effected for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. That after the
said purchase Shri Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury got his name
mutated in respect of 8 annas interest in Mool Raiyat Ka
Jote of the said mauza Billi in Revenue Miscellaneous Case
No.21 of 193-40 by an order of the sub-Divisional Officer,
Deoghar dated 27th November 1939 which was duly approved by
Deputy Commissioner, Dumka on 28th November 1939. Shri Bimal
Kanti Roy Choudhury was subsequently appointed as 16 annas
sarbarakar of the said mauza. The said order was passed
after service of notice on all the co-owners of Jamabandi
No.65.
That by Sale Deed dated 26th June 1950 said Bimal
Kanti Roy Choudhury sold his entire right, title and
interest in the Mool Raiyat Ka Jote to Shri Radha Prasad
Singh, Father or the appellants for a consideration of
Rs.17,000/-. The vendee Radha prasad Singh got hes name
mutated in the Revenue Miscellaneous Case No. 40 of 1950-51
of the Court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar. The said
order of mutation was passed after service of notice on all
the opposite parties, respondent nos.4 to 15. The vendee
Radha Prasad Singh during his lifetime remained in
possession of the aforesaid 38.09 acres of land of Jamabandi
No.65 and was also acting as sharer of a annas Mool raiyat
Ka jote and 16 annas sarbarakar or the said mauza. As the
contesting respondents sought to disturb the possession of
Radha Prasad Singh proceedings under Section 145 Code of
Criminal Procedure were initiated. They were registered as
Criminal Case No. 567 of 1950. But the learned Sub-
Divisional Officer. Deoghar by his order dated 31st August
1951 declared the possession of the appellants’ father.
Revision against the said order was rejected by Sessions
Judge, Dumka. After the death of Radha Prasad Singh,
appellant no.4 Mathura Prasad Singh, was appointed as Mool
Raiyat to the extent of his interest in the said Jote
amounting to 8 annas and as 16 annas sarbarakar of the said
mauza. It was only thereafter that in the year 1970-71
respondent nos.4 to 15 claiming to be the original co-
sharers of the mauza filed an application before Sub-
Divisional Officer, Deoghar against the appellants for their
eviction from 38.09 acres of land of Jamabandi No. 65
alleging that the same had been illegally alienated. It was
registered as Revenue Eviction Case No.67 of 1970-71. They
sought the aforesaid relief under the provisions of Section
20 sub-Section (5) read with Section 42 of the Santhal
Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949
[hereinafter referred in as ‘the Act’].
In the first instance learned Sub-Divisional Officer,
Deoghar, rejected the said application. Respondent Nos.4 to
15 carried the matter in appeal before Deputy Commissioner
‘Santhal Parganas’. It was transferred to the file of
Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, who by his order
dated 30th September 1972 allowed the appeal and ordered
eviction of the appellants. It was held by the Additional
Deputy Commissioner that the original sale transaction by
Bhatu Singh in favour of Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury dated
22nd March 1939 was violative of provisions of Section 27(1)
of the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulation’) which applied
at the relevant time and consequently the subsequent sale by
Shri Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury in favour of appellants’
father was equally violative of the provisions of Section
20(1) of the Act. Hence the appellants were liable to be
evicted from the land. The aforesaid decision of the
appellate authority resulted in further Revenue
Miscellaneous Appeal before Commissioner, Bhagalpur
Division, who by order dated 2nd June 1976 dismissed the
same and confirmed the eviction order passed by Additional
Deputy Commissioner, Dumka. The appellants thereafter
carried the matter to the High Court under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India. The appellants’ Writ
Petition was heard by a Full Bench consisting of the then
Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, Justice S. Ali Ahmad and
Justice B.S. Sinha. The Full Bench considered the main
question which was posed for its decision, namely, whether
the prescriptive period of 12 years for perfecting the title
by adverse possession when the original transfer was in
contravention of Section 27 of the Regulation would stop
running from 1st November 1949 being the date of enforcement
of the Act. The Full Bench noted that this was the
significant solitary question arising from a deep-seated
conflict of precedent within that Court which had
necessitated that reference to the Full Bench. The Full
Bench speaking through S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ., On this moot
question referred to an earlier decision of the Full Bench
of that Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain and another v.
