JUDGMENT
Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J. and Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. This is an appeal from an order of an Hon’ble single Judge dated the 14.2.2006.
2. It is an order passed In a writ matter. The writ petition was filed by the tenant Bahuguna, who prayed therein for complete stoppage of all proceedings before the Judge Small Causes Court and the Rent Controller in regard to the appellant’s eviction in suit No. 6 of 1992 and two other cases related thereto being Nos. 94 of 1991 and 29 of 1992.
3. The brief facts are that the deceased father of the tenant one Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna was a tenant in the premises in question originally and the tenancy had commenced 60-70 years ago. The original tenant died on 16.3.1989 and his widow and the writ petitioner, being one of his surviving sons, continued to live In the tenanted premises.
4. On the basis of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the writ petitioner made an application before the Rent Controller for being declared as the heir ordinarily residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his death. A favourable order was obtained by him. If that order becomes confirmed, Bahuguna would be as unevictable as the original tenant himself.
5. The proceedings in regard to which the writ petition was filed related to the landlord’s claim for reentry on the basis of bona fide requirement for own use and occupation. Eviction was also claimed on the ground of default in payment of rent.
6. The Hon’ble single Judge has opined that if Bahuguna was residing with the deceased tenant, then on the basis of the Act of 1972 he became entitled to protection and no separate declaration was necessary. His Lordship has, however, further held that as the landlord’s proceedings were got stayed in the writ on the basis of an interim order passed on 23.10.1992, and the matter had not progressed at all for 14 years, the writ petitioner was guilty of an abuse of the process of the Court. His Lordship also opined that the premises consist of 8 rooms and two verandahs in a good locality in Allahabad and the rent of Rs. 150 per month is no rent. Relying on the Supreme Court case of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra. , His Lordship has exercised jurisdiction to enhance the rent in the writ involving a landlord and tenant, and His Lordship has raised the rent to Rs. 2,000 per month. It is further ordered that the rate of rent upto February, 2006, will be determined by the Rent Controller. Apart from this. His Lordship’s order has disposed of the proceedings in Case No. 94 of 1991.
7. Furthermore, His Lordship has imposed compensation of Rs. 75,000 to be paid by the writ petitioner to the landlord for holding up the proceedings so long. His Lordship has invoked a sort of parallel with Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits compensation to be awarded to defendants who are victims of wholly bad suits.
8. The order under appeal has two aspects,- one on facts and another on law. Facts relate to such things as old tenancy, low rent and an Increase of rent as a sort of quid pro quo for the tenant being allowed to stay on In the same premises. Legal points relate to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in pure landlord tenant disputes, the grant of compensation Invoking Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure or such some such principle akin thereto and of at all passing an order against the writ petitioner when the writ petitioner could have, but did not at any time, simply withdraw the writ and walk out of the Court. Such withdrawal is no longer possible as the respondent has obtained an order which Is in the nature of a successful counter claim.
9. The appeal has been resisted principally on a point of unappealability. We have set out the above facts because even a decision on a pure point of unappealability in a total vacuum without the facts and the issues under appeal does not give the reader complete satisfaction.
10. It is submitted that the order under appeal is unappealable on account of the language of Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules which governs these matters.
11. The whole of the Rule need not be set out but It suffices to state for our purposes that orders passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction by an Hon’ble single Judge are generally appealable to a Division Bench, but there are several exceptions. The exception with which we are concerned is that no appeal is allowed from a single Judge’s order passed under “Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award… of a Tribunal, Court or statutory Arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of Jurisdiction…”
12. The respondent takes the point that the single Judge’s order In this case Is in respect of Judgment and order of the Court of the Rent Controller, which Is purported to be made in the exercise of his jurisdiction.
13. The submission is that the words “purported to be made” indicate not merely an Improper assumption of jurisdiction but that in some cases, as here, it might also indicate futurity. It is said that ‘purported to be made’ can mean in appropriate circumstances ‘intended to be made.’ Thus, the order, decree or Judgment which might at any time be passed by the Rent Controller was the subject-matter of the writ which alleged that the proceedings before the Rent Controller were harassing and liable to be quashed and completely stayed. Thus all orders Intended to be made by the Rent Controller, today, tomorrow or may be at some distant or very distant future time were all the subject-matter of the writ. As such the appeal is as much barred as if the writ had been filed in respect of an order already passed by the Rent Controller.
14. For substantiating this meaning of the word ‘purported’, two authorities are referred to which are decisions given in regard to Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The words there relate to the Government or Government officers and their actions “purporting to be done” In discharge of their official duty. The two authorities no doubt lay down that ‘purporting to be done’ will also include actions threatened to be taken, i.e., actions in the future. The references are the case of Bait Nath Sardar AIR 1971 Cal 66 (specially paragraph 6) and the case of Union of India v. R. K. Binodo Singh and Ors. AIR 1970 Manipur 90.
15. We are of the opinion that the words ‘purported to be done1 can, In appropriate circumstances Include futurity. Apart from the two authorities given above, the Black’s Law Dictionary (Current Edition) states at page 1112 that the word ‘purport’ as a verb, can have the meaning “intending”. As such the phrase ‘purported to be made’ might mean ‘Intended to be made’. This second meaning of Intention, as additionally opposed to the meaning of mere appearance (as opposed to reality) is not to be found in respect of the word ‘purport’ in the more abbreviated editions of the Oxford Dictionary up to the concise edition, but the alternative meaning is given both in the shorter Oxford Dictionary and naturally in the Oxford Dictionary. It is stated there that this second meaning of intention, naturally in relation to the use of the word in ordinary language and literature is rare. But nonetheless it is mentioned that the word ‘purport’ can mean “that ‘which is intended to be done”.
16. As an example in a sentence of that- meaning, the following sentence is quoted : “What Matthew purports doing, I don’t know.”
17. On the basis of these authorities, therefore, which cover both the language and the law, the meaning of futurity is permitted. There are two other reasons both legal, we would opine so. The first reason that if a “writ in respect of a lower court’s judgment, which is intended to be passed next week or which has already been passed, is put in a separate compartment than an order which has not yet been passed but, in all likelihood is going to be passed today or tomorrow, then the distinction would be highly artificial and a senseless one. If the proceedings are harassing, and if a writ is maintainable to quash the harassing proceedings, then an order passed by an Hon’ble single Judge has the same characteristic whether the order relates to a lower court’s Judgment already passed, or whether it is to be passed next week, or whether it is to be passed at some uncertain future date. We would, there for, not like to rule in a manner, which brings In this artificial distinction.
18. The second reason is that the usual meaning of purported which relates to improper or incorrect assumption should not be the only meaning which we should ascribe to that word under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, in the quoted portion. If that were to be the single meaning, then the word practically lose all reason for its presence because the passing of orders in purported exercise of jurisdiction is already included in the rule. Accordingly an order ‘purported to be made in purported exercise of jurisdiction’ can either be a duplication of words or a tautology (which interpretation principles of construction do not usually permit) or else the word ‘purported’, in this combination of words at least, can refer to futurity and futurity alone.
19. As such the order under appeal comes within one of the prohibitions of Chapter VIII, Rule 5. The appeal is unmaintainable and is dismissed as such.