ORDER
G.K. Israni, Judicial Member
1. These six appeals by the assessees are directed against the separate but identical orders of the learned Deputy Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals), Akola Range, Akola, of even date (3-10-1988) in relation to the assessment year 1987-88. Since the six appeals raise an identical question and arise out of identical Appellate Orders, they are being disposed of by this consolidated order.
2. The solitary question involved in these appeals relates to the valuation of unquoted equity shares owned by the assessees of M/s. R.S. Rekhchand Mohota Spinning and Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and Shree Vinay Waste Reclamations Pvt. Ltd., Hinganghat. The two companies are other than investment companies and Managing Agency Companies.
3. The department has been valuing the shares of these companies in the hands of the assessees on the yield basis right up to the assessment year 1984-85. Earlier, the Wealth-tax Officer, disagreeing with the stand of the assessees valued these shares by the break-up method as laid down in rule ID of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957. On appeal the learned A.A.C. of Wealth-tax following the order dated 7-4-1982 of the Tribunal in W.T.A. Nos. 254, 255 & 256 (Nag.)/81, directed the shares to be valued by the yield method. The said order of the Tribunal was followed in subsequent years in the cases of these assessees and all those orders are the subject matter of reference before the Hon’ble High Court. For the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 the departmental appeals before the Tribunal were successful and the Tribunal, vide its order dated 24-6-1988, reversed the orders of the learned A.A.C. and directed that the aforesaid shares be valued by break-up method as given in rule ld. For the assessment year 1987-88, which is the year in question in the present appeals, the W.T.O. valued the said shares by a break-up value method. The first appeals have failed giving rise to the present appeals by the assessees.
4. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Departmental Representative were heard.
5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the assessees that the valuation of these shares on the yield basis had been consistently followed from very inception up to the assessment year 1984-85.
There was no justification for the Bench of the Tribunal which heard the second appeals for the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 to reopen a settled matter and take a view different from the one earlier taken by the Tribunal and direct the valuation of these shares by break-up value method. Elaborating his stand, the learned counsel for the assessees stated that the break-up value method could be appropriately applied only in a case where a company had ceased to be a going concern and was not showing any profits. In the case in hand although the two companies were not showing assessable profits, yet they were going concerns and had disclosed commercial and maintainable profits and there was, therefore, no justification for applying the break-up value method. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the assessees relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Mahadeo Jalan [1972] 86 ITR 621. In this connection, the learned counsel for the assessees also referred to the valuation of the shares of the two companies made by two different valuers, namely, .Shri K.C. Agrawal & Co., Chartered Accountants and Shri Shantilal Chandaliya & Co., Chartered Accountants. On the basis of the aforesaid rulingof the Supreme Court and these two valuation reports, the learned counsel for the assessees contended that the two companies in this case are shown to be going concerns who are showing commercial and maintainable profits and, therefore, their shares ought to have been valued by yield method. Since, according to the learned counsel for the assessees, the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the taxation matters, it is open to the present Bench to take a view different from the one taken in the immediately preceding decision of the Tribunal for the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 and direct the valuation of the shares on yield basis. Alternatively it was pleaded by the learned counsel for the assessees that in case the present Bench is not inclined to review the decision of the Bench dated 24-6-1988, it may recommend to the President of the Tribunal to constitute a larger Bench for resolving the issue. On this point reference was made to CIT v. L.G. Ramamurthi [1977] 110 ITR 453 (Mad.).
6. As against the above, it was argued by the learned Departmental Representative that rule ID of the Wealth-tax Rules is mandatory in nature as has been held by the Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal in the case of WTO v. Sheo Prosad Nopany [1986] 16 ITD 166. The second argument advanced on behalf of the department was that there is no warrant for taking a view different from the one taken by the Tribunal in the assessees’ own cases for the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87. For this purpose reliance was placed on the same ruling of the Madras High Court in L.G. Ramamurthi’s case (supra). As regards the mandatory nature of the rule ID, the learned counsel for the assessees countered the argument of the learned Departmental Representative by referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. Kusumben D. Mahadevia v. CWT [1980] 124 ITR 799.
7. Now, we have before us the order of the Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal in the assessees’ own cases for the immediately preceding assessment years, that is 1985-86 and 1986-87. In that order dated 24-6-1988, the Tribunal has upheld the contention of the department and directed the valuation of these shares by the break-up value method. In these circumstances, the first question which comes up for our consideration is as to whether it is open to this Bench of the Tribunal to take a view different from the one taken by the same Bench (although consisting of different Members) in the assessees’ own cases for earlier years. On this point we entertain no doubt that although there is no absolute legal bar to this Bench giving a different finding or recording a different conclusion, yet judicial discipline and institutional integrity require that such course of action should not be adopted where the set of facts are the same in relation to both the assessment periods. This takes us to the next question as to whether subsequent to the assessment year 1986-87 there has been material change in facts and circumstances so as to justify our taking a view different from the one earlier taken by the Bench of the Tribunal. On being questioned as to whether there has been such material change, the learned counsel for the assessees stated that although the material facts have continued to be the same, yet more and different material has since been produced before this Bench, and such production of material constitutes a change in the facts and circumstances so as to justify taking of a view different from the one earlier taken by the Bench. In this connection, the learned counsel for the assessees made a pointed reference to the two valuation reports filed by the Chartered Accountants firms of K.C. Agrawal & Co. and Shantilal Chandaliya & Co. The learned counsel for the assessees contended that since such valuation reports were not before the earlier Bench and since they have been submitted before the present Bench, such submission constitutes a change in facts and circumstances and provides a goods and valid basis for reviewing the earlier decision of the Bench. We have given our careful and anxious thought to this aspect of the matter, but find ourselves not persuaded to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the assessees. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the assessees that the facts and circumstances concerning the nature of the business of the two companies, the prospects of profitability and such other considerations have continued to be the same in relation to the assessment year 1987-88 and there has been no material change therein. Merely because the valuation reports produced before this Bench had not been offered for consideration by the earlier Bench, it cannot legitimately be concluded that there has been change in circumstances so as to provide a valid basis for this Bench to depart from the view taken by the earlier Bench. Moreover, from a perusal of the material made available before us, we find that even in relation to the assessment year 1987-88 the break-up value method would be an- appropriate and preferable method for valuing the shares of the two companies. The value put by one of the two valuers, who were of the assessees’ own choice, has differed very widely from that put by the other valuer, namely K.C. Agrawal & Co., Shri Shantilal Chandaliya & Co. valued the shares of R.S. Rekhchand Mohota Spinning & Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 67 per share and those of Shree Vinay Waste Reclamations Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 33 per share. As against this K.C. Agrawal has valued the same shares at Rs. 9.84 per share and Rs. 51.65 per share respectively. The value of these shares by the break-up value method is Rs. 273.89 and Rs. 148.90 respectively. These figures clearly demonstrate that in a case of the nature as the present one, the break-up value method could be the only appropriate method. The legislative intention of the provisions contained in Section 7(1) of the W.T. Act and the rules made thereunder, more particularly rule 1D is only to estimate the price of an asset which in the opinion of the Assessing Officer it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. In the case in hand, the difference between the value estimated by the break-up value method and that by yield method is so astronomical that it renders the yield method totally inappropriate. Besides this, such astronomical difference between the two values constitutes such exceptional circumstances as is referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo Jalan (supra). We, therefore, hold that on the basis of the facts established before us, no case has been made out for our taking a view different from the one taken by the earlier Bench in the assessees’ own cases for the assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87. In this view of the matter, these appeals by the assessees should fail.
8. In the result, we do not find any force in these appeals and dismiss the same.