IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CR. REV. No.420 of 2008
RAM BACHAN PRASAD SON OF LALA PRASAD @ LALA YADAV, R/O-
VILLAGE DUMARI, P.S.- GHOSI, DISTRICT- JEHANABAD.
Versus
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR
2. UMESH SINGH, SON OF BALIRAM SINGH
3. NARESH SINGH, SON OF BALIRAM SINGH
4. SUNIL KUMAR @ SUNIL SINGH, SON OF UMESH SINGH
5. PASHUPATI SINGH SON OF UDBANSH SINGH
6. JITENDRA SINGH SON OF CHANDESHWAR SINGH
7. BAMESHWAR SINGH SON OF SURESH SINGH
ALL ABOVE RESIDENTS OF VILLAGE- DUMARI, P.S.- GHOSI,
DISTRICT- JEHANABAD.
For the petitioner : Mr. Umesh Kumar, Advocate
For the O.P. : Mr. Naresh Das, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Jharkhandi Upadhyay, APP
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3 24.09.2010 Petitioner is the injured (P.W. 4). He is aggrieved by
the judgment and order dated 15.3.2008 passed by learned Addl.
Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-II, Jehanabad in S.C. no. 8484 of 1999
whereby, on a consideration of the materials, the accuseds (O.P.
nos. 2 to 7) herein have been acquitted of the charge punishable
under Section 307 IPC. One of the accused was also acquitted of
the charge punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. He is
also aggrieved by the order passed under Section 235 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (for the short the Code) whereby the
convicts have been directed to be released on their entering into
a bond of Rs. 5,000/- with two sureties for a period of two years
for maintaining peace and good behaviour.
I have perused the reasonings assigned by learned
trial Court in paragraph 14 of the judgment impugned. It was held
that this P.W. 4 was not found to have received any fire arms
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injury as the injury report (Ext.1) did not disclose any such injury.
Considering the nature of injury sustained by the injured, a view
has been taken that no case under Section 307 IPC is made out.
Consequently, acquittal has been recorded under the aforesaid
Section. Since there was no injury found on P.W. 4 caused by fire
arm, the court below has also acquitted the accused of the
charge punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to
show any apparent illegality/impropriety in such consideration of
the matter by the learned trial court. In that view of the matter, the
first grievance of the petitioner is found to be erroneous and
misplaced.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits with
reference to Annexure-1 that opposite party nos. 2 and 3 namely
Umesh Singh and Pashupati Singh were earlier tried and
convicted for an offence punishable under Section 147 and 323
by judgment and order dated 31.5.1988 passed in Tr. No.
752/1988 (State versus Surajdeo Singh & Ors). It is contended
that wrong submission was made on behalf of the
convicts/opposite parties that the accuseds did not carry any
criminal antecedent and/or convicted on any occasion in the past.
Considering the materials brought on record, this
Court finds force in the said submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner.
After having heard the parties, and on a careful
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perusal of the judgment impugned, this Court is satisfied that the
impugned order cannot be interfered with so far as acquittal
recorded under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act
is/are concerned. Later part of the order dated 5.3.2008,
however, requires reconsideration in view of the facts brought on
record by learned counsel for the petitioner .
Consequently, the application is disposed of in the
following manner:
First part of the judgment impugned whereby the
opposite parties have been only found guilty of the minor sections
of the Indian Penal Code is/are concerned, the same does not
require any interference. So far later part of the order dated
5.3.2008 passed in terms of Section 235 of the Code is
concerned, the court below is required to have a fresh look
considering the materials on record which have been taken note
hereinabove. Consequently, that part of the order dated 5.3.2008
is quashed and set aside. Matter goes on remand to the learned
trial Court for passing a fresh order of sentence in terms of
Section 235 of the Code . The Court below shall be uninfluenced
by any observation made by this court in the present order.
( Kishore K. Mandal, J. )
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