ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. One Leela Devi filed a petition under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). She was seeking eviction for her own need. According to her, she wanted to do some retail business. Her plea was that she is a landlady Under Section 23-J of the Act. This application was taken up by the Rent Controlling Authority. Leela Devi died. Thereafter, an application was filed by Hemant Kumar in which he took a plea that he be permitted to continue with the proceedings as the premises are required for the need of his son. This prayer was allowed by the Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority). This order was challenged in this Court by filing civil revision No. 98 of 1997. In this petition, it was observed that Hemant Kumar was not within his rights to claim eviction under Chapter III-A for the need of a person who was grandson of the original landlord. However, at the same time, in paras 7 and 8 following observations were made :
“From the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down in the case of Nabi Ahmed (supra), it is held that the legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need only. In the present case, need of legal representative is not substituted but the need of son of one of the legal representatives is sought to be substituting the cause of action. By way of amendment cause of action is not substituted for the need of legal representatives but that of the son of one of the legal representatives. Smt. Leela Devi could not have filed the application for the need of her son’s son. Therefore, the right which was not available to original landlady cannot be invoked by the legal representatives. Therefore, the amendment which was sought could not have been allowed.”
A perusal of the para 7 which has been reproduced above, indicates that this Court while deciding Civil Revision No. 98 of 1997 did observe that “the legal representatives can substitute the cause of action of their need only.” Armed with the aforesaid observations made by this Court, Hemantkumar filed an application in which he pleaded that he requires the premises for his own need. He also stated that he is a handicapped person and therefore, he would be a landlord as defined in Section 23-J(iv) of the Act. This application was pending. The Court below dismissed the main petition holding that no cause of action survives. It is against the above order, the present petition has been filed.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the very decision which was earlier relied upon by him when Civil Revision No. 98 of 1997 was decided. This decision is Nabi Ahmed v. Ramprakash Rastogi, 1989 MPRCJ 482. In the above case, R. C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that in the event of death of landlord, his legal representatives can seek amendment to be substituted as their own need as basis of cause of action. Position in this case is no different. Apart from the aforementioned decision, under somewhat similar circumstances, same view was expressed in Civil Revision No. 16 of 1996. In the above case, a suit was filed Under Section 12(1)(d) and (f) of the Act. The landlord was Mahavir. He died. Later on, his grandsons wanted to participate in the proceedings by filing an application under Order 6, Rule 17. This prayer was disallowed. This order was challenged. It was held that the death of the original landlord and the need of his grandsons would equally be covered by the term “subsequent event” as visualised by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711. After taking note of the arguments so raised following observations were made in para 7. –
“I am, however, of the view that the decision given by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Hasmat Rai (supra), squarely applies to the facts of this revision petition. As indicated above, the events which have taken place, i.e., the death of Mahavir and later conferment of right of ownership on Dinanath and Dharmendra Kumar do fall within the term “subsequent event”. As such, this revision is allowed. The petitioners/plaintiffs would be permitted to amend their plaint. The defendants would be permitted to file amended written statement. This is, however, subject to payment of costs.”
The aforesaid decision was subject-matter of Special Leave Petition bearing No. 10666/96. This Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 8th of May, 1996.
3. In view of the decision given in Nabi Ahmed and in Dinanath’s case referred to above, it can safely be said that a legal representative can pursue the matter even where the need which was originally mentioned was of the landlord who had died.
4. It may also be mentioned that the earlier decision given by this Court in C. R. No. 98/97 did not debar the present petitioner to seek relief. The question as to whether he can seek relief or not is left open. It was for this relief, he filed an application. That application was not disposed of. The main application was disposed of.
5. The application filed under Order 6, Rule 17 is pending. The R. C. A. would take notice of the decision referred to above and decide the matter in accordance with law. If the application is allowed, the petitioner would file a complete amended petition within a period of one week. The petitioner would furnish a copy of this order to the R.C.A. Proceedings be completed within a period of four months.
6. Before parting with this order, the decisions referred by the learned counsel for the respondent be noticed. These are : AIR 1973 SC 2110 and 1996 MPWN-II 38. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the right based on bona fide need is personal to the landlord and this would come to an end on his death. I am of the opinion that in view of the decisions given by this Court in Nabi Ahmed and Dinanath’s cases which decision was approved by the Supreme Court of India, the legal heirs can continue with the proceedings. It be seen that the only advantage the legal heirs would get is that they would be saved of initiating fresh proceedings. This is the only benefit which they have. Otherwise, they have to establish :
(i) that he is a handicapped person;
(ii) that his need is bona fide.
I am of the opinion that the R.C.A. did not consider the above aspects of the matter. This petition is accordingly allowed. Petitioner would be entitled to costs. Costs Rs. 500/-.
The parties to appear before the R.C.A. on 10th of November, 1997.