JUDGMENT
Arunabha Barua, J. (Chairperson)
1. Learned Advocate for the appellant is present. None has appeared for the respondents.
2. The matter relates to an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay for filing the present appeal.
3. The only point for consideration is whether sufficient reason have been ascribed for the delay and whether the reasons as shown by the applicant. Bank of India, are acceptable to the Tribunal to condone the delay and to admit the appeal.
4. The sequence of events that has allegedly led to the delay in filing the appeal may be summed up as follows:
The impugned order of the D.R.T., Ranchi was passed on 21st November, 2005 and the instant appeal was filed on 3rd February, 2006. In between the controlling office of the applicant-Bank as per their usual practice forwarded all papers and documents to the zonal office on 23rd December, 2005. Mr. Pradip Pal Choudhury was engaged by the zonal office as the Advocate to file and represent the case for the Bank in the appeal. The learned Advocate, Mr. Choudhury was unable to take effective steps for the purpose due to the Christmas vacation and only on 6th January, 2006 he could supply a draft memorandum of appeal to the zonal office of the Bank for their approval and on 10th January, 2006 the zonal office duly forwarded the said memo of appeal to the said controlling office, the said controlling office after due verification by the concerned Branch forwarded the said memo of appeal to its head office at Mumbai on 18th January, 2006 to obtain their approval, the head office accorded the approval on 27th January, 2006. On 30th January, 2006 the controlling office got the said approval and asked the concerned Branch Manager to visit Kolkata to comply with the necessary formalities concerning the filing of the appeal and the said Manager on 1st February, 2006 reached Kolkata and on the same date contacted Mr. Pal Choudhury, the learned Advocate, to file the appeal and the appeal was duly filed on 3rd February, 2006.
5. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the
petitioner that there was no inordinate delay in filing the appeal and the petitioner a being a nationalised Bank, a decision with regard to filing of the appeal had to be taken at different levels of administration and was to be duly approved at different official levels. It has further been submitted that the learned Advocate, Mr. Pradip Kr. Pal Choudhury had taken prompt steps, as far as practicable, so that no delay was occasioned in the process of filing the appeal so far as he was concerned, that the rest were official formalities and at no point of time the delay was intentional, far less with any ill motive. He has further submitted that the delay is sufficiently explained and that the same should be condoned so that the appeal can be heard out on merits and sufficient merits are there for success of this appeal.
6. Learned Advocate for the respondent has submitted in supporting the contention laid down in the affidavit-in-opposition that contrary facts have been spelt out, that the delay in the process as stated in the petition for condonation of delay could have been easily avoided and that it shows lack of promptitude on the part of the applicant-Bank to file the appeal within the period of limitation. He further submitted that the appellant-Bank is guilty of deliberate laches and that the delay should not be condoned and the appeal should be dismissed.
7. In support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the learned Advocate for the applicant has staled the celebrated judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Collector of Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji , and the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok A.O. .
8. Learned Advocate for the respondent has cited two judgments, one of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Sayed Mohd. Baquir El Edross and Anr. in Union of India v. Vishnu Agencies (P.) Ltd. .
9. Now, it is evident from the explanation afforded by the applicant that the delay was mainly occasioned in several stages of processing the files and papers verification, final approval, etc. in connection with this appeal by the administrative machinery of a public sector Bank the working of which is almost at par with that of a Government. The rest of the delay may be attributed to the inability of the learned Advocate for the Bank to take effective steps in the matter of filing of this appeal in time due to the Christmas holidays. Are these explanations adequate, satisfactory and acceptable for the purpose of condoning the delay?
10. The principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court provide the right answer. I believe, a few of them only laying down the natural principles and guidelines would suffice for our purpose in the context of the factual-situation of the matter at hand.
11. The oft-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (supra) might be the most important to begin with. The relevant portion of the said judgment of the Supreme Court runs as follows:
The Legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Court. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing the condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account
of its poser to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
12. Next, in G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer , it was held that the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and, generally, delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.
13. Next, in N. Bala Krishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy , it was held by the Supreme Court thus:
The condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of
the Court. Section 5 does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of
delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only
criterion. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is
not put forth for dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost
consideration to the suitor.
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Lastly, in State of Nagaland v. Lipok, A.O. (supra), the Supreme Court in appreciating that implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process, made the following observations:
It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay–intentional or otherwise–is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit.
15. The decisions referred to and discussed above, to my mind, unmistakably lean in favour of condonation of the delay the petitioner has prayed for. The decisions referred to and relied upon by the respondent do not apply. However, much the opposite party-respondents try to find loopholes in the whole period of the delay, the applicant-Bank has successfully plugged them to show that the so-called lapses were in no way deliberate or intentional but only a part of the usually time-consuming and routine administrative process the movements of files in the Banking, for that matter, Government departments, entail. So, a liberal approach has to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay in terms of the guidelines of the Supreme Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok A.O. (supra), as cited above.
16. Here in our instant case, I find that there is no deliberate delay as a matter of strategy, no laches or culpable negligence or ulterior motive on the part of the applicant-Bank praying for condonation of the delay. Furthermore, hearing both sides and deciding the case on merits is the essence of substantial justice and not nipping in bud the claim of the petitioner seeking justice, except for very grave reasons which, in this case, there is none.
17. Thus, taking a stock of the facts and circumstances and explanations as afforded by the applicant-Bank and duly mindful of the guidelines of the Supreme Court as referred to above, I am satisfied that there were “sufficient cause” for the petitioner for the delay in filing the appeal which, therefore, should be condoned.
18. Accordingly, the delay is condoned, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and the appeal admitted.
19. The respondents are directed to file affidavits-in-opposition to the memo of appeal within three weeks, reply thereto by appellant within two weeks thereafter. Liberty to mention thereafter after usual notices.