JUDGMENT
V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. This shall dispose of Civil Revisions No. 1682 and 1683 of 1995. Both the revision petitions have been preferred by the tenants against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and in appeal, affirmed by the appellate Authority.
2. The property in dispute originally belonged to one Kirpal Kaur from whom the respondent purchased it on 13.2.1980 vide a registered sale-deed. The building consisted of three rooms and two verandahs. The portion mark ‘B’ in the site plan annexed with the petition is in possession of the petitioners in Civil Revision No. 1682 of 1995 while the portion mark ‘C is in possession of the petitioners in Civil Revision No. 1683 of 1995. Respondent sought eviction of the petitioners on the following grounds :-
(i) that the petitioners are in arrears of rent.
(ii) that the respondent bona-fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation and also for his family;
(iii) that the petitioners have materially impaired the value and utility of the premises by making material alterations;
(iv) that the premises are in a dilapidated condition and are unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
On contest by the petitioners, Rent Controller passed an eviction order against the petitioners on the grounds of personal necessity of the landlord and also that the premises have become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. In appeal by the petitioners, order of the Rent Controller has been affirmed by the appellate Authority. Hence, the present revision petition.
3. It is contended by Mr. M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate, counsel for the petitioners, that need on the part of the landlord has not been proved on record inasmuch as landlord’s children have been residing with their mother who is a government employee in the State of Haryana and therefore, the allegation of the landlord that he requires the premises for his own occupation and for occupation of his family cannot be accepted. It is also contended that the landlord being in possession of tenanted premises is not entitled to seek eviction of the petitioners. It is further contended that since the landlord has failed to bring his case within the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the order of eviction passed against the petitioners on the ground that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation is without jurisdiction. In answer to these submissions, Mr. R.K. Battas, Advocate, counsel for the landlord has contended that in revisional jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Authorities below.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that there was sufficient material before the Authorities below to record a finding that the landlord not only has a desire to occupy the premises, but he actually needs the same and his need is genuine and reasonable. The Authorities under the Act have referred to each and every evidence, oral as well as documentary, to find that the landlord requires the premises for his own occupation and for occupation of his family. Nothing has been pointed out in the course of arguments as to how the appreciation of evidence by the Authorities below is improper. Landlord is a lecturer in the Punjabi University, Patiala, and is living in a rented room in Khalsa Mohalla, Patiala, which by any standard cannot be said to be sufficient and suitable for his requirement. The family of the landlord consists of his wife and two children. The wife of the landlord is employed on a transferable post in Haryana. The children of the landlord are putting up with their mother as the landlord is not in possession of sufficient and suitable accommodation. In my view, landlord is justified in saying that the studies of his children are suffering because of his wife’s frequent transfers. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in his desiring that his children should stay with him for their proper growth and education. Moreover, the house of the landlord in village Rahon, District Jalandhar, where his parents used to reside, has fallen down and with the death of his father, his mother is residing with him. In this view of the matter, no different view can be taken than the one taken by the Authorities below.
5. Counsel for the petitioners then contended that even if it is proved that the landlord requires the premises for his own occupation and for occupation of his family, then also he is not entitled to seek eviction of the petitioners as the eviction application is barred by principles of res-judicata. His contention is that the landlord had earlier filed two eviction applications on the ground of personal necessity and both were dismissed. In this regard, reference has been to judgments in Karam Chand s/o Nathu Ram v. Ram Parkash Watch Repairer, 1981(2) R.C.R. 299, Ghanisham Dass and Anr v. Sobha Singh, 1981(1) Rent Law Reporter 294, and S.K. Verma v. Smt. Kamla Kapur, 1981(2) Rent Law Reporter, 636. In the judgments referred to by the counsel, it has been held that second eviction application would not be maintainable unless there is a fresh cause of action. Petitioners have not produced the pleadings of the previous proceedings, but only judgment dated 20.10.1982, Ex. RX, has been placed on record. On reading of the judgment, I find that the eviction application of the landlord on the ground of personal necessity was dismissed as the Rent Controller found that the landlord is in occupation of one rented room and one other room in the house purchased from Kirpal Kaur in his own right and his wife being employed in government service is residing at Tohana in the Haryana State alongwith the children. The eviction application out of which the present revision petition has arisen was filed on 18.5.1987. The time gap between the first application for eviction and the present eviction application is nearly 6/6-1/2 years. There has been a vast change in circumstances during the period the first and second eviction applications came to be filed. The children of the landlord have grown in age and are now studying in higher classes. They require constant care and vigil by the father, particularly when their mother is a dental doctor in the service of Haryana Government and is on transferable job. During this period, father of the landlord has also died and now the landlord has the responsibility of looking after his aged mother. All these circumstances were nut present when the first eviction application was filed. Second application was dismissed in default on 21.9.1985. That order has not been placed on record. In absence of the order, it cannot be taken that the eviction application was dismissed in default under Order 9 Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure, and fresh application would be barred under Rule 9. Accordingly, I am of the view that since the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the present application are quite different than the one existing at the time when the first application was filed, the present eviction application is not barred either Under Section 11 or under Order 9 Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure.
6. There is also no merit in the contention of counsel for the petitioners that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction against the petitioners on the ground that the building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation in absence of plea by the landlord that he wants to carry out any building work in the premises in dispute at the instance of any local Authority. Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act provides that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. A Full Bench of this Court in Lalit Behari v. Sant Lal, (1974)76 P.L.R. 324, has held that under the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, the landlord can claim eviction of his tenant if he pleads that the building or rented land has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and it is not necessary for him to further plead or prove that the building is required for re-construction.
7. It is next contended by counsel for the petitioners that the portion in occupation of the petitioners is not a substantial part of the integrated larger building and so, if the portion not in occupation of the petitioners has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, eviction cannot be ordered from the portion in occupation of the petitioners. This contention too is without any merit. The plan produced on the record shows that the building is a compact one, consisting of three rooms and two verandahs. Rent Controller on the basis of evidence has found that it is an old building made of big size burnt brick laid in mud-morter with pointing of lime surkhi morter. All the rooms have a single roof made of wooden battons. The roof over the room in possession of the landlord has fallen down. In this view of the matter, no interference is called for in the findings recorded by the Authorities below.
8. In fairness to the counsel for the petitioners, it may be mentioned that the contention that both the grounds, i.e. bona-fide requirement of a residential building for personal use and occupation Under Section 13(3)(a)(iii) and the building has become unfit and unsafe Under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act are mutually exclusive and contradictory to each other, is not supported from the language of the statute. In a given case, landlord may bona-fide require the building for his own use and occupation after re-constructing it and at the same time (sic) of the grounds of ejectment may be that the building is unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Both pleas are not contradictory to each other.
9. Consequently, both the revision petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. However, the petitioners in both the revision petitions are allowed two months’s time to vacate the premises provided they deposit the entire arrears of rent including that of two months, within one month from today and also file an undertaking that they shall hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the landlord on or before the expiry of period allowed by this Court.