Sub-Divisional Officer of Jamtara and others AIR 1973 Patna
1 and posed the question whether the earlier Full Bench
decision covered the controversy posed for their decision in
the present case and if so what was the precise mandate of
the earlier Full Bench decision. In the impugned judgment
the Full Bench took the view that the earlier transaction of
22nd March 1939 was violative of Section 27 of the
Regulation and that the possession of the vendee through
Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury from that date was adverse to the
vendors but by the time the Act applied to Santhal Parganas
with effect from 1st November 1949 the said vendee Bimal
Kanti Roy Choudhury had not completed 12 years of adverse
possession and consequently the transaction in his favour
and the subsequent transaction by him in favour of
appellants’ father on 26th June 1950 were liable to be
voided both under Section 27(1) of the Regulation as well as
Section 20(1) of the Act read with Section 42 thereof.
Resultantly the Full Bench did not find fault with the
decision rendered by the lower authorities against the
appellants. Sandhawalia, CJ., also noted in his judgment
that in view of his decision he was disinclined to permit or
advert to the ancillary contentions sought to be urged in
the alternative for the first time in the writ jurisdiction
by the appellants. Thus there was a unanimous decision of
the Full Bench that prescriptive period of 12 years fro
perfecting the title by adverse possession in connection
with the transactions entered into in contravention of
Section 27 of the Regulation would stop running from 1st
November 1949 being the date of enforcement of the Act.
However on the question of relief to be granted under the
circumstances the majority of the learned Judges took the
view that the orders of the learned Commissioner and the
Additional Deputy Commissioner directing settlement of land
with respondent no.10 must be set aside meaning thereby
according to the majority the land should be place at the
disposal of the State Government for being dealt with in
accordance with law. We may note at this stage that the
contesting respondents who had moved a separate Special
Leave Petition to the extent they were aggrieved by the
decision of the majority of the High Court setting aside the
direction fro restoration of the land in their possession
could not persuade this Court to admit their Special Leave
Petition which had stood dismissed. Hence strictly speaking
they are out of the arena of contest and now the contest
remains between the officers of the State of Bihar, namely,
respondent nos.1 to 3 and State of Bihar, respondent no.16
on the one hand and the appellants on the other.
Dr. Dhavan learned senior counsel for the appellants
raised various contentions before us for assailing the
decision of the Full Bench under appeal. He also had a
serious grievance against the earlier decision of the Full
Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain
(supra). However as will be indicated hereinafter it is not
necessary for us to pronounce upon the correctness of the
decision of the Full Bench in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain
(supra) which in its turn was heavily relied upon by the
latter Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the impugned
judgment. The appellants are, as will be demonstrated
hereinafter, entitled to succeed on an entirely different
ground which also was placed for our consideration by Dr.
Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellants and which
was justifiably contested by learned counsel for the
respondent-authorities. We will, therefore, deal with this
solitary ground.
The aforesaid narration of facts leading to these
proceedings shows that on 22nd March 1939 when 8 annas share
in Mool Raiyat was conveyed by one of the co-sharers of the
said Jote, namely, Bhatu Singh in favour of Shri Bimal Kanti
Roy Choudhury, Section 27(1) of the Regulation was holding
the field. The said Section 27(1) read with Section 27(3) of
the Regulation provided as under:
“27.(1) No transfer by a Raiyat of
his right in his holding or any
portion thereof, by sale, gift
mortgage, lease or any other
contract or agreement, shall be
valid unless the right to transfer
has been recorded in the record of
rights, and then only to the extent
to which such right is so recorded.
(2) … … … …
(3) If at any time it comes to the
notice of the Deputy Commissioner
that a transfer contravention of
sub-Section (1) has taken place, he
may, in his discretion, evict the
transferee and either restore the
transferred land to the Raiyat or
any heirs of the Raiyat who has
transferred it, or resettle the
land with another Raiyat according
to the village custom for the
disposal of an abandoned holding:
Provided-
(a) that the transferee whom it is
proposed to evict has not been in
continuous cultivating possession
for twelve years;
(b) that he is given an opportunity
of showing cause against the order
of eviction; and
(c) that all proceedings of the
Deputy Commissioner under this
section shall be subject to control
and revision by the Commissioner.”
It is not in dispute and was not rightly disputed by
learned senior counsel for the appellants that the said
transaction prima facie appeared to be violative of Section
27(1) of the Regulation as Bhatu Singh who was a Raiyat
sought to transfer his 8 annas share in the Mool Raiyat when
the right to transfer which was recorded in the Record of
Rights enabled the Mool Raiyat to transfer, if at all, his
entire rights in the mauza consisting of his alienable Mool
Raiyat ka Jote as he was the Mool Raiyat. But learned senior
counsel for the appellants submitted that by a family
partition prior to the transaction of sale 8 annas share in
the Mool Raiyat comprising of 38 acres and 9 decimals feel
to the share of Bhatu Singh and it was his entire share in
the Mool Raiyat that was transferred by the transaction.
