JUDGMENT
A. K. Gohil, J.
1. Heard on I. A. No. 1892 of 2001 an application for taking a fixed date.
2. After a perusal of the file it is clear that in this case every time this court is giving fixed date. On August 3, 2000, learned senior counsel himself took the date August 16, 2000, thereafter on August 16, 2000, again Shri Abhyankar prayed for time and for a fixed date of September 8, 2000. On October 14, 2000, again adjournment was asked on the ground that learned senior counsel is busy before some other Bench and the case was adjourned and listed on November 7, 2000. On November 7, 2000, Shri Abhyankar again repeatedly prayed for an adjournment for January, 2001. On April 26, 2001, Shri Rahul Gupta took a fixed date of July 5, 2001, and again on July 5, 2001, Shri Abhyankar prayed for time. Today again he prayed for a fixed date. As clear from the record this criminal revision is pending since 1996 against the order passed by Additional C. J. M., Indore (Economic Offences Court), for quashing charge dated March 9, 1996. From the perusal of criminal complaint it is clear that the Union of India through the Income-tax Officer has filed this criminal complaint under section 276C, 276 read with Sections 278 and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with Sections 420 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, which is pending since March 29,1984. The petitioner has also earlier filed the petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, for quashing the complaint on similar grounds which was registered as M. Cr. C. No. 1470 of 1990 and was dismissed on January 13, 1993 (D. H. Secheron Electrodes P. Ltd. v. Union of India [1993] 204 ITR 824 (MP)). Therefore, from the order of this court dated January 13, 1993, it is clear that this court has already examined the similar grounds in a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case
that the criminal proceedings are pending since 1984 and the petitioner has already attempted in 1993, this petition against framing of charge has no merit and deserves to be dismissed. The petitioner cannot be permitted to keep such petition pending in the High Court for an endless period. The petitioner may cross-examine the witnesses of the complainant and can very well put their side of the case in cross-examination of the witnesses. The trial court has already framed the charge after appreciating the prima facie evidence against the petitioner accused person.
3. It is settled law that when there is a prima facie case against the accused at the time of framing of charge no interference should be made in revision as the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 401 should not be exercised except in exceptional cases where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or the order is otherwise invalid under the law. In this case the learned trial court while framing a charge has found prima facie case against the petitioner and has already considered this fact that the petitioner, Dinkar, was only a technical director and he was not in charge of the company’s affairs nor responsible at the relevant time and only thereafter the trial court has found that this is a pure question of fact which can only be decided finally after recording the evidence of the parties and has found that prima facie allegations are available against the petitioner for framing the charge. Therefore, in view of this settled position under the law that the High Court should not interfere with the finding of fact while deciding a revision and should not reassess the prima facie evidence, this should be left to the trial court for deciding after recording the evidence of the parties. Therefore, I do not think that the trial court has committed any illegality in framing the charge against the petitioner and, therefore, it would be proper for this court to allow the trial court to proceed against the applicant. This court has already examined the availability of the prima facie material on record against the applicant-accused in a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and directed M. Cr. C. No. 1470 of 1990 on January 13, 1993 (D. H. Secheron Electrodes P. Ltd. v. Union of India [1993] 204 ITR 824 (MP)), that this being a very old case the trial court to expedite the trial and if necessary to proceed in the matter on day-to-day basis and the parties are expected to co-operate in profluence of the proceedings which remained under hibernation on account of the order of restraint passed in this case and thereafter again a period of eight years have expired and the trial could not proceed, therefore, this revision is dismissed with a clear direction to the trial court to expedite the trial of the case as early as possible and to complete the same positively within six months. The trial court may also proceed, if necessary, on day-to-day basis in accordance with law.