JUDGMENT
Santosh Duggal, J.
(1) The petitioner, Gulab Tulsyani, a member of the Delhi Judicial Service, has challenged his prosecution for an offence under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short ‘the Act’) and section 161 of the Indian Penal Code vide criminal case No. 16/87 by means of this Criminal Misc. (Main) petition filed under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code . Besides raising questions of fact, he contends that the sanction recorded by the Administrator of Delhi for his prosecution in terms of section 6 of the Act, was invalid and without jurisdiction for the reason that there was no recommendation of the High Court of Delhi or consultation with the same before recording of the sanction and that in view of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, vesting absolute control in the High Court in respect to members of judicial service, the prosecution based on such a sanction was not sustainable, and liable to be quashed.
(2) The petitioner has appeared in person. He was informed that no questions of fact which constituted his defense or factual arguments could be entertained. He then submitted that he wants to confine himself, so far as this petition is concerned, to the validity of the sanction for prosecution, relying on various Judgments, particularly, , Tej Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (1).
(3) The matter has been heard for admission after notice. The entire stress by Mr. Tulsyani has been on the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution to the effect that control over the District Courts and courts subordinate thereto shall be vested in the High Courts of the State. He argued that the expression “control” envisages every aspect such as disciplinary, judicial and administrative and that the decision regarding his prosecution had also to be taken by the High Court of Delhi and in the absence of that, the Administrator of Delhi could not have sanctioned the prosecution, and that the order of sanction was without jurisdiction. He finally placed reliance on four Supreme Court judgments which are . the State of West Bengal and another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (2) , B. R. Guliani v. Punjab and Haryana High Court; (3) , State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand and others, (4) and . Tejpal Singh v. State of U.P.
(4) Mr. K. K. Bakshi appearing for the Slate, on the other hand, submitted that the criminal prosecution was a matter entirely different from the disciplinary proceedings and that all the judgments relied upon by Mr. Tulsyani have reference to disciplinary enquiries or departmental action such as suspension, withholding of increment, transfer, promotion etc.
(5) On a careful consideration of the issue, I am of my considered view that the contentions raised by Mr. Tulsyani are wholly misconceived. A plain reading of Article 235 of the Constitution would expose the error in his approach. Article 235 of the Constitution reads as under : “235.Control over subordinate courts-The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law”
(6) It is thus manifest that the matters within the exclusive control of the High Court have been illustrated as those being that of postings, promotion, grant of leave etc. The judgments relied upon by Mr. Tulsyani also related to matters of discipline and departmental action and there is not a single case relating to prosecution for criminal or special offences For instance, the case of Tej Pal Singh (supra) was that of pre-mature retirement where it was held that the Governor of the State could not have acted without the recommendation of the Full Court of the concerned High Court or at least the Administrative Committee thereof. Similarly in the case of Inder Prakash Anand (supra), the action-taken was that of compulsory retirement and the only point before the Court was as to whether it was tentamount to dismissal, removal from service or reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, and it was held that except for matters of appointment, including dismissal, removal and reduction in rank and the initial posting and initial promotion as District Judges, all other matters pertaining to the service conditions and administrative control of the judicial officers of the service of a State vested in the High Court.
(7) The case of Nripendra Nath Bagehi (supra) also arose out of the question of disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court and it was held that it was the High Court and not the Governor that could initiate and hold enquiries into the conduct of District Judges. So was the case of B. R. Guliani (supra) involving only the issue of disciplinary enquiry, against the members of subordinate judiciary, and jurisdiction in respect thereto.
(8) In none of these authorities the question of criminal prosecution arose for consideration. Article 235 in terms does not extend to such matters and they are confined only to matters of discipline, and the administrative control over District Judges and other members of subordinate judiciary. The prosecution or sanction for such a prosecution under the provisions of the Act is by Statute vested in the State Governments which for Union Territory of Delhi would be Administrator and the sanction in terms of section 6 of this Act is recorded in exercise of statutory functions. Otherwise also, the terms of clause (c) to sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Act are very clear and the authority competent to record sanction is the authority who is “competent to remove the government servant from his office”.
(9) This authority under Article 311, read with Article 239 of the Constitution, vested in the Administrator of Delhi, in so far as the Members of the Delhi Judicial Services are concerned. The sanction for prosecution of the petitioner in this case has been validly recorded by the Administrator and there is no conflict in the exercise of this power with the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution.
(10) I, therefore see no point in the contentions set forth by the petitioner, and accordingly dismiss the petition.