Hence Section 27(1) was fully complied with. This contention
is not open to the learned senior counsel for the appellants
for the simple reason that the Full Bench of the High Court
of Patna in the impugned judgment has noted in paragraph 22
that there was a concurrent finding of the sub-Divisional
officer, the Deputy Commissioner and then the Commissioner
that the said transfer was in violation of the record of
rights of the estate and consequently Section 27(1) of
Regulation III of 1872 and that concurrent finding was not
challenged before the High Court indeed being based on the
relevant record was thus wholly unassailable. We must,
therefore, proceed on the basis that the transaction of sale
dated 22nd March 1939 by Vendor Bhatu Singh in favour of
vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury was violative of Section 27
(1) of the Regulation.
But now arises the further question as to how the said
transaction was treated by the authorities charged with the
administration of the Regulation in the area. so far as this
aspect is concerned unfortunately the attention of the High
court does not seem to have been drawn to it. After the
aforesaid purchase the vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury
moved an application before sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar
district, Santhal Parganas, for getting clearance of the
transaction and for getting his name mutated in the records
as a Vendee of the transferred lands. That case was
registered as Revenue Miscellaneous Case No.21 of 1939-40.
Thus he drew the attention of the competent authority in
connection with this transaction. The Sub-Divisional officer
by his order dated 31st May 1939 issued notices to the
parties concerned for objection, if any. Notices were duly
served. The landlord Ghatwal did not file any objection
through his agent as noted in the proceedings of 1st July
1939. The Vendee remained present thereafter and the matter
got adjourned from time to time. On 19th August 1939 the
landlord’s agent objected to the clearance of the
transaction by saying that the security offered by other co-
sharers was insufficient and that the purchaser had taken
only Mool Raiyat’s interest. Hence notices were issued to
the co-sharers of the late Mool Raiyat why their share would
not remain in security. Thereafter on 09th October 1939
Vendee’s agent and landlord’s agent were present and no one
appeared for the co-sharers of the late Mool Raiyat. Matter
was put up for orders on 02nd November 1939 vendee was
present. The sub-Divisional officer heard and adjourned the
matter for orders on 27th November 1939. On 27th November
1939 co-sharers of the late Mool Raiyat did not appear or
object. He, therefore, held that mutation was required to
be allowed. He, therefore, submitted the matter to the
Deputy Commissioner for orders. Submitted the matter to the
Deputy commissioner approving the transaction and the
mutation in favour of the vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury.
Accordingly mutation was carried out on 24th January 1940
and papers were corrected. The aforesaid facts which have
been brought on record and on which learned counsel for the
authorities could not obviously offer any objection, leave
no room for doubt that the first transaction of sale dated
22nd March 1939 was duly scrutinised by the competent
authorities and the Deputy Commissioner who approved the
same. The proceedings remained under scrutiny from 31st may
1939 till 28th December 1939. Thus for seven months the
enquiry went on and ultimately the aforesaid decision was
rendered. It must, therefore, be held that there was ample
opportunity for the Deputy Commissioner, if so advised, to
order eviction of the transferee in exercise of his powers
under Section 27(3) of the Regulation but it appears that in
his discretion he had waived his objection to the
transaction and the same was regularised. The said inference
is inevitable as but for the said fact mutation in favour of
vendee Bimal Roy Choudhury would never have been sanctioned
by the competent authority at the relevant time. It must,
therefore, be held that on the peculiar facts of this case
the first transaction of sale dated 22nd March 1939 was
duly approved and cleared by the competent authority
exercising powers under Section 27(3) of the Regulation.
Once that happened a right accrued in favour of the vendee
to remain in possession of the transferred lands admeasuring
38.09 acres in his own right and the curtain dropped on the
said transaction. It is obvious that thereafter under the
said Regulation if it had continued to operate the
transaction would not have been re-opened once it was found
that the Deputy Commissioner having notice of the
transaction had not thought it fit to exercise powers under
Section 27(3) of the Regulation for evicting the illegal
transferee. it may be , as learned counsel for the
authorities rightly submitted that if in a given case
relevant facts were not brought to the notice of the Deputy
Commissioner earlier and if subsequently he had found that
the transaction was violative of sub-Section (1) of Section
27 in a proper case he could have exercised power under
Section 27(3) but such are not the facts of the present
case. As noted earlier seven months elapsed during which the
transaction remained under the gaze of scrutiny of the sub-
Divisional officer and ultimately got scrutinised by the
Deputy Commissioner himself. Consequently on the peculiar
facts of this case it must be held that the said transaction
was duly filtered by the competent authority who in its
discretion approved the same years back on 28th December
1939. Accordingly it must be held that a right accrued to
the transferee of the said transfer in his favour under the
Regulation. Let us now see as to what was the effect on this
right of the vendee by the coming in to operation of the
Act. As noted earlier the Act became applicable from 01st
November 1949. Section 3 of the Act states that the
enactment mentioned in Schedule A are repealed to the extent
specified in the fourth column thereof. When we turn to
Schedule A to the Act we find listed as one of the Acts the
Regulation of 1872 and the extent of the repeal of the
Regulation was in connection with Sections 27 and 28. Once
Section 27 of the Regulation stood repealed by the Act,
question arises whether the right which had accrued to
vendee Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury under the Regulation in
connection with the operation of Section 27 sub-Sections(1)
and (3) of the Regulation was saved or not despite the
repeal of the said Section 27. A mere look at the relevant
provisions of the Act shows that there is no express
provision in the Act which lays down that notwithstanding
the orders passed or actions taken in connection with
transactions under the Regulation. and notwithstanding any
rights which might have accrued thereunder fresh scrutiny of
the said transaction could be made under the relevant
provisions of the Act which corresponded to the earlier
repealed Section 27 of the Regulation. When such a contrary
intention does not appear from the scheme of the Act, the
effect of the repeal of Section 27 of the Regulation
squarely attracts the provisions of Section 8 of the Bihar
General Clauses Act, 1917 which reads as under:
“8. Effect of repeal. – Where any
Bihar and Orissa Act or Bihar Act
repeals any enactment hitherto
made, or hereafter to be made,
then, unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) revive anything not in force or
existing at the time at which the
repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation
of any enactment so repealed, or
anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege,
obligation, or liability acquired,
accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture
of punishment incurred in respect
of any offence committed against
any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy in respect of
any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty,
forfeiture, or punishment as
aforesaid,
and any such investigation, legal
proceeding or remedy may be
instituted, continued or enforce,
and any such penalty, forfeiture or
punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act had not been passed.”
As repealed Section 27 of the Regulation is re-enacted
as Section 20(1) of the Act and as the latter Act does not
project any different and contrary intention to set at
naught any final orders rendered by competent authorities
under the repealed Section 27 of the Regulation, the repeal
of Section 27 of the Regulation by the Act will not affect
any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired,
accrued, accrued or incurred under the said repealed
provision. Consequently the immunity earned by the
transaction of 22nd March 1939 under the Regulation and the
approval granted to it by the Competent authority, namely,
the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 28th December
1939 remained available and accrued to the Vendee Bimal
Kanti Roy Choudhury despite the repeal of Section 27 of the
Regulation by the Act. Thus on the peculiar facts of this
case it must be held that the transaction of 22nd March 1939
cannot be said to have any adverse effect on the right of
the vendee under the said transaction and he remained
perfectly competent to deal with the transferred 38.09 acres
of land covered by the said transaction in his favour which
was duly filtered by the then competent authorities under
the Regulation. Consequently the decision rendered on the
merits of this transaction by all the authorities below and
which came to be accepted by the High Court in the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained on account of these salient
tell-tale facts which have remained undisputed on record of
the case.
The Second transaction which is on the anvil of
scrutiny is the sale dated 26th June 1950 by Bimal Kanti Roy
Choudhury in favour of Radha Prasad Singh, father of the
appellants. so far as this Sale Deed is concerned it stands
on a a still stronger footing. By the said Sale Deed the
entire right, title and interest of Bimal Kanti Roy
Choudhury in 38.09 acres of land got conveyed to Radha
Prasad Singh. Consequently it could not be said to be a
transfer which was hit by Section 20 of the Act. The
relevant provisions thereof read as under :
“20. Transfer of Raiyat’s rights.-
(1) No transfer by a Raiyat of his
holding or any portion thereof, by
sale, gift, mortgage, will, lease
or any other contract or agreement
express or implied, shall be valid,
unless the right to transfer has
been recorded in the record of
rights, and then only to the extent
to which such right is so recorded.
Provided that a lease of
Raiyati land in any subdivision for
the purpose excise shop thereon may
be validly granted or renewed by a
Raiyat , for a period not exceeding
one year, with the previous written
permission of the Deputy
Commissioner:
provided further that where
gifts by a recorded Santhal Raiyat
to a sister and daughter are
permissible under the Santhal law,
such Raiyat may, with the previous
written permission of the Deputy
Commissioner, validly make such a
gift.
Provided also that an
aboriginal Raiyat may, with the
previous written permission of the
Deputy Commissioner , make a grant
in respect of his lands not
exceeding one half of the area of
his holding to his widowed mother
or to his wife for her maintenance
after his death.
(2)…………………………..
(3)…………………………..
(4)…………………………..
(5) If at any time it comes to the
notice of the Deputy Commissioner
that a transfer in contravention of
sub-section (1) or (2) has taken
place he may in his discretion
evict the transferee and either
restore the transferred land to the
Raiyat or any heirs of the Raiyat
who has transferred it, or re-
settle the land with another Raiyat
according to the village custom for
the disposal of an abandoned
holding:
Provided that the transferee
whom it is proposed to evict shall
be given an opportunity of showing
cause against the order of
eviction.”
It would at once become clear that Section 20(1) of the
Act runs parallel to the scheme of the earlier provisions of
Section 27(1) of the Regulation. Bimal Kanti Roy Choudhury
was a Raiyat who was recognised as the Mool Raiyat by the
competent authorities under the Regulation. His entire
right, title and interest in the said land which was an
alienable jote was transferred under the said second
transaction in favour of the appellant’ father. The right to
transfer was duly recorded in the Record of Rights and
required the transferor to transfer if at all his entire
right, title and interest in the Mool Raiyat. That is
precisely what was done by Bimal Roy Choudhury in favour of
the appellants’ father by the transaction dated 26th June
1950. Therefore, this transaction did not offend the
provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act. If that is so, it
remained fully within the forecorners of the said provision
and could not be treated to be illegal or invalid from any
angle. Consequently there would remain no occasion for the
authorities to invoke Section 20(5) of the Act read with
Section 42 thereof in connection with this latter
transaction of sale dated 26th June 1950. In fact in
fairness to the respondents it must be submitted that all
authorities below as well as the High Court by the impugned
judgment have considered the invalidity of the first
transaction of sale dated 22nd March 1939 and in that light
they have voided the second transactions a consequential
transaction. once the nexus between the two sales gets
snapped and the earlier transaction by itself cannot be
found fault with from any angle, then there would remain no
occasion for the respondent-authorities to invoke the
provisions of Section 20(1) read with sub-section (5) and
section 42 of the Act in connection with even the second
sale transaction dated 26th June 1950. once that conclusion
is reached the result becomes obvious. On these peculiar
facts there is no escape from the conclusion that the
possession of the appellants as heirs of deceased vendee
Radha Prasad Singh can be said to have been validly obtained
and a valid title that was convoyed in land admeasuring
38.09 acres, to their father Radha prasad Singh under the
second sale transaction dated 26th June 1950, got legally
transmitted to the appellants by rules of succession.
Consequently on these facts no action could have been taken
by the authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act
against the appellants, Only on this short ground,
therefore, the appeal is required to be allowed. We made it
clear that in view of the aforesaid decision of ours we have
not thought it fit to consider the correctness of the
decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of
Bhauri Lal Jain (supra) as well as the impugned judgment of
the full Bench in connection with the adverse possession of
the vendee under an invalid transaction of land in the area
being violative of Section 27(1) of the Regulation or
Section 20(1) of the Act. That question is, therefore, kept
open. Similarly we have also not thought it fit to go into
the wider question canvassed by learned counsel for the
respondent-authorities that even if mutations are rendered
by the authorities under the Regulation or the Act if on
subsequent facts being brought to the notice of the Deputy
Commissioner and once there was no earlier occasion or
possibility for the Deputy Commissioner to exercise powers
under Section 21(5) of the Act or 27(1) of the Regulation,
such power could be exercised later on under those
circumstances. We leave that question also open as it is not
necessary for us to pronounce upon the same in view of the
decision rendered by us on the merits of the impugned two
transactions as seen earlier.
In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and
order of the High Court are quashed and set aside. Similarly
the decision rendered by the Additional Deputy Commissioner,
Dumka dated 30th September 1975 as well as the decision
rendered by the Commissioner dated 02nd June 1976 are also
quashed and set aside and the application moved by
respondent nos.4 to 15 under Section 20 sub-section (5) read
with Section 42 of the Act is ordered to be dismissed. In
the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no
order as to costs.